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2ABSTRACT
The IPO market provides owners of firms and entrepreneurs wit^ an exit 
for their equity investments and the opportunity to raise new capital. One 
empirical measure of how good a job the stock market has done for issuing 
firms over time is IPO underpricing. Yet, nothing is known about underpricing in 
Britain, nor, with one exception, about underpricing anywhere else before 1959. 
This thesis presents a new long-run IPO data set and analyses the change in 
underpricing over time. Contrary to my prior expectation and despite 
improvements in the regulation, disclosure, investor protection and underwriting 
of IPOs, underpricing rises in the second half of the century compared to the 
interwar years. This rise cannot be explained by any composition effect in the 
IPO sample or change in issue method.
Plausible explanations for this puzzle include the rise of issuing house 
monopsonistic power, provincial competition, the exacerbation of a winner’s 
curse and the resort to underpricing as an anti-takeover strategy in the second 
half of the last century. The thesis looks at the first of these possibilities and 
concludes that whilst reputable issuing houses appeared to neither lower nor 
exacerbate underpricing, they collectively failed to recommend the highly 
effective method of the tender offer to their corporate clients. The remaining 
hypotheses are to be researched in post-doctoral work.
The thesis also examines how IPO underpricing and survival behaved 
during the two episodes of investor exuberance about technology stocks in 
Britain in the last century, the 1920s and 1990s. The jump in underpricing of 
“technology” IPOs in 1928-29 was as nothing to that witnessed in 1999-2000. 
On the other hand, survival of the 1999-2000 IPOs was much improved 
compared to the earlier period.
Whilst the underpricing findings suggest that industry was not at all badly 
treated by the London stock market in the interwar years and was leaving small 
amounts of “money on the table” compared to thereafter, the survival evidence 
indicates the opposite to be true. A market such as that in 1928-29 where IPOs 
had less than a 50% chance of surviving to their fifth birthday as a quoted 
company was unacceptable.
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6Abbreviations:
AHC: Accepting Houses Committee 
BVP: Book value to offer price 
IPO: initial public offering
ICAEW: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
IHA: Issuing Houses Association 
IHYB: Issuing Houses Year Book 
LSE: London Stock Exchange
LSE Rules: Rules and Regulations of the London Stock Exchange
NASDAQ: National Association of Securities Dealers
NAV: net asset value
PSE: Provincial Stock Exchange
SEO: Secondary Equity Offering
SXYB: Stock Exchange Year Book
USM: Unlisted Securities Market
Glossary:
Book-building: the process of managing an IPO prior to actual issue which 
allows the investment bank considerable discretion in deciding both the issue 
price and the allocation of shares to investors, in particular, to informed and 
regular buyers of IPOs.
Book value: PosMPO pro forma net tangible assets attributable to voting 
shareholders.
Hot IPO market a period during which IPO initial returns rise above the long­
term average.
IPO cycle: the excess volatility in IPO volume after controlling for the corporate 
sector’s demand for equity finance as determined by the business cycle.
Long-run underperformance: this is the return on an IPO from the closing price 
on the first day over the following 3 to 5 years having corrected for the market 
return and for other systematic risk factors such as firm size and book-value-to- 
price (BVP).
Marketability, the number of shares offered at IPO as a proportion of the total 
number of shares outstanding post-IPO.
7New money, money raised by the sale of primary shares issued by the 
company.
Offer (or issue) price: the fixed price at which shares are offered to investors as 
published in the prospectus prior to trading.
Offer for Sale: the offer of shares to the public by way of prospectus at a fixed 
price by an issuing house or broker who has first bought the shares from the 
issuing firm.
Public Issues: an issue of shares by prospectus directly by the issuing company 
to the public at a fixed price sponsored by an issuing house or broker. The 
issue is usually underwritten.
Placing: an issue whereby a firm first issues shares to an issuing house or 
broker and those shares are then placed with a restricted number of investors 
on condition of a listing being approved by the Stock Exchange and prior to the 
shares beginning trading in the market. Sometimes placings are on a “best 
efforts” basis in which case the issuing house or broker does not first buy the 
shares from the issuing firm and there is no commitment of capital to 
“underwriting” the IPO.
Primary shares: new shares issued by the firm and sold at IPO.
R&D intensity the ratio of research and development to sales
Share-pushing: a small group of investors attempt to create a false market in a 
share by controlling its ownership and trading in order to push up its price and 
to realise a quick gain.
Spinning: the practice of an investment bank securing the agreement of a CEO 
to their handling of his firm’s IPO and to their underpricing it in return for the 
bank offering shares in subsequent underpriced IPOs to the CEO.
Stagging: the making of multiple applications for and the subscription of shares 
in an IPO with the sole intention of securing short-term profits by selling out as 
soon as the shares begin trading.
Strike Price: the price at which shares in a tender offer are sold to investors who 
have successfully tendered for the shares offered.
Survival rates: the proportion of IPOs in a given year which are not delisted from 
the stock market for reasons, other than merger or acquisition, in the 5 to 10 
years following the IPO.
Survival time: the number of months a firm remains listed over the 5 or 10 years 
following the IPO.
Tender offers: investors are invited to bid for the amount of shares they wish to 
buy and to indicate the price at which they will purchase above a minimum price 
set by the issuing house; the issuing house then decides the strike price at the 
close of the bidding process which clears all the shares offered.
Tombstone announcement is an announcement usually placed in a newspaper 
of the details of a forthcoming IPO which includes a listing of the investment 
bankers underwriting the issue. See Carter and Manaster (1990), p. 1054.
Underpricing (or First-day returns): the percentage change between the offer 
price and the closing price on the first day of trading. On average this change is 
positive across all IPOs and is indicative of a firm being undervalued at the offer 
price relative to the valuation placed on it by the stock market.
Underwriting: is the contractual obligation entered into by an issuing house or 
stock broker to buy at an agreed price, usually the offer price less an 
underwriting commission, any shares not subscribed by investors in the IPO. I 
have extended the definition to include placings where the issuing house or 
broker is effectively committing its capital to the transaction by first purchasing 
shares from the issuing firm.
Under/Oversubscription: if the number of shares subscribed for by investors 
exceeds the number offered, the IPO is “oversubscribed”; if the number 
subscribed is less than the number offered, the IPO is “undersubscribed”.
Vendor shares: existing shares sold by pre-IPO shareholders at IPO.
9CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) constitutes an important event in the life of a 
firm when it obtains a listing on a stock exchange by selling its shares to outside 
investors.1 The stock market plays a vital role in providing both risk capital and 
an exit for entrepreneurs and family owners as well as in facilitating an efficient 
takeover market to discipline underperforming firms. The latter function has 
received substantial attention in the empirical literature.2 This thesis deals with 
the terms on which risk capital could be raised and an exit provided for private 
owners when firms chose to go public on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
over the majority of the last century. It is not in itself intended as a history of the 
LSE.3
Relative to GDP, Britain possessed the next most important stock market 
in the world at the beginning the 20th century.4 It has been estimated that the 
paid-up value of securities listed on the LSE in 1914 was £10.7 billion, or 
approximately one-third of the global total.5 Britain is also one of only 11 
national stock markets out of 39 around the world which operated continually 
through the 20th century free from disruption caused by wars or political crises.6 
I consider how firms were treated by the British stock market by assembling a 
new data set of IPOs of ordinary shares on the LSE over the 20th century. I 
evaluate the market’s informational efficiency by first and foremost using the 
empirical measure of IPO underpricing and secondarily by looking at IPO 
survival. Underpricing refers to the positive return of an IPO defined by the rise 
in share price at the end of the first day of trading over the offer price. The 
greater is this return, the more money issuing firms have “left on the table”. IPO 
survival is measured by the proportion of newly listed firms which are still
1 “IPO" is originally US terminology which has become standard. “New issue” has traditionally 
been used in Britain, employ the term IPO most of the time.
2 See Morris (1998) for a summary of the evidence for and against the efficiency of takeovers 
and Hannah (1974) for a commentary on the interwar takeover market.
3 Among the various histories of the LSE, the most comprehensive and up to date is Michie 
(2001), which gives a detailed account of the development of the LSE from its origins up to the 
present. Neal (1990) provides a more quantitative historical account of the development of the 
market for securities in London from the late 17th century up until the early 1 9 h century in 
comparison with the Amsterdam market.
4 Rajan and Zingales (2003), p.15, Table 3. On this measure the British stock market was more 
than two and a half times as significant as the US. The most important was Cuba!
5 Davis and Neal (1998), p.40
6 Jorion and Goetzmann (1999), p. 962-963, Table I. The stock returns date from the 1920s and 
do not cover the whole of the last century.
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trading on the market 5 or 10 years later, or alternatively, the length of time a 
firm survives within a similar period of time.
IPO underpricing in Britain averaged 29.1% between 1991 and 2002 and 
reached 88.7% during the internet-related IPO bubble of 1999.7 From 1959 
until 2001 it has averaged 17.4%.8 The first question my thesis addresses is 
what happened to underpricing before 1959. In the early part of the last century 
in Britain, audited accounts were of little informational value to shareholders, 
investors were largely unprotected, IPOs were not underwritten by reputable 
banks and management and their advisers could shelter behind the principle of 
caveat emptor. This situation began to improve thanks to statutory legislation 
beginning with the 1948 Companies Act and to both the LSE strengthening its 
Rules and Regulations (“LSE Rules”) and the London merchant banks 
committing themselves to IPO underwriting in the second half of the century. 
Therefore, the second question addressed by my thesis is whether firms 
seeking a listing should have benefited from improvements in disclosure, 
regulation, investor protection and in the underwriting process. If this is indeed 
the case, I would expect underpricing to decline over the second half of the last 
century other things being equal. Alternatively, it is possible that despite these 
improvements, other institutional developments in the stock market have 
prevented firms from fully benefiting to the extent expected.
I am also interested in the stock market’s treatment of technology or 
innovative firms, given their importance to long-run industrial performance. 
Innovation is defined by either research and development (R&D) or patent- 
intensity. Given their short track record, lack of near-term cash flows and of 
tangible asset collateral, R&D-intensive firms find it difficult to raise external 
debt finance and as a consequence are dependent upon raising external equity 
once their own financial resources are exhausted.9 Given that early twentieth 
century Britain had already committed itself to a stock market-based financial 
system, a well-functioning IPO market was vital to the success of R&D-intensive 
firms. However, IPOs of R&D-intensive firms are particularly vulnerable to 
asymmetric information problems between a firm’s managers and outside 
shareholders. Hence, a third question I examine is how well the IPO market
7 Ljungqvist (2003), Table 1, p.38
8 Ritter (2003), Table 1, p.423-4
9 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.765, refers to firms with “intangible assets”; Goodacre and Tonks 
(1995)
handled these types of firms during the technology bubbles of the 1920s and 
1990s, both in terms of underpricing and survival.
Even less is known about survival rates or long-run performance in Britain 
than underpricing, outside of a handful of studies in the 1920s and in the 1980s. 
Given the enormous data gathering effort required for IPO survival as well as 
underpricing analysis, I have chosen to concentrate largely on the underpricing 
question. However, I do examine IPO survival during the 1920s and the 1990s 
as well as in the first half of the last century. The ability to price IPOs as 
accurately as possible is important in providing the correct incentives to 
managers, entrepreneurs and family owners looking to sell equity in their firms. 
It is also important that outside investors are presented with firms which at the 
time of IPO have reasonable prospects of surviving as a viable public company 
and not being delisted within a few years. A record of only 1 in 2 IPOs making it 
to their fifth birthday as a public company, as was the case in 1928-29, may be 
acceptable to an experienced venture capital investor with board representation 
and full access to financials but it is unacceptable to quoted equity investors.
Mayer (1988) has argued that equity issues, both IPOs and SEOs10, are 
not that important a component of the financing needs of industry. His 
international study of corporate finance between 1970 and 1987 concluded that 
the stock market was distinctly unimportant in the financing of industrial 
investment between 1970 and 1987.11 In aggregate, industry was able to 
finance itself fully through retentions. Such a view fails to acknowledge that 
equity finance is important for firms operating in R&D-intensive and fast-moving 
industries.12 In addition, the stock market is more than just a capital raising 
vehicle. It has importance as a market for corporate control. A consequence of 
achieving the status of a public company is that the takeover mechanism acts 
as a discipline on poorly performing managers, albeit an imperfect one. A 
listing also enables owners and entrepreneurs to realise and diversify the 
wealth locked up in their business. Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) have 
documented the decline of the family business and the spread of ownership and
10 I use “Seasoned Equity Offering” (SEO) when referring to follow-on equity issues by a listed 
firm. In Britain such issues were called “further issues” and then became known as “rights 
issues” after 1945 when pre-emption rights were established.
11 Mayer (1988), Figure 2, “Net financing of private physical investment by enterprises in 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA”.
12 Carlin and Mayer (2003)
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control in Britain over the last century. If the costs of going public, including 
underpricing, are unattractive, fewer firms will take that important first step.
This study addresses two important gaps in the literature. Firstly, this 
thesis contributes a long-run study of stock market efficiency as benchmarked 
by IPO underpricing in the second major stock market of the last century after 
the US. Previous long-run empirical studies of the IPO market are US-centric. 
With a single exception, empirical studies of underpricing only go back to 1959.
Secondly, this thesis is intended to contribute to the capital market failure 
debate in British economic history of the last century. Ever since the publication 
of the Macmillan Report in 1931 banks have received varying amounts of 
criticism over their inability to provide sufficient risk capital to industry. Kennedy 
(1987) and Bowden and Higgins (2004) claimed that by the early twentieth 
century Britain was already a stock market-oriented system but the institutions 
underlying this system were as yet insufficiently developed. According to the 
latter authors, detailed research on the “links between stock markets and 
individual companies are a sadly neglected research area”.13 The data set itself 
and the accompanying analysis of the performance of the IPO market are 
contributions to this need. My analysis of the IPO market enables me to take a 
fresh look at certain aspects of capital market failure, specifically, whether there 
was a lack of support from the City’s most reputable issuing houses, and 
whether there was a specific problem with the financing of innovative firms.
In the rest of this introductory chapter, I first review the empirical finance 
literature on IPOs and then the historiography of British capital market failure. 
Before doing so, a word of explanation about the choice of end and start dates 
is required. The start date of 1915 is determined by the lack of published share 
price information on IPOs before this date. The end date of 1986 is chosen to 
reflect the impact of “Big Bang” on the IPO market and applies to the majority of 
the analysis which follows.14 Big Bang which occurred on October 27th 
represented a major deregulation of the LSE and comprised four main 
elements, the ending of fixed brokerage commissions, the opening up of LSE 
membership to foreign firms, the removal of “dual capacity” or the distinction
13 Bowden and Higgins (2004), p.401. This quotation refers to the authors’ desire that more 
research be undertaken on the role of institutional investors in the governance of quoted 
companies. IPOs are but the first step down this road for a firm going public.
14 The exception is chapter 6, which analyses underpricing and survival between 1995 and 
2000.
between stock broking and stock jobbing, and the introduction of computerised 
share trading.15 Deregulation on this scale injected a long overdue dose of 
competition into securities business in the Square Mile including the handling of 
IPOs.
1.1 IPO stylised facts
(i) Empirical Studies
The empirical finance literature has concentrated on three stylised facts or 
alleged anomalies relating to IPOs, namely, underpricing, long-run 
underperformance and the IPO cycle.16 Whilst underpricing points to firms 
“leaving money on the table” at the time of listing, long-run underperformance 
refers to IPOs on average having a share price performance significantly worse 
than that of a peer group over the 3 to 5 years following the IPO. The IPO cycle 
is defined as the fluctuation in IPO volume in excess of that explained by the 
business cycle. I do not deal with the IPO cycle further in my thesis. The 
empirical work on both underpricing and long-run underperformance and 
survival is very US-centric.
Underpricing is usually defined in modem empirical studies as the 
percentage change in price between the offer price as published in the 
prospectus and the first day’s closing price. I use underpricing and (positive) 
first-day returns interchangeably. The return period can be longer in less liquid 
markets where excess returns can persist beyond the first day. For 
underpricing periods longer than one day, adjustment is made for the market 
movement. The underpricing implies that the owners of the listing firm have 
offered equity to outside investors at below its fair value. Long-run 
underperformance is the total share price return of an IPO after the first-day 
over the subsequent 3, 4, or 5 years. It can be expressed as a raw return, as 
the return relative to that on the market, or as the return relative to a matched 
sample of firms with similar risk attributes, primarily firm size and valuation. 
Survival rate is defined as the proportion of IPOs which are not delisted from a
15 Investors Chronicle, 13 June 1986, p.16-17, “Glossary of Big Bang Speak”.
16 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist (2004) give 
excellent and concise overviews of the literature.
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stock market for poor performance, as opposed to merger, within a defined 
period of up to 10 years. Survival time is similarly the length of time in days or 
months up to the event of delisting with censoring taking place at 5 or 10 years 
after IPO.
Empirical evidence conclusively points to the persistence of underpricing 
over time and across countries. The existence of underpricing has been 
confirmed in over 30 countries varying from low single digits to over 200% in the 
case of an emerging market such as China.17 The US IPO market has 
exhibited a similar level of average underpricing (18.4%) between 1960 and 
2001 to that of Britain over the same period.18 In both countries, this average 
surged at the very end of the century to over 60% during the dotcom bubble of 
1999-2000.19 With the exception of two small German IPO studies of the pre- 
1914 period which both uncovered underpricing20, there has been no study 
anywhere prior to 1959. “Hot” IPO markets, defined by periods of above 
average underpricing, have been identified by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter 
(1984) and by the recent studies of the late 1990s.21
Long-run underperformance is the most hotly disputed of the three stylised 
facts. A number of empirical studies did not find any long-run 
underperformance.22 Loughran and Ritter (1995) estimated the long-run 
underperformance of US IPOs between 1970 and 1990 over 3 to 5 year periods 
post-IPO at 20 to 30% below the market return. This result has been 
challenged by Brav and Gompers (1997) who claim that such 
underperformance disappears when judged relative to a quoted peer group 
matched on market capitalisation and book value to offer price (BVP). Gompers 
and Lerner (2001) also found that US IPOs between 1935 and 1972 did not 
suffer any underperformance when similarly estimated.
The estimation of long-run performance is dependent upon the availability 
of a Fama-French factor model for the British stock market in the first half of the 
last century as well as considerable data collection on capital and dividend
17 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) Table 2.1, p.38.
18 Ritter (2003), Table 1, p.423-24. It is not clear where his data for the 1990s come from.
19 Ljungqvist (2003); Loughran and Ritter (2004).
20 Schlag and Wodrich (2000); Fohlin (2000).
21 For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Ofek and Richardson (2001).
22 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) Table 2.2, p.55. If the Brav and Gompers (1997) and the 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) studies are included the figure rises to 9.
payment histories of quoted firms post-IPO.23 Whilst survival rates do not give 
the full picture, they do give a sense of the downside of investing in IPOs and 
their estimation is less demanding in terms of data requirements. Fama and 
French (2004) have produced the only major long-run study of survival rates 
over a 10 year period for US IPOs and SEOs between 1973 and 2001. They 
found that IPO survival rates in contrast to SEO survival rates fell sharply 
through the period.
There have been relatively few empirical studies of British IPOs compared 
with the US. Table 1-1 provides a summary of the main studies. The vast 
majority of studies looked at underpricing. All of them cover relatively short time 
periods. Underpricing was confirmed by all the studies listed. There have been 
very few studies of long-run underperformance or survival in Britain. Harris 
(1933), following an earlier anonymous article in the Economic Journal,24 
examined the long-run underperformance of the 1928 IPO cohort over a period 
to April 1933 and estimated a fall of 47%. This estimated return excluded 
dividends and other capital changes, was not relative to any benchmark and 
only included the 1928 IPO cohort. Andrews (1937) looked at IPO survival 
rates between 1919 and 1932 and found that they deteriorated markedly 
towards the end of the 1920s. The most carefully conducted study to date is by 
Levis (1993) and claimed long-run underperformance between 1980 and 1988 
over a 3 year holding period of between 8 and 23% depending upon the chosen 
UK equity benchmark.
Summarising, underpricing is a widely encountered phenomenon in stock 
markets around the world, including Britain. With one exception nothing is 
known about underpricing before 1959. Long-run underperformance is disputed 
in the literature on US IPOs. Relatively little has been written about IPO 
survival which will be a secondary focus of this thesis after underpricing. I next 
discuss the literature on underpricing theory.
(ii) Underpricing theories
Explanations for IPO underpricing can be grouped into those based on 
asymmetric information theory, on agency problems and on “institutional”
23 Any estimation of long-run IPO performance needs to control for these factors.
24 Economic Journal No.164 vol. 41, p.577-83, “The results of the 1928 new issue boom”.
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explanations.25 Asymmetric information exists when participants in the IPO 
market do not possess the same information. Agency problems arise when the 
interests of participants are not aligned and the resulting behaviour leads to 
second best outcomes. Asymmetric information theories of underpricing 
include those relating to the winner’s curse, ex ante uncertainty, certification, 
signalling, and information revelation. Theories based on agency problems 
include the realignment of incentives hypothesis between inside and outside 
shareholders and the ownership and control hypothesis. Institutional 
explanations of underpricing are the legal liability hypothesis and the price 
support hypothesis.
Information gaps can exist between the issuing firm and investors, 
between informed and uninformed investors, and between the investment bank 
and the issuing firm. Informed investors are assumed to have some ability to 
analyse and assess the fair value of an issuing firm more accurately than 
uninformed investors. Investor heterogeneity describes the existence of 
information gaps between informed and uninformed investors. Rock (1986) 
analysed this particular information asymmetry in the case of IPOs. His 
“winner’s curse” hypothesis stated that informed investors have the analytical 
ability to pick underpriced IPOs and earn excess profits. On the other hand, 
uninformed investors cannot recognise a good quality IPO and are squeezed 
out of these underpriced issues, whilst their applications for the poor quality or 
overpriced issues are met in full. Consequently, average underpricing across 
the universe of IPOs is necessary for uninformed investors to be able to break 
even and prevent them withdrawing from the IPO market.26
The ability to test empirically Rock’s hypothesis is crucially dependent 
upon the availability of detailed share allocation data and the identification of 
informed versus uninformed investors at the time of IPO. There have been 
several empirical studies confirming Rock’s hypothesis, among them Koh and 
Walter (1989), Levis (1990) and Keloharju (1993). Levis (1993) studied British 
IPOs between 1985 and 1988 and concluded that the winner’s curse partially
25 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), ch. 3-5.
26 In fact, as Ljungqvist (2004), p.11 footnote 3, points out, it is not necessary to assume that the 
market participation of uninformed investors must at all costs be maintained in order to obtain 
this result. A situation in which the uninformed are driven out by the informed is not a stable 
equilibrium since there will be incentives in such circumstances for investors to free ride. 
Similarly, a position where only the uninformed participate is equally unstable since the returns 
to those possessing private information will be considerable.
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accounted for underpricing. Whilst data on shareholdings and shareholder 
identities just after an IPO are available from shareholder registers, a test of the 
winner’s curse involves another substantial data collection exercise and, as 
such, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Both Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) extended Rock’s original 
hypothesis to test whether there was a positive relationship between IPOs 
characterised by higher risk, defined as ex ante uncertainty, and greater 
underpricing. This theory focuses on the information gaps between both types 
of investor and the issuing firm. The greater the ex ante uncertainty of a firm, 
or, in other words, the riskier it is, the more difficulty outside investors have in 
judging whether or not it is a “lemon”. Even informed investors have greater 
difficulty in assessing the intrinsic value of an IPO the more risky it is. Rather 
like an option, the more risky or volatile is an underlying asset, the more 
valuable is the option. In this case, the opportunity or option to apply for IPO 
shares becomes more valuable, the riskier is the firm seeking the listing and the 
more worthwhile therefore it is for informed investors to do research.27 These 
investors then require higher underpricing as compensation for the extra 
research effort expended and, accordingly, uninformed investors require higher 
average underpricing in order to cope with the larger winner’s curse which 
results.
An important source of ex ante uncertainty is firm risk that can be proxied 
by firm age, firm size, and firm valuation. Empirical tests by Ritter (1984) and 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) have lent support to this hypothesis. R&D-intensity can 
be seen as another dimension of firm risk. A further source of ex ante 
uncertainty is industry risk. IPOs in natural resource and technology industries 
that possess uncertain cash flows and few tangible assets are inherently more 
risky than IPOs in mature industries with plenty of asset-backing and stable 
cash flows. The latter type of firm should exhibit lower underpricing on average 
other things being equal. Technology IPOs in the US have exhibited higher 
underpricing since 1980 than the rest of the US IPO market, particularly in 
1999-2OOO.20
One solution to the problem of ex ante uncertainty is certification. An 
issuing firm can minimise underpricing by hiring the services of an investment
27 Ljungqvist (2003), p.15.
28 Loughran and Ritter (2004).
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bank as underwriter in order to “certify” their quality to potential investors. The 
better the reputation of the investment bank the greater the desired effect on 
underpricing. Empirical evidence in this area is again US-centric. An important 
study by Carter and Manaster (1990) concluded that high quality issuing firms 
choose “prestige” underwriters and that underpricing is more evident in IPOs 
underwritten by “fringe” banks. There have been a few British studies in this 
area but none of this type. Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) found that 
there was a considerable variation in both the mean and dispersion of 
underpricing across advisers on IPOs between 1959 and 1963.29 The authors 
did not test the significance of these differences across some measure of 
adviser reputation.
Certification can also be achieved by employing reputable accountants.30 
At least as important as accountant reputation are the listing requirements of a 
stock exchange which help investors to judge the quality of an issuing firm by 
imposing minimum levels of financial and business disclosure. In a study by 
Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller, and Reilly (1993), underpricing was found to be 
significantly lower on those US exchanges imposing stricter disclosure 
requirements on newly listed firms. Simon (1989) also reported a favourable 
impact of tighter disclosure laws on long-run performance of US IPOs on 
regional US stock exchanges after the 1933 Securities Act. The impact on 
underpricing was not examined. In the UK, Buckland and Davis (1989) found 
that prospectus disclosure had a significant effect on the underpricing of 
Unlisted Securities Market (USM) IPOs in the early 1980s.31
Another solution to the problem of information gaps between firms and 
investors is for a firm going public to signal its quality to outside investors. 
Signalling theories of IPO underpricing are based on the same underlying 
assumption that a firm knows its fair value better than outside investors.32 The 
central claim is that high quality issuing firms have a better idea than the market 
of their intrinsic value and are happy to signal that quality to the investment 
community by underpricing their IPOs because they have plenty of subsequent 
opportunity when the investment community becomes better informed about
29 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), ch.9.
30 Titman and Trueman (1986).
31 The authors consider two variables, “precise profits history” and “definite forecast” in Table 6, 
P -2 1 7 -
2 Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) have each put 
forward a signalling model for IPOs.
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their true value to make further issues (SEOs) at valuations closer to fair value. 
Low quality firms cannot afford to follow this strategy. In general, the empirical 
evidence has not been favourable for the predictions of signalling theory.33 The 
proportion of IPO firms that returned to the equity market for follow-on financing 
within a few years was not that large. Additionally, these firms did not 
experience higher underpricing than those that did not return to the market. 
Jenkinson (1990) found little support for signalling in Britain. Only 9% of IPOs 
between 1985 and 1988 in Britain returned to the market to make further issues 
and these firms had been underpriced at IPO by only 8% compared to 12% for 
the whole sample.
Last among our list of explanations of IPO underpricing based on 
information gaps are information revelation theories which assume a book- 
building method of issue. Whilst this theory is not directly relevant to the fixed 
offer price regime of twentieth century Britain, it does offer an informative 
contrast. Under a book-building process, the investment bank first indicates an 
offer price range and then pre-markets the IPO to investors. Based on investor 
feedback, the issue price and share allocations are then decided and 
knowledgeable investors with large applications and well-established clients 
receive preferential allocations. Beneviste and Spindt (1989) revised Rock’s 
model to take account of the dynamics of this information gathering process. 
The ability of the underwriter to reward informed investors with higher 
allocations of high quality IPOs in return for revealing their private information 
about the prospects for a forthcoming IPO should lower underpricing.
The advent of book-building, first in the US and then globally, including the 
UK, has spawned a large volume of research on the subject.34 In one of the few 
international empirical studies, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) 
estimated that by 1999 80% of non-US IPOs were launched by book-building 
and found empirical evidence of lower underpricing in cases of book-building 
across 61 non-US markets in the 1990s. This result was dependent upon the 
role played by US investment banks whose participation fulfils two necessary 
pre-conditions for book-building to be beneficial to issuers. One is access to 
informed US investors possessing private information valuable to the issuing
33 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), p.82-86.
34 ibid., Table 3.6, p.100-103.
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firm and the second was a strong IPO deal flow giving the investment bank the 
flexibility to reward those investors who reveal their information.
A fixed offer price regime, on the other hand, gives the issuing firm’s 
advisers no flexibility to vary either the offer price or the number of shares 
offered in reaction to any investor feedback. At its core lies the belief that these 
advisers are sufficiently skilled and experienced to ascertain what the broader 
investment community is willing to pay for the shares. Until Big Bang in October 
1986, public issues and offers were made at fixed prices in Britain. The tender 
offer, which allows some of the flexibility and information production of book- 
building, was used at various times but never threatened the dominance of the 
fixed offer price method. I take up this point again in chapter 5. Whilst the fixed 
offer price regime is less theoretically rich than that of book-building, its 
dominance of the UK market over the majority of the last century does assist 
me in making a comparison of underpricing across such a large expanse of time 
with relatively few explanatory variables and with little or no endogeneity 
problem.35
Turning our attention to agency theory, problems occur between 
investment banks and issuing firms when the former are assumed to be more 
informed about the fair value of an IPO than the firm. In this situation, the 
issuing firm relies heavily on the investment bank in setting the offer price to get 
the IPO away successfully. Baron (1982) hypothesised that underwriting 
investment banks are incentivised to underprice IPOs in order to minimise the 
effort required to make sure all the shares are placed and avoid being left with 
stock. This incentive is larger, the more uncertain is the value of the firm and is 
the demand of investors for shares in the IPO. Some doubt was thrown on this 
explanation when Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) discovered a similar 
degree of underpricing in the self-underwritten IPOs of investment banks as in 
those of their clients. If investment banks are endowed with informational 
advantages they ought to be able to put them to use in pricing their own IPOs. 
However, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) have been more cautious about
35 The advent of bookbuilding allows the issuer a choice between incurring higher direct IPO 
costs of bookbuilding led by a US bank in order to minimise underpricing, and the low cost 
option of a fixed price offer, or, indeed, something in-between. In this situation, endogeneity 
arises between the level of underpricing and the choice of method. A potentially highly 
underpriced issuer is likely to select the bookbuilding option by a US bank. (Ljungqvist, 
Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003), p.91-93) I deal with the question of endogeneity in regard to the 
impact of reputable underwriters on underpricing in chapter 5.
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accepting this view. The Muscarella and Vetsuypens result is based on a 
sample of only 38 self-underwritten bank IPOs. Furthermore, the idea that the 
underwriting market can become concentrated at certain times, giving the 
leading underwriters monopsonistic power, has intuitive appeal and has 
received empirical support from Ritter (1984). In the latter case, the 1980 US 
hot market was explained by the power of a few underwriters to underprice 
natural resource IPOs. Similarly, some of the IPO behaviour observed in the 
recent US dotcom bubble would appear to be consistent with the increased 
power of investment banks and their ability to underprice IPOs in order to 
secure other streams of security business and to “spin” IPOs among industry 
CEOs.36
Agency problems also arise between the management of issuing firms and 
outside shareholders. The realignment of incentives hypothesis stresses the 
importance of the proportion of the firm being sold at IPO and particularly the 
proportion of new or “primary” versus existing or “vendor” shares being sold. 
The more vendor shares sold, the less underpricing other things being equal.37 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) have claimed that the increase in US IPO 
underpricing in the latter half of the 1990s can, in part, be attributed to 
managers not caring about underpricing because they sold fewer of their own 
shares and held smaller percentage stakes in listing firms compared to earlier 
periods. Loughran and Ritter (2004) counter-argued that it was not so much 
fractional ownership that incentivised managers to care about underpricing as 
the market value of the shares they held and sold.
An alternative agency problem between management and outside 
shareholders concerns the control of the firm post-IPO. There are two 
competing theories of ownership and control as applied to underpricing. Each 
makes a different underlying assumption about managerial motivation.38 
Brennan and Franks (1997) assume that management is better off if they can 
secure for themselves more discretion in running the firm free from the 
monitoring of outside shareholders. Their claim is that the purpose of the IPO is 
to spread share ownership as widely as possible among outside investors in 
order to leave management with a large element of control over the firm for a
36 Loughran and Ritter (2004).
37 Habib and Ljungqvist (2001).
38 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), p136.
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given level of shareholding. Underpricing in this case can be seen as a 
deliberate ploy by management to secure control. In contrast, Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998) assume that it might actually be in the economic interests of 
managers owning shares in the firm to be seen to limit their managerial 
discretion by encouraging the emergence of a large outside shareholder. In this 
case, the size of the stake is larger from the potential investor’s viewpoint than 
they would otherwise wish and they have to be enticed with higher underpricing. 
The presence of a large outside shareholder will, other things being equal, raise 
the market valuation of the firm to the economic benefit of management. The 
Stoughton and Zechner view of the world is premised on the flexibility of a book­
building approach. The fixed offer price system characteristic of British IPOs 
during my period of study is more applicable to the Brennan and Franks view.
The legal liability theory of underpricing refers to the desire of investment 
banks and issuing firms to avoid the risk of legal action from investors who 
believe that poor long-run IPO performance is due to misrepresentations by 
either or both of the former. Underpricing in this case is a means of “buying off” 
investors in advance, or, in other words, acts as an implicit form of insurance for 
the underwriter and issuing firm. Tinic (1988) tested this hypothesis on US IPO 
data straddling the 1933 Securities Act. This Act toughened the due diligence 
and disclosure rules governing IPOs, exposing investment banks to greater 
litigation risk and therefore increasing the need for the implicit insurance of 
higher underpricing. Tinic concluded that first-day returns rose significantly 
post-1933 compared to pre-1933. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) challenged 
the Tinic results by producing empirical evidence that underpricing an IPO does 
not reduce the likelihood of the insiders being sued by disgruntled investors. In 
addition, the authors found that the average financial settlement was only about 
17% of issue proceeds and therefore that the typical level of underpricing 
seemed to represent a very expensive form of insurance. It is likely that legal 
liability explanations do not therefore account for more than a small portion of 
observed underpricing. More importantly for the purposes of this study, the 
British legal system is far less protective of the interests of investors in IPOs.39 
The resulting risk to underwriters and issuers is far less.
39 Jenkinson (1990), p.446.
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Price support is another institutional explanation for underpricing which is 
best regarded as part of a menu of services offered by an underwriter to the 
issuing firm.40 If a proportion of IPOs have their share prices supported once 
they begin trading on the market in order to prevent them falling below the offer 
price, then this can create underpricing on average by truncating the left tail of 
the distribution of IPO returns and creating a positively skewed distribution of 
first-day returns. Again virtually all the empirical evidence is from the US.
Concluding this section on the empirical literature on underpricing, there 
are many competing and complementary hypotheses, only some of which are 
relevant to the British experience and amenable to testing due to data 
limitations within the constraints of this thesis. Further consideration of which 
hypotheses are most relevant to explaining underpricing behaviour in Britain 
over the last century is left to chapter 4 once I have examined the institutional 
environment of the IPO market in the next chapter.
(iii) IPO Survival
Since long-run underperformance is hotly disputed, it is not yet clear that 
there is any anomaly requiring explanation. Indeed, Schultz (2003) has argued 
that long-run underperformance is both theoretically possible and no indication 
of market inefficiency. The only major study of IPO survival by Fama and 
French (2004) concluded that there was a surge of new IPOs brought about by 
the decline in information and trading costs after the establishment of NASDAQ 
in the early 1970s. This fall in costs effectively pushed down the supply curve 
for IPOs and lowered their cost of equity. No such decline was observed for 
SEOs. Compared to pre-NASDAQ, a greater proportion of these IPOs turned 
out to be weak firms ex post and were delisted. There was no expectation of 
such poor survival rates ex ante. Pricing at the time of the IPO was rational. 
The Fama and French view contrasts with that of Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
who argued that the poor long-run performance of IPOs is due to irrational 
exuberance by investors pushing down the cost of equity for IPOs. I do not 
attempt to distinguish between these hypotheses in this thesis. In chapter 6, I 
examine IPO survival during two episodes of investor exuberance about
40 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), p.122-126.
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technology in the last century. In so doing I may lean towards the Loughran 
and Ritter view.
1.2 Capital market failures
Considerable disagreement exists over the explanations for Britain’s 
relative economic decline through the twentieth century and over the 
contribution of the capital markets to this decline. Some scholars believe that 
there was little that British industry could have done to resist being overtaken by 
the US in the productivity race.41 British managers facing inferior natural 
resource endowments and a smaller, less homogeneous home market reached 
rational decisions in selecting a skilled labour-intensive and less capital- 
intensive production process. In this version of events, capital markets are 
exonerated since British industry in the early twentieth century did not need to 
adopt the scale production and distribution technologies widely applied in US 
industry and so did not require large amounts of risk capital. Michie (1988), 
Collins (1991) and Capie and Collins (1992) have argued that since 
industrialists showed no evidence of an unsatisfied demand for risk capital, 
financial institutions can be absolved from the charge of failing to supply 
adequate long-term risk capital prior to 1939.
Elbaum and Lazonick (1986) have been the most vocal critics of this 
position. They claim that “institutional rigidities” in industrial organisation, labour 
markets, the education system and the financial system were a substantial 
obstacle to industrial performance. The principal failings of financial institutions 
comprised the inadequate provision of long-term risk capital to industry and an 
inability to involve themselves more deeply in the strategic management and 
restructuring of their corporate clients. Much of the criticism has been aimed at 
the banking system. The joint stock banks had become inherently conservative 
institutions by the early twentieth century. Following a series of crises 
culminating in the 1878 Bank of Glasgow crisis, the industry chose to pursue 
financial stability over the expansion of long-term industrial lending under the 
guidance of the Bank of England.42 Massive banking consolidation pre-1913 
led to the severance of strong connections with provincial industry. The legacy
41 McCloskey (1970); Broadberry (1997).
42 Collins (1991); Kennedy (1987), p120.
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of, the banks’ pursuit of financial stability and consolidation in the late nineteenth 
century was a lack of involvement in the rationalisation of their mature industrial 
client base during the inter-war period.43 Furthermore, the hesitation of the joint 
stock banks in committing a larger portion of their balance sheet to industrial 
lending from the late nineteenth century onwards increasingly left industry 
turning to the stock market for its future long-term financing needs. Britain had 
opted for a stock market-based financial system. If this view holds water, then 
there remains the need for more detailed research on the role that the stock
market played in industrial finance in the first half of the twentieth century.
A related debate concerns the question as to the adequacy or otherwise of 
the pace of industrial structural shift out of traditional and into “new” industries in 
interwar Britain. Richardson (1961, 1962) and Aldcroft (1967) have argued that 
Britain put in a relatively good industrial performance in the interwar period 
thanks to the shift of resources into these new industries primarily in the 1930s. 
The presumption has always been that “new” was synonymous with the 
technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution, such as electricity and motor 
vehicles, and that the other end of the industrial continuum comprised the “old” 
mature industries of iron and steel, shipbuilding, textiles and mining. Both 
Dowie (1968) and Buxton (1975) challenged this “new industry” hypothesis on 
the grounds of the imprecision of industry definitions. I locate this debate in the 
literature on the financing of innovation discussed below.
The literature on the British stock market in the twentieth century has 
levelled the following allegations of capital market failure: domestic investor bias 
before 1913; “short-termism”; problems in financing innovation; and specific 
criticisms relating to the Macmillan gap and the high costs of new issues. I 
briefly review each, beginning with the last.
(i) Criticisms of the IPO Market
The stock market histories by Lavington (1921), Grant (1967), and Thomas 
(1978) along with the studies of the IPO market by Harris (1933), Andrews 
(1937), Henderson (1951) and Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) made 
specific criticisms about the operation of the IPO or new issues market as it was
43 Best and Humphries (1986).
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called at that time, namely, IPO costs, the lack of reputable underwriting, and 
the inadequate finance provided to small firms.
Stock market historians generally have thought only in terms of direct costs 
when lamenting the expense of IPOs. Direct costs include underwriting 
commissions, brokerage, advisers’ fees, accounting and legal expenses and 
other administrative expenses. Lavington drew attention to the high level of 
issue expenses, particularly for small firms.44 Before the 1929 Companies Act 
there was no limit on the amount of underwriting commission payable. There 
were cases of issuing firms being charged 25% or 50% of the nominal value of 
the shares issued for underwriting alone 45 By the late 1920s most IPOs were 
underwritten at 4% of the offer price plus a 1% over-riding commission and by 
1937 the figure had fallen to 3% plus 1% over-riding.46 Henderson estimated 
that total direct costs were 11.2% of gross issue size, including vendors’ 
proceeds, for IPOs in 1937 and were 11.8% for IPOs in 1945-47 47 The 1937 
sample included placings which typically were less expensive but the 1945-47 
one did not. The author did not give a break down of costs by method and, 
hence, I can only surmise that there was a decline in the direct costs of public 
issues and offers over the intervening decade.
Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) discovered a considerable scale 
effect in direct IPO costs. The authors estimated that the direct costs of IPOs 
between 1959 and 1963 varied indirectly with issue size between 5.9% and 
9.25% for public issues and offers and between 3.5% and 6.25% for placings on 
issues of £300,000 and over48 These figures indicate a further fall in direct 
costs of public offers compared to the Henderson sample. Within this total, 
underwriting expenses in particular had fallen to 2% of the issue price by the 
early 1960s from the 3% level of the thirties. Thereafter, total direct costs 
appear not to have come down much more. Jenkinson and Trundle (1990) 
estimated average direct costs of 8.8% for public issues and offers between 
1985 and 1989. A considerable scale effect was again evident. The range 
extended from 17.3% for offers below £3m to 4.7% for offers over £10m. The
44 Lavington (1921), p218-9.
45 Thomas (1978), p.40.
46 ibid., p.41.
47 Henderson (1951), Table 13, p.19.
48 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), Table 5.8, p .114. These figures are adjusted according 
to the formula in footnote 1, p.102, to enable a comparison with Henderson.
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average cost of placings appeared to have risen to 9.3%.49 Furthermore, there 
was no fall in the 3 years after Big Bang and the costs of small IPOs actually 
rose.
The overall implication is that after the early 1960s there was little or no 
decline in direct costs and the market was already quite competitive in this 
regard. Average total underwriting commissions have risen fairly steadily 
through the 1990s from the 3% level in the early years to over 7% in 2001-02, a 
rise which reflects the greater incentivisation provided to banks to minimise 
underpricing.50 This postulated inverse relationship between underpricing and 
underwriting costs did not generally exist before 1986.
Although The Economist had pointed out as early as 1929 the need for 
issuing firms to maximise their issue proceeds51, it was only with the publication 
of the Merrett, Howe and Newbould study in 1967 that underpricing received 
serious consideration for the first time as an additional and larger cost to be met 
by any issuer (Table 1-2). In June 1961, The Economist commented on the 
high premia over the issue price demonstrated by recent IPOs when reviewing 
the decision of the LSE to allow a tender issue for a non-water company for the 
first time.52 The Times similarly commented on a “bad case of underpricing” in 
1967 when referring to the IPO by O.C. Summers which surged 68% on its first 
day of trading.53 This was the first occasion that the newspaper made reference 
to underpricing according to a search of the Times Digital Archive. Similar to 
Merrett Howe and Newbould, the estimates provided by Jenkinson and Trundle
(1990) of the relative size of underpricing and direct costs in the 1980s pointed 
to underpricing being larger on average. In short, since the 1960s underpricing 
has come to be recognised by the financial press and financial economists as 
the more significant problem for issuing firms.
Two further criticisms of the new issue market were made by the 
Macmillan Report (1931 ).54 The Macmillan gap refers to the criticism in the
49 Jenkinson and Trundle (1990), Table F, p249 These IPOs were approximately 5 times larger 
than those in the Merrett, Howe and Newbould sample in constant prices.
50 Ljungqvist (2003). Commission fees are quoted in Table 2, p.39.
51 The Economist, 27 July 1929, p.175-6: “The most advantageous mode of capital issue, in any 
particular instance, is obviously that calculated to provide the company, or other borrower, with 
a maximum of new working resources against a minimum subscription by the public investor.” 
The article lamented the tendency of new issues by way of placing to seriously undervalue a 
firm to the detriment of the proceeds raised.
52 The Economist, 3 June 1961, p.1030 “Issues by Tender”.
53 The Times, 2 Nov. 1967, p.29.
54 Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry (1931), para.386-404.
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report of the stock market along with the banking system failing to provide 
sufficient long-term risk capital to small and medium-sized firms.55 This criticism 
became a recurring theme in subsequent government enquiries into the 
workings of the British financial system through the twentieth century. The 
Radcliffe Report (1959) concluded that “the (new issues) market was now far 
better organised to meet the needs of British industry”.56 The Bolton Report 
(1971) which was specifically tasked with examining the financing of small firms 
concluded that the Macmillan gap had largely been closed. The Wilson Report 
(1980), on the other hand, concluded that there was a problem in the provision 
of capital for small, high-risk venture firms and that the costs of going public and 
maintaining a listing were discouraging small firms from undertaking an IPO.57 
In 1991, the National Westminster Bank commissioned an investigation into the 
financing of small firms, both equity and debt, and found that the establishment 
of the USM and the development of venture capital had further improved the 
availability of risk capital for small firms.58 In summary, the Macmillan gap was 
only really addressed in the 1980s upon the establishment of junior markets to 
address the needs of small companies seeking a listing, and through the growth 
of venture capital (VC) investment which helped to nurture young, small 
companies through their pre-IPO stage of growth.59 The gap has been 
extensively examined and, although not a primary concern of my study, the 
relationship between firm size of IPOs and underpricing is discussed and 
estimated in chapter 4.
A second criticism made by the Macmillan Committee concerned the 
inadequacy of underwriting arrangements. This has received little attention in 
the literature. The Report alleged that the merchant banks had sponsored only 
a very few domestic industrial IPOs in the 1920s and as such bore some 
responsibility for the over-exuberance of the 1928-29 stock market.60 This 
criticism and the subsequent performance of reputable underwriters has not 
been subject to any rigorous analysis. As will be discussed in the next section, 
the application of reputable capital to IPO underwriting is critically important in
55 ibid., para.397-403.
56 Report of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System (1959), para.934 and 948.
57 Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1980), ch.27, 
p.1408.
8 Stanworth and Gray (1991), ch.6.
59 Hughes (1994), p.223-224.
60 Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry (1931), para.386.
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reducing investor concerns about the quality of IPOs. If a Barings or a 
Rothschilds were to put their name to and their capital behind an industrial IPO, 
investors would feel less apprehensive about subscribing for shares. The 
problem was that most industrial issues were not underwritten by such banks in 
early twentieth century Britain and opportunistic company promoters filled the 
resulting vacuum.61 The merchant banks moved only very slowly into 
underwriting industrial issues in the inter-war period and it was not until after 
WW2 that they committed themselves wholeheartedly to the IPO market. This 
commitment was symbolised by the establishment of the Issuing Houses 
Association (IHA) in 1945. Both the Radcliffe Report (1959) and the Bolton 
Report (1971) felt able to absolve the merchant banks from further criticism.62 
TTie Wilson Report (1980) was less forgiving, although it did offer an excuse, 
namely, that the low level of new issues in the 1970s prevented underwriters 
developing any real industrial expertise with the exception of the North Sea oil 
and gas sector.63
Notwithstanding the sanguine view of the Radcliffe Report (1959), the 
damage had perhaps already been done by the time this Committee had met. 
The virtual absence of reputable merchant banks from the IPO market pre-1939 
was crucial in an era when poor disclosure and a lack of investor protection 
most required their presence. In contrast, the US investment banks in the early 
twentieth century exemplified the value of certification to their industrial clients. 
According to Navin and Sears (1955) these banks contributed significantly to 
the emergence of an active market for industrial stocks. By taking substantial 
minority equity stakes themselves and seeking board representation, they 
certified the quality of their corporate clients and secured sufficient equity 
finance for them to implement massive scale expansion in production and 
distribution. J.P. Morgan played a pre-eminent role during this period. De Long
(1991) has estimated that the Morgan premium added as much as 30% to the 
stock market valuations of their clients.64 Ramirez (1995) concluded that these 
clients also had a financial liquidity advantage. Notwithstanding the breakdown 
of the certification process in late 1920s when many banks were drawn into
61 Lavington (1921), p.212-213.
62 Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (1971) para.19.13.
63 Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1980), para.758 
and 762.
64 Cantillo Simon (1998) challenged De Long’s estimate of the Morgan premium and came up 
with a smaller, but nonetheless positive, figure.
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making a fast underwriting buck at the expense of their reputational capital, the 
investment banks up to that date had made a considerable contribution to 
securing the necessary risk capital to finance US industrial expansion.
 In the British case, one symptom of this absence of reputable underwriters
in the early part of the last century was the low survival rates exhibited by IPOs 
in the late 1920s. Harris (1933), Andrews (1937) and Grant (1967) were all 
highly critical of the new issue excesses of the 1928-29 new issue boom. Low 
IPO survival rates were also symptomatic of lax regulation by the LSE. Michie 
(2001) reserves his harshest criticisms for the willingness of the LSE to grant a 
listing to any company that applied, particularly before 1929 and argues that the 
LSE only began to raise its regulatory standards thereafter.65
Summarising this section, we know that the direct costs of IPOs declined 
from the 1920s up to the modern period but at the same time know nothing 
about underpricing. Similarly the Macmillan gap has been extensively analysed 
but the role of underwriters has been largely ignored.
(ii) Domestic investor bias and information gaps
The debate over whether domestic investors neglected domestic industrial 
securities in favour of foreign securities has been a long running one. Utilising a 
data set of security returns on 566 British quoted debentures, preference shares 
and ordinary shares between 1870 and 1913, Edelstein (1982) has rejected the 
hypothesis of domestic investor bias on the basis that risk-adjusted returns for 
foreign assets exceeded those on domestic assets.66 Goetzmann and Ukhov 
(2005) making use of the same data set concludes that domestic investors were 
both aware of the benefits of portfolio diversification and fully rational in 
allocating a significant portion of their portfolio into overseas assets.
Although this debate relates to investment activity before 1914, it has 
equal relevance to the interwar period because of what Kennedy had to say 
about the particular problems faced by the “new” industries of electrical 
engineering, chemicals and automobiles in raising capital on the stock market.67 
His central claim is that asymmetric information problems faced by British
65 Michie (2001), p.268.
66 Edelstein (1982), ch.5.
67 Kennedy (1987), especially ch.5.
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investors, combined with their risk-averse nature and the disinterest of London 
merchant bankers, severely restricted the supply of equity finance to firms in 
these new industries to the detriment of Britain’s long-term industrial structure. 
Thus, for example, bouts of speculation in electrical equipment IPOs in the late 
nineteenth century soured investor appetite for these types of risky investment 
and led to long periods of new issue inactivity. As a result, insufficient capital 
was made available when electricity-related final product demand grew rapidly 
between 1896 and 1904 and foreign firms filled the void in Britain. Kennedy 
claimed that in all three representative technology industries British firms were 
unable to adequately exploit the huge growth opportunity, consequent upon the 
technology breakthrough, because of a lack of risk capital at the crucial time. In 
a later paper, Kennedy and Delargy (2000) provided further evidence of a 
marked aversion among British investors to technology firms, such as Brunner 
Mond, in preference to railway stocks, despite their generally poor financial 
performance after the 1870s, or to mining shares, despite their highly 
speculative nature and susceptibility to managerial fraud. The implication of his 
argument is that certain domestic securities were riskier than they might 
otherwise have been, had, for example, British merchant bankers played a 
more pro-active role in representing these investments to domestic investors.
Michie (1988) has challenged Kennedy’s view and claimed that new 
industries did not want for risk capital before 1913. Rather, regulation was the 
primary constraint on their growth since the government wished to protect its 
substantial economic interests in the incumbent technologies of gas lighting and 
the telegraph respectively. Both Saul (1962) and Lewchuk (1985, 1990) have 
concluded that outdated engineering and commercial attitudes played a more 
significant role in explaining the poor relative performance of the British motor 
industry pre-1939 than did the stock market.68
My data set currently starts in 1915 due to a lack of published share price 
data on IPOs prior to that date. I cannot therefore directly address the pre-1914 
Edelstein-Kennedy debate at present. Nonetheless, Kennedy’s focus on the 
information gaps faced by British investors in evaluating risky industrial shares 
has relevance to any examination of how well the stock market performed in 
handling IPOs in the interwar years.
68 Lewchuk (1985) includes an analysis of automobile IPOs.
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(iii) Short-termism
The belief that institutional investors were too preoccupied with current 
earnings and dividends to the detriment of management’s ability to invest for the 
long-term became a popular explanation for Britain’s continued poor relative 
industrial performance in the post 1945 period.69 Institutional investors, so the 
argument goes, turned over their portfolios too frequently and never developed 
long-term relationships with their investee companies. Moreover, it was alleged 
that the institutions were too ready and willing to sell out at the first sign of a 
premium over the current price in any takeover bid for one of their portfolio 
companies without giving full consideration to the longer-term prospects of the 
acquired as an independent firm.
Marsh (1990) demolished the short-termism case on three counts. Firstly, 
empirical financial studies have found little evidence of analysts or fund 
managers overemphasising short-term news at the expense of the evaluation of 
a company’s long-term earnings, cash flows or prospects.70 Secondly, share 
prices themselves have shown no tendency to overvalue the short-term at the 
expense of the long-term because the market is “broadly efficient” despite the 
existence of certain anomalies.71 Finally, in dismissing the charges against the 
stock market he pointed an accusatory finger in the direction of managers 
wishing to divert attention from supply-side problems in the British economy.72
Despite Marsh’s persuasive rebuttal there remains the suspicion that the 
rise to prominence of the institutional investor has not always delivered better 
outcomes for issuing firms. The resulting increase in investor heterogeneity 
through the second half of the last century has perhaps had important 
consequences for IPO underpricing over time.
69 Marsh (1990), p.1-3. The criticisms arose mostly from the press and from a report by the 
Innovation Advisory Board (1990) Innovation: City Attitudes and Practices. See also Stapledon 
(1996), p.212-213.
70 Marsh (1990), p.13-14.
71 ibid., p.18.
72 ibid., p.43-49.
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(iv) The financing of innovation
Marsh did concede one important instance of short-termism, namely, that 
under asymmetric information firms with “commercially sensitive information”, 
such as R&D projects and new product innovations, did suffer a persistent 
under-valuation problem.73 This is an acknowledgement of the original Myers 
and Majluf (1984) problem of high quality firms under asymmetric information 
foregoing raising new equity and cancelling profitable projects. Marsh’s view 
resonates with the previously discussed arguments of Kennedy and with more 
recent contributions in the finance literature on the problems of financing 
innovation. Goodacre and Tonks (1995) provided a concise summary of the 
problems of financing R&D projects. Chan and his co-authors (1990, 2001) 
have looked at how the US stock market values R&D-intensive firms. Whilst the 
1990 study brought the good news that share prices react positively to 
announcements of R&D increases, the 2001 study highlighted the problem of 
the greater return volatility of R&D-intensive firms suggesting that investors 
have trouble evaluating their prospects. Nicholas (2005) has argued that, far 
from being over-exuberant, investors may have underestimated the value of 
patents held by US listed firms in the late 1990s. Stapledon (1996) has noted 
that quoted firms cut R&D during the recession of the early 1990s, something 
which he attributes to the lack of long-term commitment of British shareholders 
to such firms.74
All these authors have highlighted problems faced by the stock market in 
adequately financing innovative firms whether firms in the new industries of the 
early 20th century or the R&D-intensive firms of the later 20th century. There is 
some disagreement about how innovation should be measured and the relative 
merits in this regard of patents versus R&D expenditure.75 I make use of both 
variable types where available.
Summarising this section on the capital market failure literature, there 
remain allegations regarding the role of the stock market that have not been 
adequately addressed by the literature. They are the questionable performance
73 ibid., p.97-100.
74 Stapledon (1996), p.225-226.
75 See Griliches (1990) for a review of this question.
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of reputable underwriters and the problems in the financing of innovation. Most 
importantly, when considering the costs of going public, IPO underpricing in the 
first half of the last century has been completely ignored.
1.3 Summary
My thesis seeks to make a contribution to both the economic history and 
the empirical finance literature regarding the role of the British stock market. 
The debate on capital market failure in Britain has largely focussed on the role 
of banks. Yet, given the course of financial development taken by Britain over 
the 19th century, the stock market has more of a case to answer and its role in 
explaining British industrial performance has been subjected to limited 
quantitative analysis to date. In contrast, the empirical finance literature has 
provided us with an abundance of detailed quantitative analysis on the modem 
stock market, much of it concentrating on the US, in an attempt to discover 
lacunae in the efficient market hypothesis.
I address three main gaps in our knowledge. Firstly, I employ a new data 
set of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange to present the first long-run study of 
IPO underpricing and in so doing shed light on how well the British stock market 
served the interests of industry over the last century. How efficiently were new 
entrants to the stock market priced earlier in the last century compared to the 
recent past? Did improvements in IPO regulation and financial disclosure have 
a desirable effect on underpricing and on survival? Secondly, I apply this data 
set to the consideration of old questions about British capital market failure, 
specifically, the absence of reputable underwriters of company flotations and 
the problems associated with the financing of innovation. How effective a role 
did the merchant banks play in IPO underwriting? How well did the market 
finance innovative firms during the technology bubbles of the 1920s and 1990s? 
Thirdly, this is a long-run British case study to place alongside the many studies 
which have been conducted on the US capital markets.
The main conclusions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly and surprisingly, 
underpricing was significantly lower in the interwar years than from the mid­
fifties onwards having controlled for changes in the risk composition of the IPO 
sample, variation in equity market conditions and issue method, and despite 
stronger regulation of IPOs in the second half of the last century (chapter 4).
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Secondly, the emergence of underwriting by reputable issuing houses appeared 
not to minimise underpricing at all (chapter 5). Furthermore, the collective 
failure of these banks to adopt the more efficient tender offer method is 
symptomatic of the lack of competition among underwriters ahead of Big Bang. 
Finally, a comparison of the technology IPOs during the two bubbles of the late 
1920s and 1990s suggests that whilst underpricing was far worse, survival was 
much improved (chapter 6). Subject to further examination of a number of 
underpricing hypotheses, the implication of the initial underpricing results from 
this long-run study of a single stock market is that, contrary to the conclusion 
reached by the cross-sectional studies of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997, 1998), law possibly did not matter for finance in this instance. 
This result would chime with that of Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004). On the 
other hand, the preliminary results from the IPO survival analysis point to both 
regulatory and underwriting improvements since the 1920s having probably 
made a difference on this particular measure.
The rest of the thesis is laid out as follows. The next chapter describes the 
institutional environment surrounding the IPO market. The new IPO data set is 
introduced in chapter 3. Both are preparatory to the univariate and multivariate 
analysis of IPO underpricing behaviour between 1915 and 1986 in chapter 4. 
The crucial role of underwriters in the IPO process and the question as to 
whether the tender offer should have been adopted more widely is considered 
in chapter 5. A comparison of the financing of innovation, underpricing and IPO 
survival in the late 1920s and late 1990s is the subject of chapter 6. A summary 
and discussion of my main findings and their implications for my future research 
are presented in the final chapter.
Table 1-1: Previous Empirical Studies of British IPOs
Study No. IPOs Period Focus of study
Harris (1933) 277 1928-33 long-run performance of 1928 IPOs
Andrews (1937) 481 1919-33 5 year survival rates
Henderson (1951) 64,158 1937,1945-47 direct costs of IPOs
Merrett, Howe & Newbould (1967) 507 1959-63 survey of total IPO costs including underpricing
Davis & Yeomans (1975) 275 4/65 - 3/71 scale effect in listing costs including underpricing
Vaughan, Grinyer & Birley (1977) 497 1966-74 underpricing, direct costs, reasons for going public
Dimson (1979) 268 1970-78 underpricing; underwriting
Buckland, Herbert & Yeomans (1981) 297 4/65 - 3/75 underpricing
Buckland and Davies (1989,1990) 331 1/80-3/85 USM impact on access and costs of listing including 
underpricing; impact of prospectus disclosure on underpricing
Jackson (1986) 260 1/83-3/86 survey of total IPO costs including underpricing
Jenkinson & Trundle (1990) 227 1/85 -12/89 survey of total IPO costs including underpricing
Levis (1990) 123 1/85-12/88 underpricing and test of winner’s curse
Levis (1993) 712 1/80 -12/88 long-run performance; underpricing
Ljungqvist (2003) 1108 1/91-12/02 underpricing, agency conflicts and underwriter compensation
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Table 1-2: Comparison of Direct Costs and Underpricing of British
IPOs 1959-63
Direct costs include underwriting, brokerage, legal and other administrative costs of 
making an IPO. All costs are expressed as a percentage of gross IPO proceeds and 
are equally-weighted means across the 149 offers and 193 placings. I have excluded 
the figures on the relatively few public issues and tender offers.
IPO method Total costs % Direct costs % Underpricing %
Offers 32.4 15.2 17.2
Placings 40.1 15.1 25.0
Source: Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), p.113 Table 5-7, p.140 Table 6.2, 
p.144 Table 6.5, and p.181 Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
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CHAPTER 2: THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1915-86
Preparatory to my analysis of IPO underpricing and survival rates in the 
following chapters I consider next those elements of the institutional 
environment surrounding the IPO market over the last century which I expect to 
influence the behaviour of underpricing and survival rates over the 20th century. 
I am concerned with issue methods employed (section 2.1), the effects of the 
rise of institutional investors (section 2.2), the development of the underwriting 
market which is of central importance to certifying the quality of an IPO (section 
2.3), and lastly, the pace and nature of regulatory change as it affected IPOs 
(section 2.4). Consideration must also be given to competition provided by the 
Provincial Stock Exchanges to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) until their 
merger in 1973 (section 2.5). Section 2.6 summarises. I return to consider the 
underwriting market in detail in chapter 5.
2.1 Issue methods
Any firm issuing shares to the public has the choice of a fixed offer price 
issue or an auction. Auctions take the form of either a tender issue or what is 
today known as “book-building.” In either case the offer price is fixed after 
applications or bids for shares have been received from interested investors. 
Tender offers were first employed by gas and water utilities when issuing 
debentures and preference stocks around the beginning of the last century. In 
the 1960s, industrial companies experimented with tender offers of ordinary 
shares for the first time but this method was only used in relatively few cases 
after its inception in 1961. I discuss this method in chapter 5.
Although it is difficult to be precise about the timing, the book-building 
method began to make inroads into UK IPOs in the UK after Big Bang in late 
1986.76 Prior to that date, the vast majority of IPOs were conducted under a 
fixed price method. Fixed offer price IPOs are of three main types: public
76 Ljungqvist (2003), p24 and footnote 25, implies that IPOs were book built by the start of his 
study in 1991. It is difficult to quantify this proportion given that formal offer price ranges typical 
of the bookbuilding approach were filed in only 30%  of IPOs and indicative price ranges were 
very often privately given.
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issues, offers for sale and placings.77 Public Issues involve an offer of shares 
by prospectus by the issuing company directly to the public at a fixed price and 
underwritten by an issuing house or broker. Offers for Sale are very similar, the 
only difference being that an issuing house or broker buys the shares from the 
company or its selling shareholders and then offers them to the public.
A placing consists of an issue or sale of shares through an issuing house 
or broker to a small number of their investment clients conditional on obtaining a 
listing on the LSE. This method was often chosen by smaller firms seeking to 
minimise the costs of a listing. Until the 1970s placings lacked fairness and 
transparency. Shares were placed with a select group of investors at a price 
very often considerably below the level at which they began trading on the 
market. The sponsoring issuing house or broker had little or no intention of 
securing a fair price for the issuing firm.
A variation on the placing method is the introduction, also extremely prone 
to price manipulation at the expense of the outside investor. In an introduction, 
share ownership ahead of a listing is judged sufficiently well dispersed to allow 
permission to deal in a company’s shares without any issue taking place. 
Shares would therefore simply be made available to the market at the start of 
dealing. Some introductions were made by firms already listed on a Provincial 
Stock Exchange or other foreign market and seeking a secondary listing.
The main characteristics of fixed offer price IPOs are (i) that they were 
frequently underwritten, (ii) that, excepting placings, share allocations were 
made to investors on a pro rata basis in the event of oversubscription of an 
issue, and (iii) that the offer price was fixed and no subsequent attempt was 
made to revise either it or, usually, the number of shares to be issued in the 
light of contact with investors during the marketing period. The latter represents 
the significant difference in comparison to the modern book-building approach.
The key events in a typical timetable of a public offer would be the fixing of 
the offer price by the issuing firm and its advisers, the publication of a 
prospectus disclosing the terms of the offer and other information on the issuing 
firm required by the LSE and by statutory legislation, the closing of application 
lists and finally the start of dealings in the company’s shares on the LSE.78
77 Thomas (1978), p.38-43, and Dimson (1979), p.26-31, give summaries of the various issue 
methods.
78 Dimson (1979), p.36-40 and Table 2.4, p.59.
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Generally speaking, by the 1960s and 1970s IPO terms were fixed around 14 
days, the prospectus published 10 days and application lists closed 7 days, 
respectively, before the start of dealings. Any underwriter of an IPO would be at 
risk over the period between price-fixing and applications closing. Public issues 
and offers in the interwar years also appeared to follow this timetable.79 The 
timetable for a placing was usually shorter than that for an offer and the 
underwriting broker or issuing house would be at risk for a shorter period, 
perhaps as little as 1 or 2 days.
The foregoing discussion has several implications for the analysis of the 
following chapters. Firstly, fixed price IPOs dominated until the late 1980s. 
Their characteristic features were a fixed offer price and a pro rata share 
allocation both of which contribute to a higher level of underpricing, other things 
being equal, than do tender offers or IPOs by the book-building method. 
Secondly, placings (and introductions) were a feature of the IPO market over 
the last century and they had a tendency to higher underpricing than public 
offers. Lastly, the market experimented with tender issues during the 1960s but 
they never gained in popularity. It is not at all clear why.
2.2 Institutional investors
The involvement of financial institutions in equity investment dates from 
the interwar years.80 Yet, private investors still accounted for around 80% of 
LSE trading volume at the end of the interwar period.81 Institutional share 
ownership began its rise in the 1950s and surpassed the holdings of private 
individuals in 1975.82
The rise of institutional investors has at least three potentially beneficial 
effects on the IPO process, namely, the pressure for better disclosure, the 
certification role played by specialist venture capital investors and the 
emergence of an organised underwriting market. There is one alleged adverse 
effect, namely, a bias against small quoted firms due to share liquidity concerns.
79 The data discussed in the next chapter do record the length of the period between prospectus 
publication and the start of dealings.
80 Scott (2002).
81 Michie (2001), p.178.
82 Stapledon (1996), Table 2.1, p.20. Financial institutions are defined as banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds, unit trusts and other institutions.
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Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) have argued that a steady transfer of 
share ownership occurred in Britain over the last century from inside investors, 
directors and family owners, to outside investors, mainly institutional investors. 
As ownership transfers from insiders to outsiders, effective monitoring of firms 
by outside shareholders is essential to minimise agency problems. Individual 
investors do not have the resources to undertake monitoring adequately and 
even if they did there is a free-riding problem. The larger institutions are, the 
more resources they possess to monitor management and the easier it is to 
overcome the free-riding problem. US empirical studies provide support for the 
effective monitoring role of large financial shareholders.83 Nickell, Nicolitsas 
and Dryden (1997) have presented UK evidence in favour of dominant 
institutional shareholders being important for the avoidance of managerial slack 
and for the encouragement of better firm performance in the absence of strong 
competitive product markets. Stapledon (1996) in a British study found that 
institutional investors have been effective in influencing the LSE’s regulation of 
quoted companies. For example, in the late 1970s investment institutions 
successfully lobbied for any acquisition materially altering the nature of a quoted 
firm’s business to require shareholder approval.84
Large institutional investors might be expected to exert greater pressure 
on both issuing firms and their advisers, demanding a higher standard of 
disclosure in the IPO process over time. The difficulty lies in assessing when 
this pressure began to be applied. The rise of equity ownership by financial 
institutions started in the interwar period and gathered momentum post 1945. 
However, the increasing importance of institutional investors did not reverse the 
decline in share ownership concentration until the 1980s, as exemplified by the 
mean number of shareholders required to attain 25% voting control of British 
firms only beginning to reverse its rise after 1980.85 Similarly, the aggregate 
holdings of the largest three outside shareholders as a proportion of shares 
outstanding (C3o) did not rise substantially above the 1910 level until 1990.86 
The general implication is that institutional investors probably did not have a 
strong influence on the behaviour of quoted firms, absent any takeover or threat 
of takeover, until the last two decades of the last century.
83 McConnell and Servaes (1990), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990)
84 Stapledon (1996), p.60. Such transactions became known as “superclass 1 transactions.”
85 Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004), Table 3, Panel A.
86 ibid., Table 4, Panel A
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Empirical evidence from the US indicates that the emergence of specialist 
venture capital (VC) investors has benefited the IPO market substantially.87 
The intensive monitoring role and the large equity stakes characteristic of VC 
investors give other- institutional investors and investment banks confidence 
when one of their investee firms lists on the public markets. Both these 
characteristics are similar to those of large, active shareholders identified in the 
corporate governance literature and crucially distinguish the modern venture 
capitalist from the company promoter of a century ago. Although British venture 
capital appeared to get off to an early start with the establishment of the ICFC in 
1945, much of its financing was in the form of debt not equity and a passive 
“hands-off” approach was adopted with investee companies.88 Not until the 
1980s did VC activity start to make an impact. Even then equity investments by 
VC investors did not surpass £1 billion until 1988.89 Hence, for the period under 
study VC investment only had real relevance to the performance of the British 
IPO market in the last decade of the 20th century.
Other than attracting a reputable VC investor onto the shareholder register 
pre-IPO, the main way an issuing firm could choose to certify its quality to the 
market was to hire a reputable and prestigious merchant bank as its 
underwriter. Institutional investors maintained increasingly close contact with 
the merchant banks and brokers and played an important part in this process by 
acting as sub-underwriters as well as investors in IPOs.
One negative impact of rising institutional investor power is their desire for 
liquidity in share trading. Gompers and Metrick (2001) have drawn attention to 
the increasing importance in the US of the 1980s and 1990s of large 
institutional investors and how this has led to a noticeably lower demand for 
small capitalisation stocks. In the absence of direct empirical evidence, it is 
likely that the UK experience is similar. In the UK, Michie (2001) has 
commented on the difficulty of small firms after 1945 in obtaining a listing right 
up until the establishment of the USM in 1980.90 As recently as the mid-1990s 
and despite the existence of the USM, the LSE is still claimed to have a bias
87 Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypen (1990); and Megginson and Weiss (1991).
88 The reference to “hands off” style is on p .116.
89 Beechcroft (1994), p.197.
90 Michie (2001), p.412 and p.477.
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against small capitalisation firms due to scale economies in the IPO process 
and illiquidity in post-IPO share trading.91
2.3 IPO underwriting
The important development in the underwriting market over the middle part 
of the last century was the application of reputable capital to the underwriting of 
ordinary share IPOs. Empirical evidence has shown that the commitment of 
reputable capital to the underwriting process is important for the performance of 
the IPO market. Prior to 1929 underwriting was conducted by an assortment of 
company promoters, syndicates, company directors themselves, stockbrokers 
and a new breed of industrial trust. Some brokers and trusts were highly 
reputable and had a sound underwriting record, for example, Cazenove and 
Gresham Trust.92 However, there were considerable doubts about the capital 
backing of underwriters, especially when such information was not made 
public.93 As the fallout from the 1928 issue boom well illustrated, there were 
too many underwriters without sufficient capital and lacking the desire to build a 
reputation for the long-term.
In 1945, the Issuing House Association (IHA) was founded to represent the 
interests of underwriters to the Bank of England, the LSE and the Capital Issues 
Committee. From this point on the underwriting process became highly 
organised as reputable merchant banks committed themselves to this new line 
of business. The key question raised by this section and to be considered in 
chapter 5 is whether the better organisation of IPO underwriting after 1945 led 
to lower underpricing.
2.4 Regulation of the IPO market
Regulation is “preventive” in requiring adequate disclosure of IPOs by way 
of a published prospectus and in affording minority investors protection from
91 Davis (1995), p. 138
92 Kynaston (1991); Kinross (1982)
93 Thomas (1978), p.39; Finnie (1934) p.137-60; The Economist, 5 Jul. 1924, p.13 Finnie in 
particular documents a number of dubious practices which were carried on by underwriters in 
the1920s.
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controlling investors. It is also “punitive” in allowing any investor redress under 
the law. Common law, company legislation and the Rules and Regulations of 
the Stock Exchange (the LSE Rules) work together to regulate the IPO market. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [LLSV] (1997, 1998) provided 
empirical support for the importance both of the law in upholding shareholder 
rights, in promoting well-developed equity (and debt) markets and in dispersing 
share ownership. I shall briefly discuss their measure of investor protection 
before focusing the majority of my attention on disclosure requirements for 
IPOs.
In Britain, common law has afforded the investor very little protection since 
the case of Foss vs. Harbottle in 1843.94 The courts thereafter continued to 
define fraud committed by directors very narrowly95 and a leading company law 
academic has confirmed the difficulty that shareholders have faced in obtaining 
justice from the courts up to the modern period96. LLSV (1998) have attempted 
to capture the essential elements of investor protection in their “anti-director 
rights index”.97 Table 2-1 describes the progress of investor protection in 
Britain. Investor protection was weak until the mid-twentieth century, and 
certainly no better than that afforded by other European countries. 
Improvements came through legislation and not through the courts, with the two 
major periods of improvement being in 1948 and the early 1980s. Franks, 
Mayer and Rossi (2004) argue for an additional measure to be added to the 
LLSV index. They ask whether there were rules affording minority shareholders 
protection in particular instances, such as allowing a minority of 25% of 
shareholders to block a merger in certain circumstances. This protection was 
introduced in Britain in 1967.
Additionally, the liability of directors for untrue statements, regardless of 
whether or not there was negligence, did not come about until the 1948
94 Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004), p.2.
95 Samuel (1933), p.23 Neither did the 1929 Companies Act substantially improve the investor’s 
lot, p.29.
96Sealy (1984), p.53.
97 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index scores 1 for each of the 
following conditions which hold: (i) shareholder proxy voting is allowed; (ii) shareholders cannot 
be blocked from voting at a general meeting by for example requiring them to deposit their 
shares beforehand; (iii) cumulative voting and proportional representation of minority 
shareholders is allowed; (iv) minority investors can seek redress when oppressed by a majority 
shareholder; (v) the minimum percentage of votes required by shareholders to call an 
Extraordinary General Meeting is 10% or less; and (vi) shareholders enjoy pre-emptive rights 
over equity issues.
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Companies Act98 This, together with the evidence on anti-director rights of 
shareholders, adds to the strong impression of a progressive strengthening of 
investor protection in the second half of the last century with little or nothing 
happening before that.
The pace of improvement in financial disclosure follows a similar story to 
that in investor protection. Disclosure is required both of the financial affairs of 
an issuing company and of its non-financial and business affairs, such as share 
issue particulars, material contracts, directors’ interests and service contracts, 
and pending litigation for example. Up until the work of the Cohen Committee 
(1943-45), the thrust of much enquiry and regulatory effort went on ensuring 
that there was full disclosure about share issue particulars. The latter included, 
for example, the number of shares issued, the rights attaching to them, and the 
number of vendor shares being issued. This was felt necessary to prevent the 
fraudulent share-pushing schemes practised by such company promoters as 
Clarence Hatry."
Once an investor knows that the share issue particulars being put in front 
of him can be relied upon, he is then most concerned with the financial 
information disclosed by the issuing company. It is possible to identify two main 
periods of improvement in financial disclosure from the accounting history 
literature. These two periods occurred in the mid- to late 1940s and again in the 
1970s. After a lag, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW) shifted its stance in favour of more disclosure and greater 
comparability in company accounts following the Royal Mail case, as evidenced 
by its active involvement in the Cohen Committee, the Company Law 
Amendment Committee which met between 1943 and 1945.100 This culminated 
in the passage of the1948 Companies Act. Secondly, in the early 1970s the 
accounting profession laid down the first Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice (SSAPs).
Prior to 1948, there was little or no improvement in company accounts 
either due to company legislation or due to self-regulation by the accounting 
profession. The Companies Acts of 1900, 1907, 1908 and 1917 did little to 
improve disclosure. Indeed, the Wrenbury Committee, appointed in 1918 to
98 Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004), Table 1, Panels C and D.
99 Morgan and Thomas (1962), p.208 describes the chaos visited upon shareholder registers by 
Hatry’s schemes in 1929.
100 Edwards (1989), p.207-209.
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consider company law reform, reported back that none was necessary.101 
Arnold (1997) analysed a sample of 30 large quoted companies between 1900 
and 1924 and concluded that the both the quantity and quality of disclosure in 
company accounts actually declined over the period. Both Edwards (1989) and 
Arnold (1997) are dismissive of the attempts made by the Company Acts prior 
to 1928 to improve this situation. The 1928 Act was at least a little bolder in its 
intentions. For example, it required the publication of a profit and loss 
statement rather than simply a balance sheet. However, when Arnold and 
Matthews (2002) compared another sample of 50 company accounts between 
1920 and 1950, they concluded that this Act made no significant impact on 
financial disclosure when comparing the detail of company accounts in 1935 
with 1920. Company legislation had failed to address such significant problem 
areas as a lack of consolidated accounts, the use and abuse of secret reserves, 
the non-disclosure of depreciation charges allowing further manipulation of 
disclosed profits and the aggregation of fixed asset items in the balance sheet 
with the consequent loss of financial detail.
As a result, company accounts were vulnerable to flagrant manipulation. 
This was exemplified in the infamous case of the Royal Mail, whose chairman 
fabricated profits through the 1920s by drawing upon a substantial and secret 
tax reserve and was ultimately found guilty of fraud in 1931. Thus the 1926 
profit of £478,000 as shown in the accounts was in reality a loss of £272,000 
once the transfer from reserves was deducted.102 The accounting profession 
was subjected to considerable judicial and public criticism following the 
revelation of the Royal Mail scandal.103 Up to that point, the profession had 
resisted any calls for greater disclosure on the grounds that it would undermine 
both the competitive position of the firm in question and its market valuation. 
Investors seemed happy to accept this view. Both Bircher (1988) and Arnold 
and Matthews (2002) concur that, although the Royal Mail scandal provoked a 
recognition that secret reserves did not constitute best accounting practice, 
there was little actual implementation of best practice other than in a few high 
profile cases.
101 Samuel (1933), p.1
102 Davies and Bourn (1972), p.118
103 Edwards (1989), p.269
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, Accounting historians have concluded that the 1948 Companies Act, into 
which the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
provided considerable input, was crucial in delivering the significant 
improvements in the presentation of company accounts.104 The level of 
disclosure as measured by the notes to accounts and the percentage of firms 
disclosing the depreciation charge, tax provision and prior year comparative 
figures jumped from 50% to almost 100%.105 Hidden reserves were prohibited. 
Consolidated accounts became mandatory and a set of accounts including a 
profit and loss statement had to be audited by a member of a professional 
accountancy body recognised by the Board of Trade. These were significant 
changes which mark the 1948 Act as the major improvement in financial 
disclosure in the first half of the twentieth century. Thereafter, the 1967, 1976 
and 1980 Companies Acts as well as the SSAPs introduced by the accounting 
profession in the 1970s built on this solid foundation. The 1967 Act greatly 
expanded the information on directors’ interests and market values of 
investments and property in the Directors Reports and Notes included in the 
accounts.106 The 1981 Companies Act was an important piece of consolidating 
legislation, standardising formats and adopting disclosures first required by the 
SSAPs.107
Complementary to the protection afforded to shareholders by company law 
and accounting standards, the Committee for General Purposes of the LSE has 
regulated disclosure of firms seeking a listing both by publishing its listing 
requirements in the form of the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange 
(“the LSE Rules”). The first fully printed rule book dates from 1812 and the first 
listing requirement from 1824.108 In 1844, the “Quotation of Price” rule stated 
that the price of any security was not to be included in the (Official) List until 
approval of dealings was granted by the LSE.109 The LSE also provided 
guidance and scrutinised listing applications beyond the letter of the written 
requirements. Indeed, the LSE aimed to be ahead of company law in setting its
104 Arnold and Matthews (2002).
105 Arnold and Matthews (2002), Table 4.
106 Nobes and Parker (1979), p.202.
107 Bartlett and Jones (1997), p63.
108 Neal (2005), p.6; and p.10-11, this requirement was made by the Foreign Stock Exchange, a 
competitor of the LSE which merged itself into the latter in 1828.
109 ibid., p.13.
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own listing requirements.110 Up until 1973 the latter were laid down in the LSE 
Rules, principally Rule 159 and Appendix 34. Thereafter they were issued as 
the Admission of Securities to Listing (the “Yellow Book”). In 1918 the relevant 
sections of the LSE Rules amounted to no more than 4 pages in total. By 1979, 
there were over 100 pages of the Yellow Book dealing with listing requirements 
and procedures. The major innovations in the listing requirements of the LSE 
Rules are set out in Table 2-2. Unfortunately, there is no indication in the 
successive editions of the LSE Rules before 1973 when rule changes occurred, 
nor any record of how the LSE provided guidance on those rules.111 The whole 
apparatus of LSE regulation of IPOs remained self-regulatory up until the 
enactment of the Financial Services Act in 1986, when both the LSE itself and 
its rule book were brought under European and English law.
In the early twentieth century the LSE was content to allow the market to 
deal in almost any new issue provided there was no blatant price manipulation 
and only those securities for which an Official Quotation was sought required a 
prospectus and an application to the LSE before permission to deal was 
granted. This was perhaps understandable, given that new listings generated 
new commissions, if a little short-sighted. Hence, according to Lavington 
(1921), on the eve of WW1 a high proportion of new issues occurred without a 
prospectus.112 Although the Ruies and Regulations of the Stock Exchange 
dealt with firms seeking an Official Quotation, there was new issue activity both 
on and off the LSE which escaped any regulation whatsoever. In 1915, the 
government finally required the LSE to publish a Supplementary List of the 
prices of those shares being traded without an Official Quotation.113 At the end 
of WW1, the LSE required that all firms contemplating an IPO seek its 
permission before dealing was authorised and a requirement that an advertised 
statement in lieu of a prospectus should be placed in the press before 
permission to deal was granted.114 However, disclosure requirements
110 Michie (2001), p.416, cites a quotation from LSE Council minutes in 1956; The Stock 
Exchange (1979), para.55.
111 Furthermore, the Yellow Book was loose-leaf, the intention being that users simply replaced 
the old rules with the newly published ones. This has made it difficult for libraries to keep track 
of rule changes subsequent to 1973 also.
112 Lavington (1921), p.202.
113 Paish (1951), p.4; and King (1947), p.75-76.
114 Michie (2001), p.265 and footnote 80. A written rule (Rule 159 and Appendix 34) governing 
“new issues”, other than Official Quotations, did not appear until the 1922 Rule Book was 
published.
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concentrated on such matters as specimen certificates of incorporation, 
specimen allotment letters, a letter stating the number of shares for which 
permission to deal was sought and a copy of the prospectus and articles of 
association among other matters.115 No financial disclosure of any kind was 
mandated by the LSE Rules. Neither was there any requirement similar to that 
applicable to Official Quotations that two-thirds of an issue be placed in the 
hands of public investors. Despite the 1929 Companies Act having little impact 
on the content of company accounts, it did require the auditors’ report in a 
prospectus to detail the last 3 years profits of an issuing firm and of an 
acquisition where contemplated (4th Schedule, Part II, para.1). The amount of 
issue proceeds the firm intended to raise and the use to which they would be 
put also had to be clearly stated. Unusually, company legislation was ahead of 
LSE regulation in this instance. The opposite was more common. In 1964, the 
LSE went further than the Jenkins Committee’s recommendations and required 
new listings as well as seasoned firms to produce interim accounts, an analysis 
of trading results where a company has a broad spread of activities and 
disclosure on major interests in associated companies.116 Again in 1966 the 
LSE mandated disclosure of turnover by listed firms ahead of the Companies 
Act of the following year.
Editions of the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange exist for 
1915, 1918, 1922, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1934, 1946, 1951, 1968 and 1969 
in the Guildhall and the LSE Libraries. 117 My reading of these rule books 
together with comment from The Economist strongly suggests that there was 
little material change to the Rules prior to 1929. Michie’s own analysis supports 
this conclusion.118 The 1928 new issue boom and the subsequent market crash 
did cause the LSE to reflect more carefully on the importance of vetting new 
issue applications in order to protect investors from the worst excesses of share 
promotion and share-pushing. In 1934, the Rules were amended to require the 
disclosure of both the last balance sheet, the last profit and loss account and a 
working capital statement. Furthermore, the LSE looked to tighten regulation as
115 Morgan and Thomas (1962), p.152-3; Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange 1922, 
Appendix 34A.
11 The Economist 29/8/1964, p.846, “Squeezing out the secrets”
117 The minutes of the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations of the LSE in the Guildhall 
Library make reference to the preparation of a new edition in 1939. In 1973 the first “Yellow 
Book” was published.
118 Michie (2001), ch.5, especially p.265-66
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much by the way it provided “guidance” on the wording of its Rules as by 
introducing new Rules themselves. In August 1930, the Committee published a 
memorandum indicating that it would scrutinise certain types of applications 
very critically.119 The latter referred specifically to applications from companies 
whose major asset was a patent, from subsidiaries the parent of which had yet 
to publish a set of accounts, and from companies whose IPO preliminary 
expenses constituted an unduly large proportion of its issued capital. A further 
example is provided by the guidance on placings. In late 1935, the Committee 
reacted to the resurgence of share-pushing by publishing a notice announcing 
its intention to adopt a much tougher stance on placings in the future and 
preferring as a matter of principle that either a prospectus issue or an offer for 
sale be used.120 A final example around this same time is the increased scrutiny 
of individual cases by the Sub-Committee on New Issues and Official 
Quotations. In one case, it instigated and then cooperated with an inquiry by 
the ICAEW into the accountant’s report on historic profits included in the IPO 
prospectus of Silver and Steelcrafts.121
Placings remained a particular target of LSE regulation. Disclosure 
requirements with regard to placings were formally brought up to those of public 
issues and offers in the 1947 LSE Rules, although actual practice had virtually 
eliminated many differences prior to that date.122 In 1958, a change to the Rules 
requiring 25% of the outstanding shares of a listing firm be made available to 
outside investors (“marketability”) was aimed directly at reducing the number of 
placings and improving the transparency of the LSE’s share dealings.
Any stock exchange has the responsibility of providing ready access to the 
market in order to underwrite its long-term growth on the one hand and of being 
careful to regulate applications for new listings in order to protect investors from 
fraudulent and poor quality investment schemes on the other.123 In the 1950s 
and 1960s the LSE took the latter responsibility increasingly seriously. In the 
eyes of the LSE, a crucial determinant of suitability to list was the length of a 
company’s trading record. In 1951, auditor’s reports were now required to 
include 10 years of historic profits where the firm had been in existence that
119 The Economist, 16 August 1930, p.323-4, “The Stock Exchange Committee and the 
Investor”
120 LSE, Minutes Committee for General Purposes, 9 December 1935.
121 LSE, Minutes Committee for General Purposes, 6 January 1936 and 9 March 1936.
122 The Economist, 10 May 1947, p.729.
123 Farrar and Hannigan (1998), p.542, quotation from ch.9 of the LSE Listing Rules.
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long. Whilst not a mandatory requirement, it indicated the direction in which the 
LSE was moving and, in the late 1950s, the LSE was reluctant to list any 
company without a trading record.124 The LSE also raised the bar for the 
minimum firm size of IPOs in 1964 to £250,000 and in 1971 to twice that 
amount125. As a consequence, small, young companies were increasingly being 
excluded from launching an early IPO. By 1970 the LSE required a minimum 
trading history of at least 5 years and an issuing firm would most likely not be 
allowed to raise funds for new investment according to Michie (2001).126
Michie (2001) draws attention to the LSE’s growing dilemma between 
creating an expanding market for securities to the benefit of its member brokers 
and providing some level of protection for the ordinary investor from the worst 
speculative and fraudulent practices in the market. Protecting the ordinary 
investor demanded tighter regulation of applications for a listing. However, in 
the absence of the government conferring a monopoly in share dealing upon 
the LSE, the great fear was that tougher regulation would drive share and IPO 
business away. Such a dilemma slowed the pace at which necessary Rule 
changes governing disclosure were introduced. Despite acting more speedily 
than statutory law, the LSE still tended to react to events rather than anticipate 
them.
Recognising the success of NASDAQ in attracting young firms into going 
public in the US and how moribund the domestic IPO market had become, the 
establishment of the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in 1980 marked a distinct 
relaxation in the LSE’s tougher regulatory stance. Firms listing on the USM now 
only required a 3 year profits record and marketability of 10% as against 5 years 
and 25% on the Official List. Furthermore, the LSE took the decision to admit to 
the Official List firms such as Eurotunnel and biotechnology start-ups that did 
not have the requisite 3 years’ profits history.
Summarising this section, LSE regulation and company legislation in 
respect of disclosure as well as investor protection were weak during the 
interwar years. All the significant improvements fell into the second half of the 
last century. LSE regulation improved after 1945 and financial disclosure and 
investor protection after 1948.
124 Michie (2001), p.416
125 ibid., p.533
126 ibid., p.533
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2.5 London and the Provincial Stock Exchanges
In 1973 the LSE merged with the Provincial Stock Exchanges (PSE’s) and 
brought to a close the competition for both investor and new issue business that 
these exchanges had provided since the early 19th century. In the mid-1960s 
there had been 14 exchanges in England, 4 in Scotland and 1 each in Dublin 
and Belfast.127
Thomas’s study of the PSE’s gives some indication of their importance and 
activity prior to that date. At the peak of the railway boom in the mid-19th 
century, Liverpool had attracted more railway listings than London and 
Manchester was not far behind. There were also active markets in Sheffield, 
Birmingham, Bristol and Leeds.128 The period from the late nineteenth century 
until 1914 witnessed these same exchanges attracting IPO business. 
Birmingham specialised in IPOs in bicycle and automobile shares, Manchester 
(and Oldham) in textiles and Sheffield in iron and steel.129 The PSE’s were also 
very active in the 1920s. During the peak years of the new issue boom 
between 1926 and 1929, Manchester handled 172 issues, Birmingham 123, 
Liverpool 99, Bristol 86 and 9 other PSE’s 160.130 These figures include issues 
of preference shares and debentures as well as ordinary shares. There were 
by comparison 525 IPOs on the LSE, excluding debenture issues, based on my 
own estimates. Whilst I estimate approximately 10% of the latter also 
simultaneously attained a listing in the Provinces, I do not know what proportion 
of the Provincial listings quoted by Thomas also listed in London.
Although there is no reliable and comprehensive source of Provincial IPO 
activity, the late 1920s probably represented the peak in their importance 
relative to the LSE. Even so, in the interwar period firms seeking a listing were 
“too frequently compelled to go to London”131 and Liverpool and Manchester
127 Murphy and Prussmann (1967), p.169.
128 Thomas (1973), p.33
129 ibid., p .114
130 Issuing House Year Book 1934 and Thomas (1973), p.249
131 Thomas (1973), p.256
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both recognised that London “possesses the only true and the only ultimate 
market in stocks and shares”132.
After WW2, Provincial IPO activity declined sharply. Ghandi (1964) was 
able to trace only 379 IPOs of mainly ordinary shares between 1951 and 1960, 
of which 109 were placings and 243 were introductions. This figure compares 
to 736 IPOs launched on the LSE according to my own data over the same 
period. Given that the average proceeds of Provincial IPOs were lower than 
those raised in London, these IPO volume figures overstate the relative 
importance of the PSE’s.
How seriously did the PSE’s compete with the LSE for IPO business? 
Issue expenses were significantly lower in the case of placings but not 
necessarily in the case of offers for sale.133 Exchanges could also compete for 
IPO business on listing requirements. The strong impression given by Thomas 
(1973) is that IPOs on the PSE’s before 1914 were unregulated. Towards the 
end of the interwar years the main PSE’s moved rapidly towards adopting the 
listing requirements of the LSE, whilst the smaller exchanges were slower to 
assimilate.134 In the absence of a detailed comparison of the listing 
requirements of each exchange it is difficult to be precise as to when the PSE’s 
fell into line with the LSE. Although, formally speaking, the PSE’s did not 
assimilate their requirements with London until 1965, when they established the 
Federation of Stock Exchanges in Great Britain and Ireland, there were 
probably few material differences by 1945 in the case of the main exchanges 
such as Birmingham Liverpool and Manchester. As a consequence, the English 
PSE’s, particularly the latter three exchanges, would appear to have offered 
competition to London for IPO business both in terms of direct costs and more 
flexible listing requirements during the interwar years. There were of course 
also important stock exchanges in Scotland and Ireland but little or nothing is 
known about IPO activity on these exchanges.
Did the PSE’s do a better job for issuers than the LSE? In terms of explicit 
issue expenses, as already pointed out, they were cheaper for small firms 
considering a placing. More importantly, Lavington (1921) has argued that
132 ibid., p.220, footnote 31, quotation taken from the Minutes of the Liverpool and Manchester 
Stock Exchanges on 19th and 17th May 1922, respectively.
133 Ghandi (1964), p.254, Table X. Controlling for issue size, PSE placings cost around 10% or 
proceeds whereas LSE placings were twice that between 1945 and 1947.
134 Thomas (1973), p.215. The main PSE’s are taken to be Liverpool, Manchester and 
Birmingham.
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“local knowledge on the part of the investor ensured that securities were sold at 
prices fairly near their investment values” (p.208). Franks, Mayer and Rossi 
(2004) claim that this greater level of trust as well as the smaller information 
gaps between issuers, local brokers and investors oiled the new issue 
machinery in the early 20th century despite a weak regulatory environment. The 
implication is that, other things being equal, the PSE’s allowed firms to raise 
equity on better terms than did the LSE.
2.6 Summary
There are several important developments in the institutional environment 
for IPOs through the last century. Firstly, differences in issue methods must be 
taken into account in any study of IPO underpricing. The fixed offer price 
method dominated the market and tender issues were relatively few despite 
their attractions to issuing firms. Placings were likely to be more underpriced 
than public offers and issues. Secondly, although the process of investment 
institutionalisation most likely assisted the development of the IPO market 
through better shareholder monitoring and specialist VC investors, these 
benefits did not materialise until the 1980s at the earliest. The underwriting 
market witnessed the entry of reputable capital after 1945. The relevant 
question is whether this contributed to a more efficient IPO market or whether 
the benefits were internalised. I take this question up in chapter 5.
Regulation of both investor protection and financial disclosure was 
relatively weak in the first half of the last century. 1948 stands out as a major 
event on both counts. Whilst there was a noticeable hardening in the stance of 
the LSE during the 1930s, the financials disclosed were only as good as the 
accounting principles used to draw them up. As such, the 1948 Companies Act 
injected some backbone into accounting practice and introduced the important 
principle of a “true and fair view” as well as offering substantial additional 
protection to minority shareholders. Thereafter, there were important 
innovations such as the introduction of the first SSAPs in the early 1970s and a 
further strengthening of investor protection a decade later. A case might also 
be made for 1929 as a regulatory watershed. Prior to that date the LSE 
subscribed to the caveat emptor principle and left the buyers of IPOs to their
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own devices. However, ultimately the case for 1929 is let down by the 
continued lack of transparency in the accounts presented to shareholders. The 
major occurrences of regulatory progress were crowded into the second half of 
the last century.
Lastly, notwithstanding London’s dominance, the Provincial Stock 
Exchanges played an active role in the British IPO market in the first half of the 
last century and posed an alternative for some firms contemplating a listing. It 
is also possible that they enjoyed greater trust and lower information gaps 
between issuers and investors.
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Table 2-1: Investor Protection as measured by LLSV anti-director rights
index
The index, developed by LLSV (1998) and adapted by Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) to the 
British case, scores 1 for each of the following conditions which hold: (i) shareholder proxy 
voting is allowed; (ii) shareholders cannot be blocked from voting at a general meeting by for 
example requiring them to deposit their shares beforehand; (iii) cumulative voting and 
proportional representation of minority shareholders is allowed; (iv) minority investors can seek 
redress when oppressed by a majority shareholder; (v) the minimum percentage of votes 
required by shareholders to call an Extraordinary General Meeting is 10% or less; and (vi) 
shareholders enjoy pre-emptive rights over equity issues. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
Score Period Description of anti-director rights provision__________
1 1843-1947 Shares cannot be blocked (always been in place)
3 1948-1979 1948 Companies Act (s. 136 and s. 132 respectively)
allowed proxy voting and a minimum of 10% of voting 
shares to call an EGM
4 1980-1984 1980 Companies Act (s.17) recognised pre-emptive
rights of shareholders to new issues
5 1985-today 1985 Companies Act (s.459) recognised oppressed
minorities mechanism
Source: Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004), p37, Table 1 Panel B; LLSV (1998), p.1123
Table 2-2: LSE Rules and Guidance regarding IPOs 1915-86
Year Source Description Financial disclosure
Pre-1915 Rule 151, App.36 Rule Book Rules only covered firms seeking a quotation in the 
Official List (OL) includinq prospectus requirements
1915 Government guidance See text p.48 Establishment of Supplementary List to cover those 
shares traded but without an Official Quotation
1918-19 Rule 159 Rule Book New issues require grant of “permission to deal” by LSE 
Committee.
1919 LSE guidance Michie, p265 Advertisement or statement to be placed in press before 
permission to deal was granted if no prospectus.
1922 Rule 159 App.34A-D Rule Book Obtaining permission to deal in “new issues”. Less 
stringent than an application for Official Quotation.
1922 Rule 163 Rule Book Broker to give full information re issue. Previously 
applied to OL quotations; now extended to all 
applications.
1929 Rule 159 App.34A 
Rule 159 App.34B
Rule Book 
Rule Book
Guidance given re. “all material conditions relating to the 
formation of the Company and to the flotation of the 
issue”. Material conditions include: all rights attaching to 
each security: amounts and dates of securities 
previously issued; underwriting and other commissions 
paid and issue expenses to be paid; details of “Vendor” 
transactions; directors particulars and interests; details 
of all material contracts; shares under option.
Dividends paid on each share class for each of last 3 
years. No other requirement as to financial disclosure; 
no a dividend forecast required.
1934 Rule 159 App.34A-B Rule Book Prospectus or statement to include: 
a copy of last audited balance sheet and profit & loss 
account; working capital statement. No other 
requirement as to financial disclosure; no dividend 
forecast required.
1934 LSE guidance Michie p266 last 3 years profits
1939 LSE guidance The Economist,
25 Feb 1939, p.401-402
Holding companies to issue consolidated accounts
1951 Rule 159 App.34 Sch.ll 
Pt.A
Rule Book Auditors’ report disclosing: last 10 years’ profits or less 
where earlier incorporation; group accounts; 
trading statement; use of proceeds statement; qualified 
accountants’ report on any acquisition
Table 2-2: LSE Rules and Guidance regarding IPOs 1915-86 (continued)
Year Source Description Financial disclosure
1956 LSE guidance Michie p416 LSE favoured established firms rather than start-ups
1958 LSE guidance Michie p412 25% of shares outstanding to be made available to market at 
time of placing (“marketability”)
1963 Rule 159 App.34 Rule Book Memo giving further guidance on content and form of 
accountants reports; and
Memo re. prospectuses issued by property firms including 
independent valuation of properties and full disclosure of 
basis of valuation
1964 Rule 159 App.34 Michie p476;LSE Council 
Minutes 9 Mar 194
Min. market capitalisation of £250,000 i
1966 Rule 159 App.34 Michie p476; LSE Council 
Minutes 10 Jan 1966
Min. issue size of £100,000 turnover for last 3 years incl. breakdown between 
important trading activities
1970 Rule or guidance? Michie p476; LSE Council 
Minutes 19 Jan 1970
35% of shares outstanding to be made available at time of 
listing whether issue or placing
1970 Rule or guidance? Michie p533 5 year trading record reguired
1971 Rule or guidance? Michie p533 Min. market capitalisation of £500,000
1980 USM LSE 10% marketability 5 year trading record reguired
Sources: Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange; LSE Minutes, Manuscripts Section, Guildhall Library; Michie (2002).
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CHAPTER 3: A NEW IPO DATA SET 1915-79
The assembly of a long run data set on IPOs on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) is in itself intended as an important contribution of my thesis. 
Previous empirical studies of IPO underpricing in Britain (Table 1-1, chapter 1) 
have assembled data spanning no more than a single decade and all fall into 
the period after 1959. I have been unable to access data employed in other 
studies between 1959 and 1979 and have collected the necessary data 
myself. This chapter will describe the primary sources and the construction of 
the data set. I then use this data to illustrate how some of the main 
developments in the institutional environment discussed in the previous 
chapter, namely, changes in issue methods, in underwriting practice and in 
financial disclosure by issuing firms have influenced the characteristics of 
IPOs. This analysis is preparatory to the discussions of underpricing, 
underwriting and survival which follow in the next three chapters.
In this chapter, I discuss my primary and secondary data sources (3.1 
and 3.2), describe the combined data set (3.3) and analyse certain features of 
the interwar capital market (3.4). I then examine the time series of IPO 
volume (3.5), the relative importance of the offer and placing methods (3.6), 
the importance of IPO certification (3.7) and the characteristics of the IPOs in 
my data set (3.8) before summarising (3.9).
3.1 Primary Data Sources
My primary data source on IPOs is the Times Book of Prospectuses (the 
Times Books) which were published annually between 1890 and 1969 and 
continued as the Extel Book of New Issues (the Extel Books) after 1970. Data 
for the period 1970 to 1979 were supplemented from “New Equity Issue 
Statistics” published by Singer and Friedlander. Public issues and offers 
required the publication of a prospectus under the 1908 Companies Act. 
Having said that, 596 public companies were formed without a prospectus
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between 1911 and 1913 compared to 378 formed with one.135 Beginning in 
November 1919 any firm seeking permission for its securities to be dealt on 
the LSE had to publish in a national newspaper a prospectus or, if not a 
prospectus, then at least a statement.136 I have called the latter “information 
only” statements because these entries were conspicuous by the wording: 
“this statement is for information only and not an invitation to subscribe for 
shares”. These statements in the Times Books failed to distinguish between 
placings and introductions. In the interwar years and particularly during the 
1920s, these volumes also include corporate notices about mergers, 
reorganizations, capitalization issues, proposed issues requiring shareholder 
approval and other corporate actions. There are therefore many more entries 
in the Times Books than issues that took place. On occasions, the prospectus 
as published in the newspaper was abridged and I needed to consult the 
original prospectus.137 The Times Books include preference shares, 
debentures and other fixed interest securities as well as issues of ordinary 
shares. SEOs are covered as well as IPOs. Issuers include sovereign and 
municipal borrowers as well as corporations, both domestic and foreign.
Information on IPOs is also found in the Issuing House Year Books 
(IHYB) which were first published in 1929 and gave brief particulars on all 
issues. This source did not distinguish between placings and introductions 
before 1939.
I am interested only in the prospectuses or statements relating to IPOs 
of ordinary shares carrying voting rights. In the post 1945 period the vast 
majority of equity issues whether IPOs or SEOs have been of this type. In the 
interwar years issues of preference shares and debentures were as common 
as those of ordinary shares (see section 3.4 below). Entries in The Times 
Books numbered over 6000 in total between 1915 and 1939 comprising 
corporate notices as well as prospectuses. Only 1441 entries were ordinary 
share IPO prospectus or information statements. After 1945, the Times
135 Lavington (1921), p.202
136 Michie (2001), p.265
137 These are found in the Loan and New Company Prospectuses in the Guildhall Library. 
There were only 2 IPOs with an abridged prospectus for which the full prospectus was 
unavailable.
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Bopks give a clearer classification between IPOs and other types of issues 
such as rights issues, capitalisation and bonus issues, and reorganisations.
I collected the following data items from the prospectuses and 
information only statements: the number of shares offered, the security type, 
the date of publication of the prospectus, the offer or placing price, the 
number of shares outstanding, the method of issue, whether the IPO was 
underwritten or not, the proportion of the issue accounted for by new 
(“primary”) versus existing (“vendor”) shares where these figures were 
disclosed, whether the accounts were audited or not, the historic profits record 
and the net asset valuation of the listing firm and the identity of the 
underwriter. Data on number of shares offered, the offer price and the 
number of shares outstanding is verified against the new firm’s entry in the 
Stock Exchange Year Books (SXYB), the Issuing House Year Books (IHYB) 
and published reports in The Times and The Financial T/mes.138 This process 
provides a check as to whether the proposed issue actually went ahead and 
as to the number and offer price of the shares issued. It also enables me to 
distinguish an IPO from an SEO in those instances where the prospectus 
does not make this clear as was often the case in the days before rights 
issues became common practice in Britain. I verified the number of shares 
offered and the offer price of all interwar IPOs. The offer price never changed 
and there were only 20 IPOs out of 588 where the number of shares offered 
differed from that advertised in the prospectus, 18 of which involved a 
downward revision. From 1946 to 1969 I sampled the IPOs on a 1 in 4 basis 
and verified their details. None of these differed from the prospectus terms. 
Information on IPOs in the 1970s and 1980s was sourced from Singer & 
Friedlander and Buckland and Davies (1989) whose accuracy is assumed.
Share prices are collected from the Stock Exchange Daily Official List 
(SEDOL) published by the LSE. I have been unable to find share prices on 
IPOs before January 1915. Almost without exception IPOs began their new 
life on the Supplementary List rather than the Official List of the Stock
138 The Guildhall Library only maintains indexed files on firms applying for a listing before 
1939. The UK Listing Authority only has records for the most recent 6 years. Electronic 
sources such as Perfect Information allow access to the Regulatory News Service of the LSE 
but only from the early 1980s.
62
Exchange.139 The Official List carried prices of securities, including shares, 
which had been granted an Official Quotation by the LSE. The 
Supplementary List dates from January 1915 and was appended as a 
supplement to the Official List in the SEDOL until 1947 at which point the two 
Lists were merged. Prior to 1915 the SEDOL only carried price quotations of 
stocks on the Official List. There was no list of stocks dealt off the Official 
List. My analysis of the IPOs of ordinary shares for 1912 and 1913 indicated 
that approximately 10% of these appeared for the first time on the Official List 
after a lag of approximately 6 months following the IPO. I have yet to find any 
other source for pre-1915 IPO share prices. This finding is in itself indicative 
of the extremely lax regulation of the LSE at the beginning of the last century.
I collected share prices for the first day on which a share appeared in the 
SEDOL and the last day of the first month of trading. Bid-ask prices for IPOs 
were only published from 1931. All IPOs, with or without a bid-ask, spread did 
possess a string of price quotations, or “marks”, although these were not time- 
ordered. A mark refers to the marking slip completed by a broker giving 
details of the transaction in the said security. Completion of a slip was not 
compulsory. Being unable to obtain the closing price on the first day of 
trading I collected all marks on the first day of trading and calculated the 
simple average for IPOs up to 1939. After 1939, most IPOs were quoted in 
bid-ask form from the first day and I took the mid-market price.140 Where the 
bid-ask price was not available, I again collected all the marks and calculated 
the mean. Further discussion of share prices and IPO return calculations is 
reserved until the next chapter on underpricing.
An important feature of the pre-1939 stock market was the partly-paid 
share. In such a case, the investor was required to pay only a proportion of 
the issue price upon application and at the time of share allotment. The 
balance of the issue price, known as the call, was then payable at a single 
date or series of dates after the issue. In some cases the date of the call is 
not fixed at the time of issue and is at the discretion of the company. This call 
feature was common to IPOs up until 1939 but disappeared after 1945.
139 Only 3 IPOs in my data set listed directly on the Official List.
140 In the 1930s only 3 in 10 IPOs were quoted with a bid-ask spread on the first day. After 
1939 this rose to 3 in 4 IPOs.
Whilst it made sense for a company to call funds when it needed them and 
not before, in practice the investor was then contractually committed to paying 
the future call when declared due by the company. In an effort to minimise 
agency problems any investor would prefer that the company issue fully-paid 
shares to meet its estimated medium-term financing needs at the time of IPO 
and then return to the market again at a later date for any additional financing. 
Hence, the call feature has disappeared in the modern period as institutional 
investors have grown in influence. The existence of a call feature has 
implications for the calculation of IPO returns which are discussed in the next 
chapter.
There were a small number of IPOs conducted by way of an offer for 
sale by tender. Although a prospectus is published and the IPO underwritten 
in the same way as an offer for sale, the important difference is that investors 
are invited to tender for shares at or above a minimum price. The results of 
these tenders, namely, the price at which the shares were fixed (“strike price”) 
and whether or not the issue was oversubscribed, were extracted from reports 
in The Times and Financial Times. Tender IPOs are analysed in detail in 
chapter 5 along with developments in the underwriting market.
IPO survival rates are calculated by reference to both the SXYB and 
SEDOL to ascertain whether an IPO was subsequently delisted from the 
market, was acquired, or was still trading on the LSE within a fixed period, 5 
years, for example. Survival times, defined by the number of months an IPO 
continues as a listed company, are estimated in a similar way. Detailed 
discussion of survival rates and survival times is deferred to chapter 6.
3.2 Secondary Data Sources
I bring my analysis up to the end of 1986 to coincide with the timing of 
Big Bang, which marked the beginning of the end of the fixed price offer 
method in this country. Data on IPOs between January 1980 and March 1985 
were sourced from the Buckland and Davies (1989) data set deposited with 
the ESRC Data Archive. This includes both Official List and Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) IPOs. I have excluded introductions, transfers from
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another exchange, and privatisation issues. The inclusion of the latter is likely 
to bias any results given their size and the different objectives of the 
government compared to any other issuer.141
I therefore supplement my earlier data with 447 IPOs up to the end of 
1986. This figure comprises 276 IPOs listed on the USM and 72 on the 
Official List taken from Buckland and Davies (1989) covering the period up to 
March 1985, along with a further 99 IPOs on the Official List from January 
1980 to December 1986 which I have sourced myself. I do not currently have 
data on the 73 USM listings between April 1985 and December 1986. I have 
reconciled and supplemented any missing data on the Official List IPOs in the 
Buckland and Davies (1989) data set with my own data. I collected data on 
firm age, underwriting details, and pro forma net asset valuation although 
Buckland and Davies have data on some balance sheet items which enable 
an approximation to be made. These same variables are missing for the 276 
USM listings.
3.3 Data description
Table 3-1 summarises the annual time series for 5110 IPOs comprising 
4518 ordinary share IPOs between 1915 and 1979 plus 592 IPOs between 
1980 and 1986 including the 447 IPOs mentioned in the previous section. 
Included in this total are 164 “dual” share IPOs, 187 “penny” ordinary share 
IPOs, 418 placings which did not disclose the placing price, 646 introductions, 
222 ordinary share IPOs for which share prices could not be found in 
SEDOL,142 452 IPOs listed exclusively on a Provincial Stock Exchange for 
which a share price could not therefore be found in SEDOL, and 351 
investment trust IPOs. The 452 Provincial IPOs were advertised in the Times 
Books from 1946 until their merger with the LSE in 1973. This source 
captures none of the considerable Provincial IPO activity in the interwar years
141 See Jenkinson and Mayer (1994). Table 14.2 lists all privatisations between 1979 and 
1991 including the 7 offers for sale and 2 tender offers between 1980 and 1986.
142 The vast majority of these companies had an entry in the Stock Exchange Year Book. In 
some cases they were small IPOs or IPOs which had been scaled back presumably due to 
lack of demand. 83 of these IPOs occurred in 1919-20.
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discussed in the previous chapter. Included in these figures are 326 IPOs 
simultaneously listed in both the Provinces and London.
I make a number of exclusions following the practice of previous studies, 
namely, any firm already listed on another exchange and applying for a 
secondary listing as well as any firm transferring its listing from another 
market, investment trust shares and penny shares. An investment trust is a 
company set up to invest in a diversified portfolio of securities without taking 
on any management role in the investee firms. Information gaps faced by 
investors can either be much larger, as they were before 1939 when their 
managements gave out virtually no information regarding investment policy, 
or much smaller than the average industrial company when full disclosure of 
investment policy applies. Furthermore, underpricing can be regarded as 
another means by which the sponsoring issuing house or broker extract fees 
from the end investor. I propose therefore to treat investment trusts 
separately and research them outside this thesis.
Both penny ordinary share and dual share IPOs are excluded from my 
analysis of underpricing and survival rates given that they were prone to share 
price manipulation.143 Penny shares are defined as those shares with an offer 
price of 2 shillings or less. Such issues were characteristic of speculative 
mining and rubber share counters. Dual share IPOs involved the offer of 
preference shares together with ordinary shares, where the investor was 
obliged to subscribe for both together. The preference share usually carried 
an issue price of between 5 and 20 shillings, the ordinary share a 1 or 2 
shilling issue price. These issues were also susceptible to price manipulation. 
Insiders took most of the lower-priced ordinary shares in issue as 
consideration for overvalued assets injected into the newly listed company 
thereby guaranteeing a small float and a strong initial after-market price 
performance.144 Not surprisingly, the annual time-series of IPO volume
143 Thomas (1973), p250, footnote 19: “florin shares were used in pre-war rubber boom and 
proved very effective in attracting public subscriptions”. The Economist, 25 January 1930, 
p.180: “...the amazing appetite for gambling which sprung up in shilling, florin and other
shares of small nominal value.” See also Thomas (1978), p.37.
144 Thomas (1973), p250: “the widespread use of the shilling share...was closely linked with 
the deliberate restriction of the amount of ordinary capital”.
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confirms that penny and dual share IPOs were features of the late 1920s 
stock market and virtually disappeared thereafter (Table 3-1).
After these exclusions there remain 2103 ordinary share IPOs between 
1915 and 1979 for which I possess both share price and IPO details (column 
(2), Table 3-1).145 I add the 447 IPOs between 1980 and 1986 to this figure 
so that the analysis in the remainder of this chapter is based on these 2550 
IPOs where I have the data. Otherwise, the characteristics analysis is 
conducted on a sample of 2274 excluding the 276 USM IPOs for which I do 
not currently have data on firm age and underwriting arrangements. In the 
following chapter on underpricing, my sample size is 2170 IPOs further 
excluding the tender offers which are separately analysed in chapter 5.
3.4 The interwar capital market
Ordinary shares became the dominant form of corporate security in 
issue in Britain after 1945146, but how important were ordinary share issues 
and especially IPOs in the interwar years? How important were issues by 
domestic as opposed to foreign companies and how does my primary data 
source, The Times Books, compare with other published series such as The 
Economist? I deal with each of these questions in this section.
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 summarise all new issues included in The Times 
Book of Prospectuses for two representative years, 1927 and 1935. Both 
years displayed moderately heavy issuance without exhibiting the “excesses” 
of the boom years of 1928-29 and the share-pushing years of 1936-37. For 
each year, I have estimated the volume of issues in terms of both gross issue 
proceeds, calculated at fully-paid offer or placing prices, and of the number of 
issues on the LSE by all issuers, domestic or foreign, corporate, sovereign or
145 There were no IPOs in 1930 and so I included 5 SEOs by small and medium-sized 
companies; a sixth by Unilever was excluded on grounds of size. Underpricing of SEOs has 
also been well-documented in the empirical literature.
146 Tew and Henderson (1959) surveyed between 1949 and 1953 2549 quoted companies 
which in total made 359 ordinary share issues and 116 preference issues, p.17, Table 1.12. 
In 1960 the market value of all ordinary shares issued by industrial and commercial 
companies was £20.1 billion as compared to £1.7 billion for each of preference shares and 
debentures; by 1975 these market values had become £47.1 billion, £0.6 billion and £4.5 
billion respectively, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin vol.16 no.2 June 1976, “The cost of 
capital, finance and investment”, p.196, Table B, columns (1)-(3).
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local government and public authority. UK government and conversion debt 
issues are excluded. All gross proceeds are expressed in current prices.
Several interesting features stand out from a comparison of these two 
tables. Firstly, companies issued more debt than equity in 1927. Equity 
issues, both ordinary and preference shares, amounted to £56.2m whilst 
corporate debt issues totalled £112.5m. Secondly, whilst ordinary shares, 
both IPOs and SEOs, accounted for 43% of all issues advertised in The 
Times, preference share and dual share issues were also widely used. 
Thirdly, non-voting share issuance was common. Whilst all ordinary shares 
carried voting rights, usually on a 1 for 1 basis, only 2 out of every 5 
preference issues and 1 out of every 2 dual share issues did so. In 1935, the 
issuance picture is a little different. The total size of share issues (£50.0m) 
overhauls corporate debt issues (£48.7m). Preference share issues 
increased in importance relative to ordinary share issues accounting for 55% 
of the total. It would appear that ordinary share issuance still had to recover 
fully from the sharp decline in the stock market in 1929. the incidence of 
preference shares carrying voting rights declined sharply to represent barely 1 
in 10 preference and dual issues combined.
SEOs numbered only 20 in 1927 and 10 in 1935 representing 23% and 
6% respectively of equity issue proceeds. This estimate is likely to understate 
the true position because firms did not require a prospectus or information 
statement to be published in a national newspaper. Placings as opposed to 
issues by prospectus were relatively unimportant. Of the 15 share placings in 
1927, only 3 issues disclosed sufficient information to enable the estimation of 
gross proceeds. Placings became more popular in 1935 when there were 42 
share placings representing 20% of the total share issues by value. 
Sovereign debt issuance declined substantially in the wake of the collapsing 
gold standard and international capital flows.
The overall impression given by these data is that ordinary share issues 
were substantial but preference share and debt issues were as, if not more, 
important as a source of funds to domestic companies in the interwar years. 
Post 1945, the preference share has virtually disappeared as the voting
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ordinary share claimed investor portfolios.147 The issuance pattern of these 
two sample years is consistent with the view expressed by Scott (2002) that 
the interwar period was witnessing only the beginning of the rise of the cult of 
the equity. The other contrast with the modern period is the predominance of 
non-voting shares. This reflects a pre-hostile takeover state of the world 
where outside shareholders attached little if any value to being able to 
exercise “voice” in their dealings with corporate managements.
Table 3-4 provides a comparison of capital issues made on the LSE by 
domestic as against foreign companies. Investment Trust issues are 
separately disclosed given that they are likely to be investing in both domestic 
and foreign firms. Domestic corporate issues are defined by the locus of the 
firm’s operations, as disclosed by the prospectus, and not by place of 
incorporation. It was not uncommon for firms in industries such as natural 
resources to be incorporated in Britain but to have all their operations 
overseas. In the vast majority of cases in the interwar period, despite there 
being no disclosure of the geographic breakdown of turnover or assets, it was 
possible to determine the locus of operations from the prospectus. This was 
undoubtedly helped by the absence among the IPO population of multi­
divisional and diversified holding companies which grew to populate the 
corporate landscape of the fifties and sixties. Whilst 60% of equity and debt 
issues were on behalf of foreign firms in 1927, domestic corporate issues rose 
to represent 77% of all corporate issues by 1935, reflecting the Treasury 
restrictions placed on foreign issues in 1934. Foreign issues of equity and 
debt declined from £104m in 1927 to slightly below £10m in 1935. For similar 
reasons there was also a dramatic decline in sovereign issues or issues by 
foreign governments from £151m to £12m. The latter led directly to the 
decision made by reputable underwriters to focus henceforth their attention on 
industrial issuers. This is discussed further in chapter 5.
How do these figures compare with other published statistics? There 
are three statistical series covering capital issues in the interwar years, 
published by the Midland Bank, the Bank of England and The Economist. It is 
a massive task to try and reconcile my IPO data with these series, not least
147 See chapter 2, section 2.2.
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because I have concentrated upon ordinary share issuance to the exclusion of 
preference share and debenture issuance. All I can achieve here is to make a 
selective comparison for the two sample years. A detailed comparison of 
these three series particularly as regards the question of how much money 
was raised by the British capital market for domestic industry can be found in 
Henderson (1951), Appendix A, pp.155-161.
The series most comparable to my primary source, The Times Book of 
Prospectuses, is that of The Economist since it covered only issues on the 
LSE and only corporate issues, whether industrial, trading or financial. The 
“Home” issues component excludes British, Empire and Foreign government 
and local government issues, and foreign railway, mining finance and 
exploration, rubber and oil issues. However, those manufacturing and trading 
companies operating abroad but having a listing in London are included. 
Neither series excludes issues raising funds to be paid to vendors. The 
Economist estimates that domestic firms raised £134m and £184m in 1927 
and 1935, respectively.148 Even when following The Economist definition and 
including Investment Trusts among domestic firms, the figures of £71 m and 
£98m generated from The Times Book of Prospectuses are considerably 
smaller (Table 3-4). Part of the explanation for this discrepancy may be that 
issues to shareholders, both SEOs and secondary offerings of debt securities, 
are included in The Stock Exchange Year Book, the source of The Economist 
series, but are missing from The Times Book of Prospectuses.
In summary, the interwar London capital market was very diversified. 
Ordinary share issuance accounted for about 30-40% of total equity funds 
raised based on the two sample years. By the 1930s a clearer distinction 
between ordinary shares carrying voting rights and non-voting preference 
shares was emerging and domestic issuers were becoming more dominant as 
foreign issues fell into decline under the weight of capital restrictions and a 
collapse in international capital flows. Such reconciliation with other published 
series of capital issues as is possible indicates that the Times Books may 
underestimate the total volume of issues, most especially, of secondary 
issues.
148 Henderson (1951), p.160, Table A3, columns 2 and 3, and p.161, Table A.
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3.5 Annual Time Series of IPO Volume
Figure 3-1 graphs the annual time series of ordinary share IPOs based 
on the underlying data in column (2) of Table 3-2 supplemented with data 
from Levis (1990), Jenkinson and Trundle (1990) and Ljungqvist (2003). 
There were no IPOs in 1915 and 1916. During both WW1 and WW2 the 
capital markets were heavily restricted. In January 1915, responsibility for 
new issues of any kind passed to the Treasury which was primarily interested 
in channelling investment funds into British government debt.149 The position 
was very similar in September 1939, when the Treasury again took control of 
new issues.150 On both occasions, in 1919 and in 1946, there was a surge in 
IPO volume following the relaxation of issue restrictions.
Outside of these unusual periods, the annual time series clearly 
illustrates the existence of a cycle in IPO volume which generally fluctuates 
with real equity prices.151 1928 witnessed a boom in IPO volume. This was 
followed by a collapse between 1930 and 1933. Activity then recovered in the 
mid-thirties. After a period of catch-up in the late 1940s following the end of 
wartime restrictions, IPO volume was depressed for most of the 1950s. 
Activity was then sustained at high levels through the sixties and into the early 
seventies before the 1974 stock market crash led to a collapse in volume 
similar to that seen in the early 1930s. The establishment of the USM 
rejuvenated IPO activity in the 1980s. The build up in IPO volume in the late 
1990s, following the replacement of the USM by the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), culminated in the heaviest period of ordinary share issuance 
witnessed by the market at the very end of the century.
149 Michie (2001), p.167.
150 ibid., p.291.
151 The equity price series is taken from the CSFB Equity-Gilt Study (2003) and is deflated by 
a UK cost of living index. I have not tested the relationship between IPO volume and the 
equity index.
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3.6 Issue methods
The striking feature of Figure 3-2 is the decline in the proportion of IPOs 
undertaken by public issue and offer for sale (“public issues, offers”) and the 
corresponding rise in importance of placings and introductions. Before 1939, 
disclosure in the Times Books makes it difficult to distinguish between the latter 
two. The total sample covering the period to 1986 comprises 3734 ordinary 
share IPOs, including the 2550 IPOs discussed above plus those placings that 
did not disclose placing terms and introductions. The first placing appears in 
my data set in November 1919 following a change in the LSE Rules that 
required issuing firms to advertise a statement in lieu of a prospectus in a 
national newspaper.
Taken together, placings and introductions assumed growing importance, 
accounting for 29% and 52% of all ordinary share IPOs in the period to 1929 
and the 1930s respectively. These figures are comparable to The Economist's 
own estimate of 35% between January 1926 and September 1933.152 By the 
1950s the share of placings and introductions had soared to 83%. This trend 
was attributable not only to the desire of small firms to minimise issue costs but 
also to the more lax listing requirements governing placings. These were not 
brought fully into line with those of public offers and issues until 1963.153 The 
subsequent decline in the relative importance of placings reflects the desire for 
greater transparency and the stricter regulatory stance of the LSE in the 1960s 
and 1970s as discussed in the previous chapter. Following the establishment of 
the USM and a realisation by the market that this method was not to be 
misused, there was a resurgence in the use of the placing method given its 
suitability for small firms at which this new market was primarily aimed.
The other feature of Figure 3-2 is the small share of the tender offer 
method in the 1960s and again in the 1980s. There were 67 such issues in the 
1960s, only 1 in the following decade and 46 between 1980 and 1986. 
Thereafter the tender offer disappeared. I will return to the question of tender 
offers in chapter 5.
152 The Economist, 14 October 1933, p.723. This estimate covered both IPOs and SEOs and 
probably included preference as welll as ordinary shares.
153 See Chapter 2, Table 2-4.
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3.7 IPO Certification
If an IPO is underwritten, this assures the issuing firm that they will receive 
the gross proceeds of the issue less the underwriting commission and other 
issue expenses. I define underwriting to include either the actual underwriting 
of a public issue, the purchase of shares from the issuing firm before offering 
them on to investors as under an offer for sale, and the placing of shares with 
investors where the issuing house or broker has committed to take any shares 
not so placed. The latter is to be distinguished from a placing on a best efforts 
basis where the placing agent enters into no commitment to purchase any 
shares not taken up. When underwriting an IPO, the issuing house or broker 
commits their capital, both financial and reputational, to the transaction. It is 
also important from the standpoint of prospective investors in an IPO that the 
underwriter be a third party unconnected with the issuing firm and not a director, 
a controlling shareholder, or a vendor of existing businesses or assets to the 
issuing firm.
In the early days of the IPO market, it was not always the case that IPOs 
were underwritten by independent third parties. Figure 3-3 graphs the rising 
propensity to underwrite IPOs over the entire period. Before 1930, 30% of IPOs 
were not underwritten. The proportion underwritten then rises in the following 
decade and in the 1960s and 1970s reaches almost 100%. The dip in the 
1950s is probably attributable to the large number of placings, a portion of 
which were done on a best efforts basis.
It is also informative to look at how often the issuing house or broker sat 
on the board of directors of the issuing company as indicated by the prospectus. 
My prior expectation is that this would be a fairly rare occurrence given the 
extensive commentary on the lack of “involvement” of City institutions in 
industrial firms in the early 20th century. Whilst this is indeed the case, interwar 
underwriters did show a greater predilection to involve themselves in the affairs 
of their corporate clients than in the post 1945 era (Figure 3-4). In 
approximately 1 in 6 IPOs, the underwriter had board representation. This 
proportion however fell away to 1 in 20 in the 1950s and 1960s.
Certification can be carried out by auditors as well as underwriting banks 
and brokers. The propensity of issuing firms to signal their quality to the market 
by including an audited or professional asset valuation in their prospectus or
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statement was very low before 1929 but rose sharply in the following decade 
(Figure 3-5). Thereafter, all IPOs disclosed audited financials.154 An issuing 
firm can also choose to have their IPO underwritten by a prestigious bank or 
broker and their financial statements prepared by a reputable firm of 
accountants in order to signal further their quality to investors in expectation of 
raising equity on better terms both today and in the future. The role of 
prestigious underwriters is considered in chapter 5, whilst that of auditors is not 
dealt with by my thesis.
3.8 IPO characteristics
Firm age is based on the number of years difference between a firm’s 
founding date as disclosed in the Times Books or the SXYB and the year of the 
IPO. An attempt has been made to ascertain the original date of establishment 
of a business, where it pre-dates the date of incorporation of the firm seeking a 
listing. Determining the age of IPOs prior to 1929 is sometimes problematic due 
to poor disclosure. This often occurs where shares are issued by a new 
company of substantially the same name in order to take over the assets of an 
existing business, where shareholder and board control remain with the original 
management. In such cases, only the date of incorporation of the new 
company is disclosed in the prospectus and the prospectus remains silent on 
both the history and the financial performance of the “acquired” business. In 
this case, I have taken the date of incorporation as the founding date. Where 
there is no date of incorporation but a profits history is disclosed, I have taken 
the length of this track record as indicating firm age. Figure 3-6 charts the rise 
in the mean age of IPOs over the first half of the last century. Before 1929, 
mean firm age was only 12.4 years but this increased to 25.2 years in the 1930s 
and then to slightly over 50 years in the 1940s and 1950s, before subsequently 
declining modestly to around 40 years in the following two decades.
There are two possible explanations for this aging of the IPO sample. The 
first is that investors became more risk averse in the aftermath of the 1929 
collapse in the stock markets in London and New York. This would explain the 
greater maturity profile of IPOs in the 1930s but surely not thereafter. An
154 Any dip below 100% reflects IPOs with missing prospectuses.
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alternative explanation is provided by tighter LSE regulation, which had a direct 
influence on firm age.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the LSE introduced minimum listing 
requirements such as a minimum number of years of historic profits (track 
record). There was no such minimum until 1934, when 3 years of historic 
profits had to be disclosed (Chapter 2, Table 2-2). From 1951, 10 years of 
profits were required until the 1970s when 5 years were sufficient. However, 
this requirement appeared not to be mandatory, as evidenced by the fact that 
15% of IPOs between 1934 and 1979 did not meet this minimum (Table 3-5). 
The LSE exercised an element of discretion in considering applications to list. 
Nonetheless, the overall effect was to raise the mean length of track record 
from below 2 years in the 1920s to around 10 years in the 1940s and 1950s, 
followed by only a modest decline in the following two decades. This had the 
effect of pushing up firm age.
Further evidence of the impact of tighter LSE regulation is reflected in the 
sharp decline in the proportion of start-up IPOs and new money raised (Figure 
3-7). A start-up is defined as a genuinely newly-established business, where 
the majority of the IPO proceeds are raised by the sale of primary shares issued 
by the company for cash and are to be spent on capital expenditure and/or 
developing the new business.155 “New money” is therefore defined as the 
proportion of new or primary shares issued for cash out of the total shares 
issued, including shares issued in kind to vendors in consideration for assets 
and businesses acquired. The inadequacy of disclosure as to which shares 
were primary and which vendor prevented an estimation of the start-up and new 
money proportions before 1929.
As mentioned above, it was common before 1929 for a newly established 
firm (“newco”) to acquire the assets or business of an existing firm (“oldco”) 
where both shareholder and board control remained essentially unchanged. 
The vendors of oldco received shares in newco as consideration for selling that 
business and these shares were then offered or placed with investors as well as 
being listed. No new money is being raised in this situation. There were also 
instances where newco was established and sought a listing on the basis of 
acquiring, on an arm’s length basis, an existing asset or business for cash paid
155 New property firms acquiring an existing portfolio of assets are excluded.
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out of the proceeds of the IPO of newco. This is still not a start-up but in this 
case there is a change of ownership and management and new money has 
been raised as opposed to the IPO proceeds going straight to the vendors. 
Before 1929 disclosure regarding directors’ interests was poor and it was not 
therefore possible to establish when an acquisition occurred on an arm’s length 
basis. For this reason also, it was problematic to estimate the new money 
raised for all IPOs before 1929.
The proportion of start-ups proceeded to decline sharply from 8% in the 
1930s and to nothing after 1945 (Figure 3-7). This was most likely attributable 
to a mix of greater investor risk aversion, tighter regulation and higher taxation 
on both companies and wealthy individuals through rising death duties. 
Following the establishment of the USM there was a minor reappearance of 
start-up IPOs, numbering 12 in all and only one of which occurred on the Official 
List. Although the USM minimum track record was set at 5 years along with the 
Official List, the LSE was prepared to make exceptions in certain 
circumstances. However, the role of the USM was not to provide early stage 
venture capital finance, something which the pre-1929 stock market had 
undertaken as much by chance as by design.
Accompanying the decline in the importance of start-ups is a sharp fall in 
the amount of new money raised by IPOs out of total gross proceeds from over 
one-third in the 1930s to less than 10% by the 1950s. This proportion did rise 
progressively through the sixties and seventies and averaged 50% in the period 
1980-86.
Marketability, defined as the proportion of total ordinary shares 
outstanding which are offered or sold at IPO whether those shares are primary 
or vendor shares, is another IPO characteristic which has shown significant 
change over time. This proportion also declined through the interwar years into 
the fifties and then flattened out at around the 30% level (Figure 3-8).156 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, LSE Rules first required a minimum of 25% 
marketability for placings in 1958. This figure then rose to 35% on both offers 
and placings in 1970 (Chapter 2, Table 2-2). Whilst the average marketability 
for offers came close to this figure, that on placings did not.
156 It is possible that the interwar esttimate is overstated given that preference shares were more 
common at this time and may have (been viewed by investors as part of the firm’s equity despite 
frequently not carrying voting rights.
76
Does the tightening of disclosure and regulation from the mid-century 
onwards show up in IPO characteristics? Better disclosure should affect the 
level of detail disclosed in balance sheets or asset valuations of issuing firm’s 
over time (Figure 3-9). A simple count of the number of items excluding 
aggregated figures provides an indication of the level of disclosure. The mean 
number of balance sheet items disclosed by IPOs increased steadily from low 
single digits in the 1920s, to an average of 10 through the 1930s before 
approaching a level of 20 items just before the 1948 Act was introduced. In the 
10 years following the 1948 Act, the number of items shows no further increase.
Broadly, this result agrees with the findings of a study of the change in 
financial disclosure of 50 large British firms between 1920 and 1950. Arnold 
and Matthews (2002) found that the average number of items disclosed in the 
balance sheet increased hardly at all between 1920 (36.2 items) and 1935 (38.7 
items) but had increased dramatically (57.2 items) by 1950. There are two 
differences however in comparison with my results. Firstly, the average number 
of items disclosed by IPO prospectuses is far fewer than that of the Arnold and 
Matthews’ sample, even after 1945 when they reach their peak. This is almost 
certainly attributable to the much smaller size of the IPO firms compared to the 
large British companies of the Arnold and Matthews’ sample. Secondly, there is 
a marked improvement in the number of items disclosed by IPOs before the 
introduction of the new Companies Act in July 1948 but not thereafter. The rise 
in the number of items is consistent with more disclosure being urged by a 
combination of the accounting profession in the wake of the Royal Mail scandal, 
and the LSE tightening its listing requirements. This finding cannot be tested 
against the Arnold and Matthews sample given the lack of a continuous sample. 
In addition, the simple measure of disclosure employed here does not capture 
the way in which the 1948 Act was crucial to improving the quality of financial 
statements.
The tighter scrutiny by the LSE of applications to list by way of a placing 
manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, between 70% and 80% of the placings in 
my data set during the interwar years did not disclose the placing price. By the 
fifties and sixties, non-disclosure of the placing price had dropped to almost 
10%. Secondly, there was a decline in the average size of firms conducting 
their IPO by way of a placing from the 1940s onwards (Figure 3-11). As the 
LSE applied its guidance more strictly, the firm size of IPOs by placing fell to
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legs than half that of the interwar years (Figure 3-10). In contrast, firms 
undertaking public issues and offers were becoming much larger from the 
1950s onwards. These figures exclude the privatisations of the 1980s.
Firm risk is proxied by firm age and firm size, both of which increased 
between 1945 and 1979, suggesting IPOs were becoming less risky. A third 
proxy is firm valuation. Fig 3-11 graphs firm valuation measured by book value 
to offer price (BVP), where book value is pro forma net asset value per share 
attributable to voting shareholders.157 After a sharp increase in the 1950s, 
valuations decline over the next two and a half decades. This initial increase is 
perhaps due to the improved disclosure of asset values prompted by the 1948 
Act.
An industry breakdown of IPOs is less than satisfactory (Table 3-6). 
Classifications by the LSE were somewhat crude over the majority of this period 
of study. Only in the 1980s did the LSE develop a richer industry classification. 
As a result, 80% of the 2274 IPOs fell into the “Commercial, Industrial, etc” 
sector. The next most important sector was Property with a 6% share. The 
three natural resource sectors (Mines, Oil, and Tea Coffee and Rubber 
Plantations) accounted for 7% of IPOs in the data set. Following Edelstein 
(1982), who defined foreign securities by their sector classification, the natural 
resource sectors represent foreign IPOs. All but 20 of these 157 IPOs occurred 
in the interwar years. Hence, on this somewhat crude measure, whilst almost 1 
in 4 interwar IPOs were foreign firms, only 1% of post-1945 IPOs were.
Finally, there were 161 IPOs undertaking R&D activity as indicated by the 
prospectus, amounting to 7% of all IPOs in my data set. There was no 
disclosure of amounts actually spent on R&D until the IPO by Standard 
Telephones and Cables in June 1979. Such disclosure was not required until 
the introduction of an accounting standard on R&D in 1977. I consider how 
R&D firms were treated by the IPO market in chapter 6.
157 Where the prospectus disclosed a market valuation of any asset by professional valuers or 
by directors, any surplus over book costs was included in the net asset value calculation.
78
3.9 Summary
I have described the data set in detail and provided quantitative evidence 
to illustrate some of the main developments in the environment surrounding the 
IPO market which were analysed in the previous chapter.
The interwar capital market was quite diverse. Preference and debenture 
issues by companies both domestic and foreign were as common as ordinary 
share issues. Nevertheless, there were early signs that ordinary shares were 
displacing voting preference shares as the chosen equity instrument.
Changes in the characteristics of the IPO data set over time reflect the 
improvements in regulation and disclosure. There was a sharp rise in the 
proportion of IPOs with audited accounts from only 25% before 1929 to 100% 
by the 1940s and also in the number of balance sheet items disclosed. 
Although these measures showed substantial improvement ahead of the 1948 
Act, neither is able to capture the improvement in the quality of financial 
disclosure consequent upon the enactment of this legislation. The LSE 
toughened up its scrutiny of IPOs, leading to a sharp rise in the mean firm age 
and mean track record after 1929 to around 50 years and 10 years, 
respectively, in the 1940s and 1950s. These averages declined only modestly 
thereafter. In the 1980s, the establishment of the USM led to a noticeable fall in 
the track record and a rise in new money raised, substantiating claims that this 
new market rejuvenated IPO activity by attracting younger, expansionary firms.
Together with the disclosure of audited accounts in the IPO prospectus, 
the underwriting of IPOs became the norm. Whereas 3 out of every 10 IPOs 
were not underwritten in the 1920s, virtually all IPOs were underwritten from the 
1960s onwards. In general, underwriters chose not to be represented on the 
board of directors of issuing firms.
Firm size increased along with firm age. Firms undertaking placings 
became smaller, reflecting the desire by the LSE to eliminate instances of the 
abuse of this method and to limit its use to small firms wishing to minimise IPO 
expenses. Firm valuations rose from the 1960s onwards. Based on age and 
size, firms seeking a listing were becoming less risky; based on valuation, they 
appeared more risky.
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In the next chapter, I consider the behaviour of IPO underpricing and how 
it was influenced by changes in variables such as firm size, age, valuation and 
marketability along with the changes in disclosure, regulation and underwriting 
practice. The impact of these same factors on IPO survival is considered in 
chapter 6.
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Table 3-1: Total Volume of Ordinary Share IPOs 1915-86
My data cover the period up to 1979. Data for 1980-86 were taken principally from the data set of 
Buckland and Davies (1989). Provincial IPOs are listed on a Provincial Stock Exchange only. 
Columns (2) to (8) exclude Investment Trusts (IT’s). Penny share IPOs have offer prices equal to 
or less than 2 shillings. Dual share IPOs are combined offers of ordinary share and voting 
preference shares. “Placings, no price” are IPOs which did not disclose the placing price. “Not 
quoted” indicates where a share price could not be found in SEDOL. Column (1) is the sum of 
columns (2) to (9). The number of introductions for 1985 and 1986 exclude those on the USM.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Ordinary Dual Penny Placings Intro­ Ordinary Provincial Investment
IPOs Share share share no price ductions not quoted Trusts
1915-86 5,110 2,550 164 187 418 766 222 452 351
1915-79 4,518 2,103 164 187 418 646 222 452 326
1915 2 0 0 0 0 na 2 0
1916 0 0 0 0 0 na 0 0
1917 4 1 0 0 0 na 3 0
1918 4 3 0 0 0 na 1 0
1919 82 43 4 1 0 na 33 1
1920 135 62 6 11 4 na 50 2
1921 13 3 4 2 0 na 4 0
1922 20 5 5 0 7 na 3 0
1923 30 13 4 7 2 na 2 2
1924 41 8 4 2 15 na 5 7
1925 89 39 6 20 12 na 4 8
1926 51 20 5 3 8 na 8 7
1927 89 38 21 1 11 na 5 13
1928 219 75 67 33 14 na 4 26
1929 100 45 9 20 8 na 7 11
1930 6 5 1 0 0 na 0 0
1931 5 3 2 0 0 na 0 0
1932 6 5 1 0 0 na 0 0
1933 35 10 2 3 15 na 4 1
1934 81 36 5 6 27 na 7 0
1935 101 49 7 4 36 na 4 1
1936 136 65 6 3 58 na 3 1
1937 94 48 4 0 28 na 4 10
1938 18 9 0 1 7 na 0 1
1939 11 3 1 3 3 na 1 0
1940 3 1 0 0 0 na 2 0
1941 6 1 0 0 1 na 4 0
1942 5 1 0 0 2 na 2 0
1943 3 1 0 0 1 na 1 0
1944 8 4 0 0 3 na 1 0
1945 20 8 0 0 11 na 0 1
1946 168 60 0 2 29 44 22 5 6
1947 190 96 0 4 19 20 28 19 4
1948 140 64 0 2 29 32 6 7 0
1949 64 36 0 4 1 15 1 7 0
1950 61 28 0 2 3 16 0 11 1
1951 77 38 0 4 1 18 0 15 1
1952 50 19 0 5 2 13 0 11 0
1953 75 32 0 11 0 16 0 16 0
1954 72 40 0 8 10 13 0 0 1
1955 85 39 0 8 1 15 0 21 1
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
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Table 3-1: Total Volume of Ordinary Share IPOs 1915-86 (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) O )
Total Ordinary Dual Penny Placings, Intro­ Ordinary Provincial Investment
IPOs share share share no price ductions not quoted Trusts
57 15 0 8 1 20 0 11 2
50 23 0 1 1 21 0 0 4
65 36 0 1 3 20 0 0 5
135 80 0 2 15 10 0 20 8
149 93 0 1 3 12 0 28 12
102 60 0 2 2 13 0 17 8
121 68 0 1 2 12 0 23 15
162 63 0 0 4 21 0 40 34
200 76 0 0 3 24 0 71 26
148 58 0 0 3 24 0 55 8
82 31 0 0 8 21 0 13 9
78 30 0 0 3 22 0 18 5
156 81 0 0 2 41 1 24 7
108 56 0 0 0 38 0 6 8
58 53 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
76 59 0 1 0 5 0 7 4
152 88 0 0 0 16 0 0 48
104 43 0 0 0 45 0 2 14
14 1 0 0 0 13 0 0
16 2 0 0 0 13 0 1
17 5 0 0 0 11 0 1
18 6 0 0 0 12 0 0
24 11 0 0 0 13 0 0
27 9 0 0 0 17 0 1
31 14 0 0 0 15 0 2
76 52 0 0 0 20 0 - 4
82 57 0 0 0 22 0 - 3
127 103 0 0 0 20 0 - 4
144 109 0 0 0 34 0 - 1
66 56 0 0 0 4 0 - 6
66 56 0 0 0 5 0 - 5
Table 3-2: New Issues Advertised in The Times Book of Prospectuses 1927
Amounts (£000) represent gross proceeds estimated at issue or placing prices in current prices. Percentage figures are expressed with respect to total 
share and total debt issues respectively. New issues are classified by type of security (shares versus debentures), by issue method (prospectus issues 
versus placings) and by stage of issue (IPO versus SEO). “Dual” share issues are issues of ordinary and preference shares where the investor must 
subscribe for both shares in fixed proportion. Preference shares were issued with or without voting rights either by themselves as a component of dual 
share issues. All ordinary share issues in 1927 carried voting rights. Debt issues include debentures, bonds, notes and other debt securities. UK Treasury 
debt issues are excluded as are conversion issues.
(i) Shares Total
£000
% No. ProspectusIPO
£000
% No. ProspectusSEO
£000
% No. Placings
£000
% No.
Ordinary 23,982 43% 54 22,087 39% 48 1,894 3% 6 0%
including:
Investment Trusts 5,050 9% 8 5,050 9% 8 0 0% 0 0%
Preference 19,123 34% 37 11,509 20% 27 6,627 12% 7 987 2% 3
Voting 6,739 11% 16 4,925 8% 11 827 1% 2 987 2% 3
Non-voting 12,384 21% 21 6,584 11% 16 5,800 10% 5 0%
Dual 13,052 23% 41 8,588 15% 34 4,464 8% 7 0%
Voting 6,286 11% 22 3,971 7% 20 2,315 4% 2 0%
Non-voting 6,766 12% 19 4,617 8% 14 2,149 4% 5 0%
Total 56,157 100% 132 42,185 75% 109 12,985 23% 20 987
COCM
(ii) Debt Total
£000
% No. All Offers 
£000
% No. Placings
£000
% No.
Corporate 112,546 37% 60 94,721 31% 48 17,825 6% 12
Sovereign 151,469 50% 27 151,469 50% 27
local governments and public authorities 37,871 13% 30 37,386 12% 29 485 0% 1
Total 300,886 100% 117 283,577 93% 104 18,310 7% 13
Table 3-3: New Issues Advertised in The Times Book of Prospectuses 1935
Amounts (£000) represent gross proceeds estimated at issue or placing prices in current prices. See comments in Table 3-2.
(i) Shares Total
£000
% No. ProspectusIPO
£000
% No. ProspectusSEO
£000
% No. Placings
£000
% No.
Ordinary 14,968 30% 78 9,614 19% 50 1,543 3% 6 3,811 8% 22
including:
Investment Trusts 0 0% 0 750 2% 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 0
Preference 27,498 55% 71 20,188 40% 49 1,185 2% 3 6,124 12% 19
Voting 1,551 3% 11 710 1% 7 713 1% 2 129 0% 2
Non-voting 25,946 40% 60 19,478 39% 42 473 1% 1 5,996 12% 17
Dual 7,513 15% 26 7,053 14% 24 300 1% 1 160 0% 1
Voting 1,322 3% 7 1,022 2% 6 300 1% 1 0 0% 0
Non-voting 6,031 12% 19 6,031 12% 18 0 0% 0 160 0% 1
Total 49,979 100% 175 36,855 74% 123 3,028 6% 10 10,095 20% 42
(ii) Debt Total % No. All Offers % No. Placings % No.
£000 £000 £000
Corporate 48,664 45% 77 39,303 36% 37 9,361 9% 40
Sovereign 12,287 11% 4 11,794 11% 3 493 0% 1
local governments and public authorities 47,630 44% 26 44,891 41% 21 2,740 3% 5
Total 108,581 100% 107 95,987 88% 61 12,594 12% 46
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Table 3-4: Corporate New Issues Advertised in The Times Book of 
Prospectuses 1927 and 1935
Equities are both ordinary and preference shares. Amounts (£000) represent gross proceeds 
estimated at issue or placing prices in current prices. See text for definitions of domestic and 
foreign.
(i) 1927
total
£000
% dom estic
£000
% Inv. Trusts  
£000
% foreign
£000
%
equities 56,157 32% 34,743 20% 6,4900 4% 21,414 12%
debt 112,546 64% 27,394 16% 2,158 1% 82,995 47%
total 175,193 100% 62,137 35% 8,648 5% 104,409 60%
(ii) 1935
total
£000
% dom estic
£000
% Inv. Trusts  
£000
% foreign
£000
%
equities 49,979 46% 42,373 39% 2,800 3% 4,806 4%
debt 58,026 54% 41,181 38% 11,882 11% 4,963 5%
total 108,004 100% 83,555 77% 14,682 14% 9,768 9%
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Table 3-5: IPOs with less than the minimum Track Record 1935-79
“Track Record” is the number of years of historic profits which are disclosed in the 
prospectus or statement. “Minimum” refers to the minimum number of years profits 
required by the LSE. There are 2 missing observations.
IPOs with IPOs with IPOs with %IPOs<
Track<3yrs TrackdO yrs Track<5yrs min.Track N Obs.
1935 19 39% 49
1936 15 23% 65
1937 7 15% 48
1938 2 22% 9
1939 0 0% 3
1940 0 0% 1
1941 0 0% 1
1942 0 0% 1
1943 0 0% 1
1944 0 0% 4
1945 1 13% 8
1946 0 0% 60
1947 1 1% 96
1948 0 0% 64
1949 0 0% 36
1950 0 0% 28
1951 2 5% 38
1952 1 5% 19
1953 3 9% 32
1954 5 13% 40
1955 5 13% 39
1956 3 21% 14
1957 2 8% 24
1958 10 28% 36
1959 26 33% 80
1960 17 18% 92
1961 14 24% 59
1962 17 25% 69
1963 9 15% 61
1964 13 18% 74
1965 8 15% 55
1966 8 26% 31
1967 5 17% 30
1968 20 27% 73
1969 17 30% 56
1970 4 7% 55
1971 3 5% 61
1972 6 7% 89
1973 3 7% 45
1974 0 0% 1
1975 0 0% 2
1976 0 0% 5
1977 1 17% 6
1978 0 0% 11
1979 0 0% 9
Total 15% 1681
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Figure 3-6: SEDOL Classification of IPOs 1917-86
N=2274 excluding USM listings. Transport combines 
“Shipping” and “Tramways”; and Utilities combines “Gas” and 
“Electrical Lighting & Power”.
SEDOL SECTOR N %
TEA, COFFEE & RUBBER 50 2.2%
MINING 75 3.3%
OIL 32 1.4%
PROPERTY 139 6.1%
BANKS 21 0.9%
FINANCIAL TRUSTS 40 1.8%
INSURANCE 36 1.6%
BREWERIES & DISTILLERIES 19 0.8%
TRANSPORT 18 0.8%
UTILITIES 6 0.3%
IRON COAL & STEEL 28 1.2%
COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ETC 1810 79.6%
2274 100.0%
Figure 3-1: Annual Time Series of IPO Volume 1917-2002
The underlying data for 1917 to 1986 are taken from column (2) in Table 3-1. 1987 and 1988 estimates from Levis (1990); 1989 estimate from Jenkinson & 
Trundle (1990); and 1991-2002 from Ljungqvist (2003). 1990 is my own estimate which excludes USM IPOs as does the Jenkinson & Trundle estimate for 
1989. The UK Equity Index is taken from the CSFB/Barclays Capital Equity-Gilt Study and is expressed in 2004 prices.
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Figure 3-2: IPO Volume by Issue Method 1917-86
N=3734 equalling the sum of columns (2), (5), and (6) in Table 3-1. Before 1939 
introductions cannot be separately distinguished from placings.
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
□ Offers ■ Placings ■Introductions ■ Tenders
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Total IPOs 436 407 479 549 874 422 567
Offers 71% 48% 29% 17% 39% 52% 26%
Placings 29% 52% 48% 54% 28% 13% 45%
Introductions na na 23% 29% 26% 34% 21%
Tenders 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 8%
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Figure 3-3: Proportion of IPOs Underwritten 1917-86
“Underwritten” signifies an IPO underwritten by a third party and excludes underwriting by the 
issuing firm’s directors, controlling shareholders or the vendors to the issuing firm. N=2266 and 
excludes USM IPOs. Missing obs.=8.
100%
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
% 1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Underwritten/Total IPOs 70% 89% 94% 88% 98% 98% 99%
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Figure 3-4: Board Representation 1917-79
The percentage represents the proportion of all IPOs where the underwriter has board 
representation at the time of the IPO. I have not collected data for 1980-86. N=2096. Missing 
obs.=7.
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Figure 3-5: IPOs disclosing audited financials 1917-79
The denominator of the percentages shown below is the number of IPOs capable of disclosing 
a balance sheet or independent asset valuation and therefore excludes IPOs with firm age 
equal to zero. N=1937. Missing obs.=117, all in the period 1915-29.
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
% 1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Audited/Total 25% 64% 100% 100% 100% 99% 100%
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Figure 3-6: Mean Firm Age and Track Record of IPOs 1917-86
Firm age is the number of years the business has been trading and often predates the date of 
incorporation. Track record is the number of years of historic profits disclosed in the 
prospectus. In the case of 30 IPOs with minimal disclosure firm age was taken as being 
indicated by track record. N=2261 excluding USM IPOs with missing obs.=13 for firm age. 
Mean age for 1980-86 is likely to overestimate the true IPO population mean. N=2550 with 
missing obs.=0 for track record.
60.0
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
lA g e  ■ Track Record
No. of years 1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Firm age 12.4 25.2 50.8 51.8 39.4 42.7 36.4
Track record 1.4 3.4 10.7 9.6 9.1 8.4 4.7
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Figure 3-7: IPO Start-Ups and New Money raised 1930-1986
“Start-ups” are newly established businesses the majority of whose IPO proceeds is new 
money. N=2194 Missing obs.=1. “New money” is the proportion of the total shares issued at 
IPO represented by the sale of primary shares by the issuing company for cash. N=2189. 
Missing obs.=6.
I am not able to estimate either variable for 1917-29.
60%
1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
B Startups% ■Newmoney%
1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
No. start-ups 18 0 0 1 0 12
Start-ups %Total 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
% New money 37% 10% 6% 17% 32% 50%
Note: I have estimated the number of start-ups among USM IPOs between 1980 and 1986 
despite not having age data on the basis that the lack of a track record in the prospectus is 
sufficient indication.
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Figure 3-8: Marketability of IPOs by Issue Method 1917-86
Marketability is defined as the proportion of total shares outstanding which are offered or placed 
at the IPO. N=2550.
90%
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
■ Offers ■Placings
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Offers 79% 67% 51% 44% 33% 34% 33%
Placings 55% 49% 45% 32% 31% 27% 27%
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Figure 3-9: Balance Sheet Disclosure 1917-58
“No. of Items” equals the number of separate items on both the assets and liabilities sides of 
the balance sheet or professional asset valuation statement (in the absence of a balance 
sheet), excluding sub-totals. The 1917 observation is based on a single IPO. N=849 and 
excludes start-ups.
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Figure 3-10: Firm Size of IPOs 1917-86
Firm size is defined as voting share market capitalisation of the IPO at the offer price expressed 
in 2004 prices. N=2550.
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1915-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
■ all ■ offers ■ placings
£000 1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
All IPOs 15,529 17,499 18,125 18,237 24,070 48,252 54,334
Offers 14,582 16,684 24,056 44,188 31,328 57,367 92,601
Placings 21,905 21,552 12,018 8,983 9,680 12,235 12,902
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Figure 3-11: IPO Valuations 1917-86
Book value to offer price (BVP) is defined as ratio of the proforma net asset value attributable to 
voting shareholders per share to the offer (or placing) price. N=2390. Missing obs.=160.
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
(X) 1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
BVP 1.02 0.81 0.67 1.10 0.61 0.47 0.46
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CHAPTER 4: IPO UNDERPRICING 1917-86158
I define underpricing as the rise in the share price at the end of the first 
day of trading over the offer price. The difference represents a positive initial 
return to investors in the IPO. It also represents the difference between the 
proceeds the firm actually received as opposed to what they should have 
received had offer pricing been more accurate. The greater is this positive 
return, the lower are gross IPO proceeds and therefore the greater is the money 
issuing firms and selling shareholders have “left on the table”.
Underpricing is a well documented feature of international IPO markets 
over the last three decades. Previous empirical studies of underpricing were 
reviewed in chapter 1. Several British empirical studies ranging over the period 
between 1959 and 2002 have also reported IPO underpricing significantly 
different from zero (Table 4-1). The latest study by Ljungqvist (2003) reported 
mean underpricing of 29.10% between 1991 and 2002. There has been no 
underpricing study in Britain prior to that of Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) 
over the period 1959-63, despite The Economist pointing out that issuers were 
leaving considerable sums of money on the table as early as 1929.159
In this chapter, I examine underpricing behaviour between 1917 and 1986. 
The choice of end date is intended to coincide with Big Bang and reflects the 
fundamental changes marking the beginning of the end of the fixed offer price 
regime. With a new IPO data set covering the period 1917-79, supplemented 
by data predominantly from Buckland and Davies (1989) for the period up to Big 
Bang, I consider three main questions in this chapter. Firstly, is there evidence 
of underpricing in this period and how does it compare to the results from 
existing studies of the modern period? Secondly, to what extent can existing 
theory explain observed underpricing? Lastly, did the improvements in 
regulation, financial disclosure and investor protection and the emergence of a 
more orderly underwriting market in the second half of the century discussed in 
chapter 2 reduce underpricing, other things being equal?
The results of this chapter confirm the existence of positive first-day 
returns averaging 12.14% across 2436 IPOs on the LSE between 1917 and
158 There were no IPOs falling into my sample for which share prices were available in 1915 and 
1916.
159 27 July 1929, p. 175-6.
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1986, excluding tender offers.160 Returns were statistically significantly different 
from zero in all decades. Contrary to my prior expectation, underpricing rises 
over time. Having averaged only 7.65% in the interwar years, returns rose to 
average 15.25% between 1955 and 1986.161 I have modest success in fitting a 
linear model of underpricing to this data. Controlling for the changing risk 
composition of the IPO sample, issue method and overall equity market 
conditions, this puzzling underpricing result still holds.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section 4.1, I review the theory 
of underpricing relevant to the period and set out a simple linear model for 
underpricing in section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses data issues specific to 
estimating underpricing. Section 4.4 presents my results and section 4.5 
summarises.
4.1 Explanations of underpricing 1917-86
Having reviewed the literature on underpricing theory in chapter 1, I 
recapitulate on the points most relevant to modelling the behaviour of 
underpricing over the period 1917-86.
Theory has run ahead of the ability of empiricists to go back in time in 
order to test it. Some theories are not relevant to this period. As I argued in 
chapter 1, irrelevant theories include signalling, information revelation and legal 
liability theories. Signalling is precluded by the adoption of pre-emptive rights 
after 1945. The information revelation hypothesis assumes book-building of the 
IPO, a method not employed in Britain until after Big Bang. Tender issues have 
some of the characteristics of book-building. Given their differences from fixed 
price offers, they are excluded here and discussed in the next chapter. Legal 
liability theories are ruled out by the unwillingness of the British legal system to 
allow shareholders resort to any claim for damages.162
Most recently, the surge in underpricing in both the US and the UK at the 
end of the nineties spawned an interest in behavioural explanations focussing 
upon the influence of “irrational” investors prepared to bid up IPO share prices
160 This mean return is 10.37% excluding the USM IPOs.
161 Excluding the USM IPOs, the 1955-86 mean is 13.18%.
162 Jenkinson (1990), p.46.
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beyond their fair value.163 This type of hypothesis is more amenable to 
explaining hot IPO markets than any structural changes in underpricing over 
time. The experience of the late nineties, particularly in the US, also gave rise 
to hypotheses built on new varieties of agency problem between IPO 
participants.164 Their relevance to earlier periods is open to doubt given the 
different institutional environment.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I am still left with some hypotheses to help 
explain underpricing in 20th century Britain, although not all these hypotheses 
are amenable to testing given data limitations.
The winner’s curse, first put forward by Rock (1986) to explain IPO 
underpricing, claims that uninformed investors are disproportionately successful 
in being allotted shares in poor quality and overpriced IPOs, which informed 
investors are able to spot and avoid. In order to avoid their total withdrawal 
from participating in IPOs, these investors therefore need compensating for 
their losses by average underpricing. In the absence of data on IPO share 
allocations, I cannot directly test this hypothesis at present.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argued that the greater is the ex ante uncertainty 
as to the firm’s fair value, or valuation uncertainty, the more it is worth an 
investor becoming informed about the issuing firm. If one thinks in terms of an 
investor holding an implicit call option to buy an IPO, then the investor will 
exercise this option if the fair value of the issuing firm exceeds the offer price. 
This option becomes more valuable, the greater is the valuation uncertainty. 
This uncertainty provides an incentive for investors to become informed. An 
increase in the number of informed investors exacerbates the winner’s curse. 
Consequently, underpricing will be greater, the more uncertainty there is. I 
make use of firm risk variables, such as size, age, valuation and whether or not 
a firm undertakes R&D activity, as proxies for information gaps between issuing 
firms and investors and as explanatory variables for underpricing. Chan, 
Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) claimed that quoted R&D-intensive firms 
suffer excess share price volatility due to the greater uncertainty of their future 
cash flows. Their finding can be extended to cover R&D-intensive IPOs.
163 Ljungqvist (2004), p.57-64.
164 See Loughran and Ritter (2002) for a discussion of “prospect” theory and Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) for a discussion of the “analyst lust” and “spinning” hypotheses.
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If information gaps cause a problem for investors in evaluating IPOs, then 
certification by reputable investment banks underwriting an IPO and by 
reputable accountants auditing financial statements disclosed in a prospectus 
should minimise the extent of underpricing. Similarly, better prospectus 
disclosure, as measured by the number of items disclosed in the balance sheet, 
and tougher listing requirements such as the number of years of historic profits 
disclosed (“track record”), should lower underpricing, other things being equal.
Explanations based on agency problems both between investors and 
issuing firms, as well as between the firms and investment banks, are also 
relevant to this period. Theories based on the former are of two main types, the 
realignment of incentives hypothesis and ownership and control hypotheses. In 
the first case, the issuing firm may care more about underpricing if a greater 
portion of the firm is being sold (“marketability”). The price pressure hypothesis 
would suggest the opposite relationship, namely, that the more shares are sold 
at IPO, the more the market price would decline when trading begins. This 
hypothesis has not received empirical support in the literature.165 Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) focus on the proportion of those shares sold at IPO which are 
vendor shares, which are shares sold by existing shareholders, usually, 
managers, directors, and other “inside” shareholders, as opposed to primary 
shares, which are issued by the firm. The greater the proportion of vendor 
shares sold in the IPO, the more managers care about underpricing. Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) refine this hypothesis by showing the importance of the size 
of managerial shareholdings. The more of his total shareholding being sold at 
IPO, the more the manager is motivated to minimise underpricing. Similarly, the 
smaller their stake in the firm seeking a listing, the less incentivised are 
managers to be good agents for other shareholders. In either case, prospectus 
disclosure as to whether the shares offered at IPO were vendor or primary 
shares and regarding directors’ shareholdings in the firm was too inconsistent in 
the 1920s to allow these hypotheses to be tested across the whole period. I 
can, however, test for the influence of marketability on underpricing throughout 
the period.
165 Marsh (1979) tested this hypothesis on UK rights issues between 1962 and 1975 against the 
alternative “substitution” hypothesis, which says that there is a large supply of risky assets (or 
shares) which are close substitutes, and found in favour of the latter.
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Regarding ownership and control theory, as argued in chapter 1, the 
Brennan and Franks view that underpricing is a deliberate strategy employed by 
non-selling managers of issuing firms to spread ownership at the time of IPO 
and retain control of the firm is most appropriate to this period. However, my 
lack of data on IPO share allocations does not allow me to test this hypothesis.
Baron (1982) considered agency problems between issuers and 
underwriting banks and argued that investment banks were incentivised to 
underprice IPOs in order to minimise the effort expended in selling the deal to 
investors. This view has been challenged by Muscarella and Vetysupens 
(1989) on the grounds that, although IPOs by US investment banks should not 
exhibit effort avoidance if Baron’s hypothesis is correct, they have been 
underpriced just as much as those of their clients. Unfortunately, there were 
only 11 IPOs by issuing houses on the LSE between 1917 and 1986, which 
represents too small a sample to test these hypotheses. Problems between 
investment banks and issuing firms can be ameliorated where there is a longer- 
term commitment between the two, as for example, when the investment bank 
takes a seat on the board of directors of the issuing firm. Board representation 
should moderate underpricing ceteris paribus and is part of my data set.
Those hypotheses which are both relevant and amenable to empirical 
testing in the period in question are summarised in Table 4-2 along with a 
related explanatory variable and in each case its hypothesised impact on 
underpricing. I use these variables to construct a simple linear model of 
underpricing in the next section.
4.2 A model of underpricing
Treating my sample of IPOs between 1917 and 1986 as a cross-section, I 
test these various hypotheses with a simple linear model of underpricing 
employing the explanatory variables listed in Table 4-2. The dependent 
variable is the first-day return of the IPO (D1RET). Since the daily FT30 Index 
was only published from 1935, I am unable to adjust for market movement 
between the date of publication of the prospectus and the first day of trading 
across the whole sample in the absence of daily market index levels. Hence, I 
include the length of this period (T) as a right hand side variable. The linear 
regression model is as follows:
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D1RET = pi*LNMCAP + p2*LNBVP + p3*RD + p4*TRACK + p5*UW + 
p6*MKTABILITY + p7*PLACING + p8*YEAR + p9*SEDOL + pi0*MRET + pn*T + 
e
where the error term, e, is assumed to be i.i.d. normal and where:
a) LNMCAP, the natural logarithm of market capitalisation at the offer 
price in constant 2003/04 prices, is a proxy for firm size. Firm age, LN(1+AGE) 
is an alternative proxy. Age is calculated from the foundation date of the 
underlying business rather than the incorporation of the firm which usually 
occurs later and where both are disclosed; otherwise, the date of incorporation 
is used. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis implies negative coefficients on 
both variables.
b) LNBVP, the natural logarithm of the book value to offer price ratio, 
measures firm valuation where book value is the proforma post-IPO net asset 
value per share attributable to voting shareholders. Alternative measures are 
dividend yield and price earnings ratios but data on these variables was not 
available across the whole period. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis implies a 
negative coefficient.
c) RD is defined by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
IPO prospectus indicates the firm undertaking R&D activity and 0 otherwise. 
The expected sign is positive.
d) TRACK, the number of years historic profits disclosed in the 
accountant’s report included in the IPO prospectus, proxies financial disclosure. 
The expected sign is negative.
e) UW, an underwriting dummy variable, takes the value of 1 when 
an IPO is underwritten and 0 otherwise. Placings are treated as underwritten, 
unless it is clear from the prospectus they are conducted on a best efforts basis. 
The certification hypothesis implies that underpricing will be greater, if an IPO is 
not underwritten and therefore a negative sign is expected; and
f) MKTABILITY, the proportion of the total shares outstanding sold 
at IPO, is one test of the realignment of incentives hypothesis. The issuing 
firm’s managers care more about underpricing, the more shares are being sold. 
A negative coefficient is expected. The proportion of vendor shares offered 
(VENDOR) is a more precise test of the same hypothesis. I do not have this 
data for IPOs before the 1930s due to inadequate disclosure.
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I control for issue method by the use of a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 if the IPO is a placing and 0 otherwise. Year dummy variables, indicating 
the calendar year in which the IPO took place (YEAR), and industry dummy 
variables based on SEDOL classification (SEDOL) are also employed as control 
variables. Equity market conditions are proxied by lagged market returns, either 
1 month or 3 months prior to the first day of trading, (MRET). For IPOs prior to 
1935, the lagged market returns are estimated over 1 and 3 month periods up 
until the end of the month before the first day of trading. Daily volatility of the 
market over the 90 days prior to trading can only be estimated for IPOs after 
March 1935.
Alternative explanatory variables to test for prospectus disclosure, such as, 
a dummy variable for the audit of financial statements disclosed in the prospectus 
(AUDIT), and a count of the number of lines disclosed in the balance sheet 
(ITEMS) were also included in the model. I also made use of a dummy variable 
for whether the underwriter had representation on the board of the issuing firm at 
the time of the IPO (BoD).
4.3 Data
I discussed my data set in detail in the previous chapter. Here I 
recapitulate on the main points specifically relevant to modelling IPO 
underpricing.
Following modern empirical studies, underpricing in this study is defined as 
the percentage change between the mid-point of the closing bid and ask 
quotations in the SEDOL on the first day of trading and the offer price. Where 
bid-ask was not quoted, I collected all price quotations, or “marks”. Since the 
marks in SEDOL are not time-ordered, I was unable to identify the closing price 
and so took the simple average of all marks on the first day.
There were 320 IPOs with call features, equivalent to 54% of all IPOs, in 
the interwar years. Thereafter, there were none in my data set excluding the 
privatisations of the 1980s. According to the prospectus, shareholders had a 
legal obligation to meet the outstanding calls when due, or otherwise faced 
forfeiture of their shares according to the terms of the prospectus. I have taken
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account of this obligation by calculating first-day returns based on the fully-paid 
offer price. Most call periods extended from a month up to a year and 
occasionally some calls were undated. I assumed that the investor earned the 
3-month Treasury Bill rate on the call money up until the date of call. 
Accordingly, I estimated first-day returns based upon the percentage change in 
the share price quoted on a fully-paid basis and the present value at the first 
dealing date of the fully-paid offer price discounting any outstanding calls at the 
bill rate. Where the shares were not quoted on a fully-paid basis, I added the 
outstanding calls to the partly-paid price. In the 44 cases where shares had 
undated calls outstanding, I assumed that these would not be called and 
estimated first-day returns based on the partly-paid share price and offer price 
ex the undated call.
Table 4-3 sets out the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables employed in the regression analysis reported in the next 
section.
The discussion of the annual time series of mean first-day returns is 
based on 2436 IPOs between 1917 and 1986, including 266 IPOs on the USM 
between 1980 and March 1985 but excluding tender offers166. Data on such 
explanatory variables as firm age, underwriting arrangements, net asset values 
and R&D activity are not included in the data set of Buckland and Davies (1989) 
which covers USM as well as Official List IPOs. The multiple regression results 
presented in the next section are based on 2170 IPOs between 1980 and 1986, 
excluding both the USM IPOs and the tender offers, unless otherwise stated.
A word is necessary on the IPOs occurring during 1940 to 1944. 
Essentially the British stock market, although open for share trading, was shut 
down for new issues during both world wars. As a result, there were only 4 
public issues during WW1 and 8 placings during WW2 in my data set. The 8 
IPOs in 1945 took place after the end of the war in Europe. Before 1945, 
statements in the Times Books usually did not indicate the price at which shares 
were placed with outside investors, only the price at which shares were 
acquired by the sponsor. The spread between these two prices represented the 
sponsor’s profit. Failure to take this into account would upward bias 
underpricing. The 8 placings between 1940 and 1944 did not disclose the
16610 of the USM IPOs were tender offers.
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placing price which I estimated in order to obtain some measure of underpricing 
during these years.167 I also included 5 SEOs in 1930, a year in which there 
were no IPOs at all following the collapse in the stock market.
Table 4-4 summarises the IPO returns of the 2170 IPOs by SEDOL 
classification. As already noted, IPOs in the “Commercial, Industrial, etc.” 
sector represent almost 80% of all IPOs.
4.4 Results
I firstly present my results on the annual time series of mean underpricing, 
then examine how IPO characteristics influence underpricing univariately, and 
lastly, estimate the linear model set out in section 4.2 in order to analyse the 
behaviour of underpricing over time.
(i) Annual Time Series of Underpricing
The annual time series of equally-weighted (EW) mean underpricing for 
the 2436 IPOs between 1917 and 1986 is graphed in Figure 4-1 along with 
mean underpricing results from recent IPO studies. Table 4-5 displays the 
underlying data for all IPOs as well as by issue method. Table 4-6 aggregates 
the data into decades with the exception of the first and last periods which 
reflect the choice of the 1917 start and the 1986 end dates. Also displayed are 
standard deviations, medians, the proportion of IPOs with a positive first-day 
return and the mean number of days between publication of the prospectus and 
initial trading (T). Table 4-7 presents mean underpricing by issue method for 
these same sub-periods.
As Figure 4-1 illustrates, there is a cycle of “hot” and “cold” markets in 
underpricing. In the case of 1919 (20.60%, Table 4-5) and 1945-46 (23.35%, 
14.55%), this is a reaction to the relaxation in capital market controls on IPOs 
following the end of war. The 15.30% average underpricing between 1940 and 
1944 is based on only 8 observations and is only an approximation, as 
explained in the previous section. Other than the surge in underpricing which
167 I assumed the broker took a turn of 15% based on the average difference between the 
placing price and the price paid by the broker for 7 IPOs between 1941 and 1945 where there 
was full disclosure.
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ta,kes place at the very end of the century, the most striking feature of the chart 
is the unexpected rise in underpricing from the mid-fifties onwards. Equally- 
weighted (EW) mean underpricing was 8.93% and 5.70% in the interwar 
decades but then increased in the 1950s, 1960s and in 1980-86 to 11.87%, 
14.12% and 21.73% respectively (Table 4-6). In the 1970s, underpricing dipped 
just below 10%. The same pattern is visible in median underpricing. In fact, 
median underpricing in the interwar years was only around 1%.
When issue method is taken into account, there is a marked tendency for 
underpricing of placings to exceed that of public offers and issues (Figure 4-2 
and Table 4-7). This is particularly true during the interwar years. Thereafter 
the gap narrowed reflecting the attempts of the LSE to improve the 
transparency of the placing method. The fact that underpricing of placings in 
the period 1980-86 widened once more reflects the choice of this method by 
small firms listing on the USM and the prohibition by the LSE of placings above 
£3 million.168 Notwithstanding the behaviour of placings, the unexpected rise in 
mean underpricing of public issues and offers from the mid-1950s onwards 
remains.
(ii) IPO characteristics and Underpricing
The univariate relationships between underpricing and firm size (MCAP), 
firm age (Age), book value to offer price (BVP), length of disclosed profits track 
record (TRACK) and the proportion of an issuing firm’s outstanding ordinary 
shares sold at IPO (MARKETABILITY) are described in Table 4-8. Ignoring the 
few observations falling into the restricted war years, the data set is divided into 
the interwar period 1919-39, the period immediately after WW2 up to 1949, the 
period from 1950 up to the establishment of the USM in 1979, and the run-up to 
Big Bang 1980-86. IPOs are sorted by characteristic into quartiles within each 
period and the equally-weighted mean first-day return is estimated for each 
quartile. If underpricing varies negatively with market capitalisation, as 
hypothesised, we should observe a monotonic decrease in underpricing as 
capitalisation increases, other things being equal. At the minimum, the smallest 
2 quartiles should display higher underpricing than the largest 2 quartiles. I am
168 Jackson (1986), p.532
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missing firm age and firm valuation data for the USM IPOs in the 1980s. 
Hence, there are fewer observations for these two variables.
There is a clear monotonic relationship between firm size and underpricing 
in 1980-86 only, whilst from 1945 to 1986 the largest two quartiles are 
underpriced less than the smallest two quartiles. The evidence that 
underpricing decreases with age is strongest in the period 1950-79 and again in 
1945-49. There is no relationship in the interwar years and in 1980-86 the 
oldest firms suffer the greatest underpricing. Only in 1950-79 is greater 
valuation uncertainty associated with more underpricing. Again in 1980-86 and 
also in 1945-49, there is some evidence of the opposite relationship. With the 
exception of the last period, the two quartiles with the shortest track records are, 
as expected, more underpriced than the two longest two quartiles. These 
results suffer from the lack of variability in track record reflecting the impact of 
tighter LSE regulation from the 1950s onwards. Greater marketability is, as 
expected, associated with lower underpricing in all periods. In 1950-79, there is 
a clear monotonic decrease of underpricing as the proportion sold increases. I 
also examined the proportion of vendor shares sold at the IPO (VENDOR) 
starting in 1930 but there was no relationship with underpricing in any period. 
These results are not shown.
Summarising, univariate analysis gives modest support for the 
hypothesised relationships between underpricing and firm size, firm age, length 
of track record and firm valuation. Marketability has the strongest association 
with underpricing in all periods. Looking across time, the clearest support for 
the five hypothesised relationships is found in the period 1950-79.
As Loughran and Ritter (2004) pointed out, the changing risk composition 
of the IPO population is one reason for observed shifts in underpricing. How 
might the changes in IPO characteristics across the whole period 1917-86 
explain underpricing? The shifts in mean IPO characteristics discussed in the 
previous chapter up are summarised in Table 4.9. Up until the start of the USM 
in 1980, firms became larger and older, were more likely to have their IPOs 
underwritten and to disclose an audited net asset value, had longer track 
records and were selling fewer primary shares in the IPO post 1945 compared 
to the interwar years. These changes should lower underpricing other things 
being equal. On the other hand, the observed decline in the marketability of 
IPOs is expected to raise underpricing, as might the upward drift in firm
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valuations (lower BVP). However, whilst in cross-section higher firm valuations 
equate with greater ex ante uncertainty other things being equal, a rise in 
valuations over time does not necessarily do so. The latter may reflect the 
increased appetite of institutional investors for equity investments and the better 
macro-economic background of the Golden Age compared to the turbulence of 
the interwar years.
(iii) Multiple Regression Results
One way to unwind this tangle of univariate relationships is to analyse 
underpricing in a multivariate framework. I have run OLS regressions of the 
underpricing model set out in section 4.2. Regression results are summarised 
in Table 4-10.
All regressions use year dummy variables, industry dummy variables 
based on SEDOL classifications, and a lagged market return variable for one 
month or three months prior to the first day of trading, or to the end of the month 
prior to the first day of trading as appropriate. Daily market volatility over a 90 
day window prior to the first day of trading could only be estimated starting from 
early 1935, when the FT30 Index was published on a daily basis. It did not 
enter significantly into any regressions, implying that underpricing did not 
fluctuate directly with overall equity market uncertainty.
Regressions (1) to (8) are estimated on 2170 IPO observations, excluding 
USM IPOs and tender offers. Missing variables are most problematic in the 
case of book values. All variables are of the correct sign with the exception of 
LNMCAP. UW and MKTABILITY are significant at the 1% level, LNBVP at the 
5% level and RD and TRACK are only marginally significant. Regression (8) 
represents the model with the best statistical fit to the data. LN(1+AGE) has the 
wrong sign but is not statistically significant. TRACK, RD, UW and 
MKTABILITY are all statistically significant at least at the 5% level. These 
variables are also economically significant. A two standard deviation increase 
in the length of track record and in marketability would lower underpricing by 
3.58% and 4.76% respectively other things being equal. An underwritten IPO 
would benefit underpricing by 5.53%. An IPO undertaking research and 
development activity would suffer 4.10% higher underpricing. The substitution 
of LN(1+AGE) with LNMCAP yields very similar results (not shown).
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These results in general agree with those from the univariate analysis. 
Several variables have significant coefficients and carry the correct sign. Whilst 
the overall explanatory power of the regressions is disappointing, this is not 
untypical for this type of underpricing model under a fixed offer price regime. It 
is not clear why firm size and age do not have better explanatory power. In the 
interwar years, LN(1+AGE) is marginally statistically significant but the wrong 
sign (regression (10)); in the post war period, the coefficient is the correct sign 
but not significant (regression (11)). These results may be attributable to a 
material number of IPOs in the interwar period being those of mature firms 
acquired by a new firm applying for a listing and where management retained 
control. In such cases there was little or no disclosure about the history of the 
underlying business. Disclosure about the age of mining and plantation IPOs 
pre-1929 was particularly poor in this regard. There were 87 such IPOs in the 
data set.
Alternative explanatory variables, namely, dummy variables for an audited 
balance sheet (AUDIT), the number of items in the balance sheet (ITEMS), the 
dummy variable for underwriter representation on the board (BoD) and the 
proportion of vendor shares sold at IPO (VENDOR) did not have any statistical 
significance. These results are not reported.
Having controlled for the influence of the above explanatory variables what 
happens to underpricing of IPOs over time? I have graphed in Figure 4-3 the 
coefficients of the YEAR dummy variables from regression (8) along with their 
99% confidence intervals. The graph confirms my earlier claim that 
underpricing rises from the mid-fifties onwards, once these variables are 
controlled for. Somewhat more rigorously, a Wald coefficient test, or F-test, 
rejects the null hypothesis of the average coefficients for 1920-39 and 1955-86 
being equivalent at the 1% level. The F-statistic is 10.50 (p-value is 0.001). 
The rise in underpricing is 6.58%. The widening of the interwar period dummy 
variable to include the 1919 IPOs does not affect this result.169
Does this result imply that regulation, and the 1948 Companies Act in 
particular, had little or no impact on underpricing? There are several challenges 
in trying to model the impact of the 1948 Companies Act, which became law in 
July. The first is that IPOs are highly clustered in the two and a half years just
169 F-statistic is 9.35, p-value is 0.002 and the difference in means is 6.06%.
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before the Act was passed, a period when the ICAEW, as we know, was 
anticipating the Act and urging fuller disclosure on firms through its members. 
Due to wartime restrictions there are virtually no IPOs between 1940 and 1945. 
The second challenge is that the financial disclosure provisions of the 1948 Act 
were as much about the quality as the quantity of disclosure and it is difficult to 
find a variable which reflects this quality dimension. Lastly, the LSE, as 
mentioned in chapter 2, were strengthening their own vetting of IPOs and, for 
example, required consolidated accounts of holding companies from 1939 
onwards. It is difficult if not impossible to isolate the influence of such self­
regulation from that of statutory law, given the lack of IPO observations between 
1939 and the run up to the 1948 Act.
An alternative, but indirect, way to test for the impact of the 1948 Act is 
firstly to test for the stability of the basic underpricing model before and after 
1948 and then to examine whether the coefficients on firm valuation (InBVP) 
and track record improve in statistical and economic significance. A Chow 
breakpoint test indicates that there is a structural break in the basic underpricing 
model. When the sample was partitioned in July 1948, the null hypothesis of 
stability in the model was rejected at the 1% level. The structural break is 
confirmed by a comparison of regressions (10) and (11) in Table 4.10 which 
split the sample into two sub-periods straddling wartime, the period marked by 
the establishment of the Issuing Houses Association in 1945 and the passage 
of the 1948 Companies Act. Whilst the coefficients in regression (10) are 
statistically insignificant apart from the UW dummy variable, those on LNBVP 
and TRACK become both highly statistically significant as well as economically 
significant in regression (11). The significance of these two variables is perhaps 
indicative of the greater reliability of book values and profits disclosed in 
prospectuses and the greater confidence of investors in reputable underwriters 
having done their due diligence on issuing firms in the post 1945 period.
(iv) Robustness
Early studies of British IPOs defined underpricing over a period from the 
first two days to the first week of trading (Table 4-1). I therefore also estimated 
underpricing by partial first month returns to verify whether underpricing had any 
tendency to increase beyond the first-day. For the interwar period, these
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returns were not statistically significantly different from first-day returns. Mean 
partial first month returns could only be adjusted for overall market movement 
beginning in 1935 when the daily FT30 index started. Accordingly, the mean 
adjusted partial first month return was 2.72% as against a mean first-day return 
of 2.26% for 153 IPOs between 1935 and 1939. The unadjusted mean partial 
first month return for 348 IPOs between 1917 and 1929 was 9.0% as against a 
mean first-day return of 9.1%. Similarly, the 53 IPOs between 1930 and 1934 
had unadjusted partial first month returns of 3.63% as against first-day returns 
of 5.03%. None of these differences in means are statistically significant. I also 
checked adjusted partial first month versus first-day returns for the five year 
period just after WW2, 1946-50, and again over the period of the Merrett, Howe 
and Newbould study, 1959-63, these authors having argued that all 
underpricing could not show up on the first day. In each case, first-day returns 
were 5.40% and 17.28% as against adjusted partial first month returns of 6.43% 
and 20.65% respectively. Both differences in means were not statistically 
significant.
Davis and Yeomans (1975) adjusted their estimates of underpricing for the 
overall movement in the market between the estimated date of setting the offer 
price and the first week of trading to reflect the inability of issuers and 
underwriters to incorporate fully any change in market conditions. I, therefore, 
also estimated first-day returns adjusted for market movement between the date 
of publication of the prospectus, approximating the date of setting the offer 
price, and the first day of trading. As mentioned above since the daily FT30 
index was only published from 1935, I could not adjust first-day returns before 
that date. The market-adjusted returns since 1935 were not statistically 
significantly different from the unadjusted first-day returns (Table 4-11).
I have used White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in all 
regressions in an attempt to deal with the problem of clustering in IPO 
observations and the resulting heteroscedasticity. In regression (9), I re- 
estimated the model in regression (8) after removing 62 outlier observations, 
defined as those IPOs with returns falling outside 2.5 standard deviations either 
side of the mean for the whole period. The main difference between the two 
regressions is the decline in both the statistical and economic significance of the 
UW and MARKETABILITY variables. The overall explanatory power of the 
regression increased slightly. The main result stands and a Wald-test again
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rejected the equality of the coefficients on the interwar and post-war period 
dummy variables.170
Unlike equally-weighted (EW) returns, capitalisation-weighted (CW) mean 
first-day returns do not rise over time. In the period after 1945, the EW mean is 
greater than the CW mean, as would be expected if larger firms are less risky 
and therefore less underpriced. However, this expected relationship does not 
hold for the interwar years and for the 1930s in particular. This result could be 
attributable to my use of ordinary share market capitalisation which excludes 
non-voting preference shares. These shares may have been used more 
frequently by large firms and their exclusion might underestimate the size of 
large firms as perceived by interwar investors.
Finally, I have excluded 164 dual share IPOs from the foregoing analysis. 
In fact, these IPOs, priced as a package of ordinary and preference shares 
based on the terms of application disclosed in the prospectus, exhibited 
overpricing, or negative first-day returns of 2.9%, on an equally-weighted basis. 
On a capitalisation weighted basis, this overpricing virtually disappears (-0.3%). 
The ordinary share component was usually underpriced and the preference 
share component overpriced reflecting the intentions of the insiders and 
promoters in launching this type of issue. Post-IPO trading activity was 
channelled into the low-priced ordinary shares, of which the insiders owned the 
majority, at the expense of the preference shares, the vast majority of which 
were issued to outside investors. When dual share IPOs are added to the 
sample and a dummy variable for dual share IPOs included, the main results 
from the multiple regressions in Tables 4-10 do not change, although the 
dummy on dual shares has a negative coefficient which is statistically 
significant.
4.5 Summary
Underpricing was a consistent feature of the IPO market from WW1 up to 
1986. I have modest success in modelling IPO underpricing. I find support for 
the certification hypothesis and for better disclosure in the form of longer track 
records moderating underpricing. Furthermore, after 1948, there is perhaps
170 F-test statistic is 28.81 (p-value=0.000). The difference between the interwar and post-war 
means is 7.14% .
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evidence that better disclosure brought on by the Companies Act of that year 
improved the performance of the model.
The major finding of this chapter is that, contrary to my expectations and 
the improvements in regulation, disclosure, investor protection and underwriting 
after WW2, there was no decline in mean first-day returns in the second half of 
the century. On the contrary, returns increased from the mid-fifties onwards 
compared to the interwar years. This result still holds when changes in the risk 
composition of the IPO sample and issue methods are taken into account. In 
contrast, capitalisation-weighted returns do not exhibit any increase over time. 
On the basis that we should be as interested in the experience of the “average” 
firm undertaking an IPO as of the largest firms compared to the smallest, I 
believe that the equally-weighted results deserve particular attention.
At present I cannot explain this puzzling rise in underpricing. There are 
several plausible hypotheses one of which relates to the change in the role of 
the issuing house over the last century and the possibility of their exercising 
monopsonistic power. A fragmented interwar underwriting market in which the 
reputable merchant banks did not participate became a considerably more 
organised market post-1945 with the Issuing House Association in its vanguard. 
The full implications of this change for IPO underpricing are examined in the 
next chapter. Other plausible hypotheses are discussed in the concluding 
chapter and provide a basis for my post-doctoral research.
Table 4-1: Previous Major Studies of British IPO Underpricing
OL is Official List, USM is Unlisted Securities Market and AIM is the Alternative Investment Market. Note that underpricing was not necessarily the only 
area of enquiry of the studies below.
Study No. of IPOs Period Issue method Mean Under- 
pricing
Underpricing definition
Merrett Howe & Newbould (1967) 357 1959-63 Offers 149 17.20% End of day 2
Placingsl 93 24.97% market-adjusted
Other15 6.46%
Davis & Yeomans (1975) 275 4/65 - 3/71 Offers 172 8.88% End of first week
Placings 60 19.08% market-adjusted
Other 43 6.93%
Buckland Herbert & Yeomans (1981) 297 4/65 - 3/75 Offers only 9.67% End of first week
unadjusted
Buckland & Davies (1989) 331 1/80-3/85 Offers 56 15.68% End of first week
OL&USM Placings 214 27.10% market-adjusted
Tenders 33 10.90%
Other 28 29.95%
Jenkinson & Trundle (1990) 227 1/85 -1 2 /8 9 Offers 100 8.50% Average of first week
OL only Placings 112 14.30% market-adjusted
Other 15 19.60%
Levis (1993) 712 1 /8 0 -1 2 /8 8 Offers 184 11.50% End of first day
OL&USM Placings 528 15.28% market-adjusted
Ljungqvist (2003) 1108 1/91-12/02 29.10% End of first day
OL&AIM unadjusted
Table 4-2: Underpricing Theories Relevant to UK IPOs 1917-86
Hypothesis: Explanatory variable: Variable Name Impact on 
underpricing
1. ex ante uncertainty:
(a) firm risk (i) firm age AGE _
(ii) market capitalisation MCAP -
(iii) book value to offer price BVP -
(b) technology risk R&D dummy variable RD +
(c) industry risk SEDOL sector SEDOL +/-
2. certification and disclosure (i) underwriting dummy variable UW
(ii) audited balance sheet dummy variable AUDIT -
(iii) length of profits record TRACK -
3. agency problems:
(a) realignment of incentives (i) proportion of shares outstanding sold at IPO MKTABILITY -
(ii) proportion of shares issued at IPO which are existing or 
vendor shares
VENDOR
(b) between investment bank and 
issuing firm
(i) dummy variable for underwriter presence on board of 
issuing firm
BoD -
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables Used in OLS Regressions
D1RET is the first-day return on the IPO. AGE is firm age and LNAGE is the natural logarithm of (1+AGE). MCAP is the market capitalisation at the offer price in 
constant 2003/04 prices and LNMCAP is the natural logarithm. BVP is the book value to offer price ratio and LNBVP is the natural logarithm. TRK is the length of 
historic profits record disclosed by the IPO in years. Sold is the proportion of total shares outstanding sold at the IPO. UW is a dummy variable for whether the IPO 
was underwritten by a third party. R&D is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm engages in R&D activity or not. T is the no. of days between the publication 
of the prospectus and the first day of trading. N=2170, excluding USM IPOs and tender offers. Missing observations are 13 age observations, 159 book values, 11 
underwriting dummy variables, 2 R&D dummy variables and 1 T period. 2 of the missing book values are due to firms having negative net worth after deducting 
goodwill.
Panel A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
D1RET
%
AGE
yrs
LNAGE MCAP
£000
LNMCAP BVP
X
LNBVP TRACK
yrs
AUDIT UW
MKT­
ABILITY RD T
days
Mean 10.37% 36.93 3.04 27,565 16.37 0.76 -0.51 7.11 0.81 0.91 0.45 0.07 12.32
Median 5.40% 27.00 3.33 11,367 16.25 0.66 -0.41 10.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.00 10.00
Maximum 212.91% 256.00 5.55 1,901,537 21.37 5.30 1.67 41.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 495.00
Minimum -61.00% 0.00 0.00 533 13.19 0.10 -4.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 23.00% 35.76 1.33 77,369 1.06 0.56 0.73 4.23 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.25 19.88
Skewness 2.970 1.691 -0.962 12.793 0.717 2.975 0.875 -0.075 -1.570 -2.820 0.956 3.482 14.818
Kurtosis 18.935 7.118 3.282 233.005 3.992 18.044 6.052 4.539 3.465 8.951 2.758 13.127 277.200
N. Obs. 2170 2157 2157 2170 2170 2011 2011 2170 2170 2159 2170 2168 2169
Panel B : CORRELATION MATRIX 1917-86
Common samp e. N=2000.
D1RET AGE LN(1+AGE) MCAP LNMCAP BVP LNBVP TRACK UW MKTABILITY RD T
D1RET 1.000 -0.036 -0.010 0.023 -0.009 -0.028 -0.054 -0.004 0.087 -0.063 -0.151 0.044
AGE 1.000 0.804 0.108 0.127 0.107 0.111 0.372 0.262 0.043 -0.160 -0.021
LN(1+AGE) 1.000 0.083 0.123 0.005 -0.002 0.620 0.504 0.105 -0.314 -0.018
MCAP 1.000 0.593 -0.051 -0.097 -0.041 0.069 0.048 -0.105 0.086
LNMCAP 1.000 -0.260 -0.320 0.027 0.179 0.142 -0.244 0.090
BVP 1.000 0.849 -0.074 -0.172 -0.159 0.149 -0.057
LNBVP 1.000 -0.088 -0.220 -0.148 0.215 -0.039
TRACK 1.000 0.584 0.137 -0.390 -0.031
UW 1.000 0.154 -0.565 0.024
MKTABILITY 1.000 -0.067 0.020
RD 1.000 -0.005
T 1.000
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Table 4-4: SEDOL Classification of IPOs 1917-86
N=2170. Transport combines Shipping and Tramways and Utilities combines 
Gas and Electrical Lighting & Power.
SEDOL SECTOR N % MEAN RET%
TEA, COFFEE & RUBBER 50 2.3% 16.69%
MINING 75 3.5% 11.46%
OIL 31 1.4% 8.55%
PROPERTY 137 6.3% 10.32%
BANKS 20 0.9% 7.66%
FINANCIAL TRUSTS 39 1.8% 3.11%
INSURANCE 36 1.7% 19.18%
BREW ERIES & DISTILLERIES 19 0.9% 10.45%
TRANSPORT 18 0.8% 1.88%
UTILITIES 6 0.3% 2.64%
IRON COAL & STEEL 28 1.3% 2.86%
COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ETC 1711 78.8% 10.43%
2170 100.0%  10.37%
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Table 4-5: Annual Time Series of Mean First-day Returns and IPO
Volume 1917-86
All means are equally-weighted (EW). There are 1439 Public Issues and Offers and 997  
Placings totalling 2436 IPOs in all.
ALL
Mean no. IPOs
PUBLIC ISSUES, 
OFFERS  
Mean no. IPOs
PLACINGS
mean no. IP'
1917 -3.68% 1 -3.68% 1 0
1918 0.97% 3 0.97% 3 0
1919 20.60% 43 20.60% 43 0
1920 -0.60% 62 -1.45% 58 11.68% 4
1921 0.34% 3 0.34% 4 0
1922 5.80% 5 5.80% 5 0
1923 18.09% 13 18.09% 13 0
1924 -5.08% 8 -4.21% 7 -11.16% 1
1925 7.32% 39 4.22% 34 28.36% 5
1926 7.17% 20 -6.46% 13 32.47% 7
1927 6.53% 38 5.21% 29 10.77% 9
1928 9.03% 75 3.86% 64 39.12% 11
1929 16.57% 45 5.62% 38 75.96% 7
1930 -0.70% 5 -0.70% 5 0
1931 1.37% 3 1.37% 3 0
1932 13.58% 5 -4.89% 2 25.90% 3
1933 8.41% 10 2.09% 7 23.16% 3
1934 13.09% 36 1.53% 28 53.54% 8
1935 2.20% 49 0.57% 43 13.83% 6
1936 7.28% 65 4.35% 56 25.50% 9
1937 2.50% 48 1.02% 43 15.23% 5
1938 2.17% 9 -17.25% 4 17.71% 5
1939 . -5.29% 3 -5.29% 3 0
1940 19.35% 1 0 19.35% 1
1941 -13.20% 1 0 -13.20% 1
1942 23.57% 1 0 23.57% 1
1943 57.33% 1 0 57.33% 1
1944 8.68% 4 0 8.68% 4
1945 23.35% 8 0 23.35% 8
1946 14.55% 60 15.33% 34 13.52% 26
1947 5.06% 96 3.42% 56 7.35% 40
1948 0.64% 64 -1.94% 35 3.74% 29
1949 2.07% 36 0.38% 13 3.03% 23
1950 3.54% 28 1.18% 5 4.05% 23
1951 4.98% 38 4.84% 9 5.02% 29
1952 7.74% 19 -5.94% 2 9.35% 17
1953 6.69% 32 0.95% 8 8.60% 24
1954 9.52% 40 3.29% 7 10.85% 33
1955 13.17% 39 15.18% 9 12.57% 30
1956 15.53% 15 0.61% 2 17.82% 13
1957 14.14% 23 -8.87% 3 17.59% 20
1958 14.34% 36 11.08% 10 15.60% 26
1959 19.20% 80 17.56% 37 20.61% 43
Table 4-5: Annual Time Series of Mean First-day Returns and IPO
Volume 1917-86 (cont.)
ALL
Mean no. IPOs
PUBLIC ISSUES, 
OFFERS  
Mean no.IPOs
PLACINGS
mean no.lP(
1960 12.21% 93 8.65% 35 14.36% 58
1961 17.08% 59 15.65% 31 18.73% 28
1962 17.31% 68 12.90% 36 22.30% 32
1963 26.02% 49 22.66% 34 33.63% 15
1964 10.03% 65 8.65% 54 16.82% 11
1965 7.50% 57 5.87% 28 9.08% 29
1966 12.31% 30 11.79% 22 13.75% 8
1967 23.10% 26 20.96% 17 25.46% 9
1968 13.66% 50 10.49% 37 22.71% 13
1969 8.14% 52 5.42% 43 21.14% 9
1970 2.33% 53 2.21% 43 2.87% 10
1971 14.71% 59 13.60% 45 18.42% 14
1972 9.02% 88 9.68% 80 2.40% 8
1973 3.37% 43 .5.51% 31 -2.17% 12
1974 21.25% 1 0.00% 0 21.25% 1
1975 19.50% 2 10.67% 1 28.33% 1
1976 15.40% 5 12.81% 5 28.33% 0
1977 19.51% 6 17.52% 3 21.49% 3
1978 25.51% 11 29.98% 8 13.59% 3
1979 32.49% 8 21.27% 5 43.70% 3
1980 19.1% 13 16.00% 5 21.41% 8
1981 18.0% 50 5.62% 12 11.38% 38
1982 34.9% 55 2.53% 11 19.96% 43
1983 31.1% 81 13.15% 22 22.70% 59
1984 20.5% 103 20.03% 30 16.14% 73
1985 11.7% 48 5.78% 30 9.06% 18
1986 8.6% 51 8.86% 36 10.08% 15
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Table 4-6: First-day Returns of British IPOs by Sub-period 1917-86
Means are both equally-weighted (EW) and capital weighted (CW ). Return>0 is the percentage 
of all IPOs within a given period with a positive first-day return. T  is the number of days 
between publication of the prospectus and the first day of trading. EW  mean returns are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level for all periods shown below.
EW mean 
return
median
return
stdev
return
t-statistic
EW
m ean>0%
CW
m ean
return
return>0  
(%  total)
T
mean
#days
No.
of
IPOs
1917-86 12.14% 6.33% 25.65% 23.54 11.89% 71% 12.3 2436
1917-29 8.93% 1.37% 36.04% 4.67 9.20% 55% 16.7 355
1930-39 5.70% 0.89% 23.89% 3.64 16.69% 57% 9.0 233
1940-49 6.55% 4.38% 16.15% 6.69 4.03% €7% 14.0 272
1950-59 11.87% 8.70% 17.27% 12.86 9.00% 81% 8.9 350
1960-69 14.12% 8.93% 19.70% 16.79 11.13% 81% 11.4 549
1970-79 9.73% 5.33% 18.90% 8.56 2.98% 68% 14.5 276
1980-86 ALL 21.73% 12.74% 34.05% 12.78 14.17% 86% - 401
1980-86 OL 12.07% 7.50% 19.54% 7.18 14.32% 79% 12.1 135
Table 4-7: Mean First-dav Returns and IPO Volume by Method 1917-86
Means are equally-weighted. There are 1439 Public Issues and Offers and 
997 Placings totalling 2436 IPOs in all.
mean
Public issues, offers 
No of IPOs % mean
Placings 
No of IPOs %
1917-29 5.49% 311 88% 33.26% 44 12%
1930-39 1.42% 194 83% 26.99% 39 17%
1940-49 4.71% 138 51% 8.45% 134 49%
1950-59 10.22% 92 26% 12.46% 258 74%
1960-69 11.07% 337 61% 15.62% 212 39%
1970-79 9.44% 221 80% 10.88% 55 20%
1980-86 13.91% 146 38% 26.48% 248 64%
Table 4-8: Univariate Analysis of First-day Returns by IPO Characteristics 1917-86
Firm size is defined as market capitalisation at offer price in constant 2003/04 prices. Age is firm age. BVP is book value to offer price.
Quartile 1919-39 1945-49 1950-79 1980-86
Mean Mean ret N Mean Mean ret N Mean Mean ret N Mean Mean ret N ,
MCap (£000) 584 264 1175 401
1 :lowest 3,220 13.08% 146 4,859 10.87% 66 4,542 13.36% 294 4,635 33.03% 101
2 5,929 6.31% 146 9,140 6.64% 66 9,260 13.17% 294 10,510 26.20% 100
3 10,327 3.24% 146 15,973 3.43% 66 17,748 11.33% 294 23,453 17.61% 100
4: highest 46,045 8.20% 146 44,026 4.22% 66 78,730 11.82% 293 135,034 9.79% 100
Age (Yrs) 574 264 1175 133
1: youngest 0.0 9.33% 144 17.9 11.79% 66.0 9.9 15.81% 294 6.7 10.43% 34
2 2.2 8.53% 143 33.7 5.28% 66.0 25.5 13.84% 294 14.6 10.83% 33
3 13.3 9.86% 143 53.3 3.94% 66.0 45.4 10.12% 294 28.2 11.47% 33
4: oldest 54.9 3.84% 144 99.3 4.15% 66.0 94.1 9.91% 293 82.5 15.87% 33
BVP (x) 433 264 1173 135
1: lowest 0.48 4.42% 109 0.22 4.97% 66 0.24 15.24% 293 0.14 15.97% 34
2 0.83 0.26% 108 0.46 5.09% 66 0.49 13.19% 293 0.30 10.83% 34
3 0.96 12.37% 108 0.68 6.96% 66 0.78 11.05% 293 0.46 12.12% 34
4: highest 1.48 5.39% 108 1.15 8.14% 66 1.57 9.95% 294 0.56 24.66% 33
Track (Yrs) 584 264 1175 401
1: shortest 0.0 8.27% 146 9.3 15.45% 66 5.3 14.99% 294 3.8 15.89% 101
2 0.0 9.55% 146 10.0 4.91% 66 10.0 12.50% 294 5.0 13.54% 100
3 2.4 7.09% 146 10.2 2.37% 66 10.0 13.41% 294 5.0 37.02% 100
4: longest 6.5 5.92% 146 13.7 2.42% 66 10.6 8.76% 293 5.1 20.34% 100
Mktability (%) 584 264 1175 401
1 :lowest 34% 15.55% 146 23% 5.44% 66 20% 14.58% 294 15% 26.24% 101
2 64% 6.31% 146 37% 8.68% 66 27% 14.65% 294 24% 20.05% 100
3 87% 6.56% 146 51% 4.60% 66 34% 11.50% 294 30% 21.42% 100
4: highest 100% 2.41% 146 79% 6.44% 66 52% 8.95% 293 52% 18.99% 100
Table 4-9: Change in Equally-Weighted Mean IPO Characteristics 1917-86
Vendor (%) is proportion of shares offered or placed which are vendor shares. Audited Asset Value is proportion of IPOs 
which disclose an audited or professionally valued net asset figure. Underwritten (%) is proportion of IPOs which are 
underwritten by a third party. Other characteristics are as defined in Table 4.3.
1917-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
MCap (£000 15,529 17,499 18,125 18,237 24,070 48,252 54,334
Age (yrs) 12.4 25.2 50.8 51.8 39.4 42.7 36.4
BVP (x) 1.02 0.81 0.67 1.10 0.61 0.47 0.46
Track record (yrs) 1.4 3.4 10.7 9.6 9.1 8.4 4.7
Marketability (%) 76% 64% 48% 35% 33% 33% 30%
Vendor (%) - 63% 90% 94% 83% 68% 50%
Audited Asset Value 25% 64% 100% 100% 100% 99% 100%
Underwritten (%) 70% 89% 94% 88% 98% 98% 99%
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Table 4-10: OLS Regressions of First-dav Returns 1917-86
The dependent variable is first-day return on the IPO (%). Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm 
of market capitalisation at the offer price in 2004 prices, LNMCAP, and age, LN(1+AGE). Age is the no. 
of years difference between the founding year of the business and the year of IPO. Book Value to Price 
(BVP) is the proforma net asset value attributable to voting shares divided by the market capitalisation 
at the offer price. TRACK is the number of years historic profits included in the prospectus. RD is a 
dummy variable indicating where a firm is engaged in R&D activity according to the prospectus. UW is 
a dummy variable for whether the IPO was underwritten by a third party. MKTABILITY is the proportion 
of total shares outstanding sold at the IPO. There are 169 book values, 20 age observations, 8 track 
records and 7 underwriting dummy variable observations missing. The estimated model is as described 
in the text. Substituting with In(Mcap) gives similar results. Regression (9) is the same model as 
excludes outliers from the data. Outliers are those first-day returns lying outside +/- 2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean. Estimation method is OLS. The standard errors in brackets are calculated 
using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent method. Statistical significance of coefficients at the 
10%, 5% and 1 % level is indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
LN
1+AGE
LN
MCAP
LN
BVP
TRACK R&D UW MKT­
ABILITY
N Adj.
Rsqd
(1) -0.766 2156 0.087
ALL (0.564)
(2) 0.628 2169 0.086
ALL (0.656)
(3) -1.451** 2010 0.101
ALL (0.742)
(4) -0.346* 2169 0.086
ALL (0.199)
(5) 3.455* 2167 0.086
ALL (1.945)
(6) -8.942*** 2158 0.096
ALL (2.573)
(7) -11.084*** 2169 0.093
ALL (2.882)
(8) 0.070 -1.921 -0.423** 4.096** -5.525** -9.408*** 2003 0.120
ALL (0.605) (1.929) (0.182) (1.890) (2.657) (2.904)
(9) 0.635 -0.820 -0.322** 2.854* -1.319 -3.097 1953 0.158
ALL (0.396) (0.542) (0.144) (1.520) (1.376) (1.975)
(10) 2.281* -1.972 -0.172 7.660 -12.815** -8.460 427 0.127
1917-39
(11)
(1.174)
-1.012
(1.882)
-2.634***
(0.399)
-0.614**
(5.292)
4.139**
(5.421)
-2.068
(5.900)
-7.582*** 1338 0.125
1948Jul-
86
(0.736) (0.913) (0.243) (1.990) (2.538) (3.220)
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Table 4-11: Adjusted First-day Returns 1935-86
Tender offers are included in 1960-69 and 1980-86. USM IPOs are excluded.
D1DATE N EW MEAN  
UNADJUSTED
STDEV EW MEAN  
ADJUSTED
STDEV
1935-39 174 4.05% 22.11% 4.04% 21.82%
1940-49 272 6.55% 16.15% 5.95% 16.36%
1950-59 350 11.87% 17.24% 11.60% 17.47%
1960-69 616 13.21% 19.02% 13.58% 20.38%
1970-79 276 9.73% 18.90% 9.55% 18.89%
1980-86 171 10.70% 17.91% 10.57% 17.62%
Figure 4-1: Annual Time Series of Mean Underpricing of IPOs 1917-2002
Mean underpricing is defined as the equally-weighted mean of first-day returns. There were no IPOs in 1915 and 1916. The 5 issues in 1930 are SEOs. The 
underlying data for 1917 to 1986 is taken from column (2) in Table 3-1. 1987 and 1988 estimates are from Levis (1990); 1989 estimate from Jenkinson & Trundle 
(1990); and 1991-2002 estimates from Ljungqvist (2003). 1990 mean is my own estimate. Jenkinson & Trundle exclude USM IPOs. Estimates of underpricing 
between 1940-44 are made despite no disclosure of the placing price (see text).
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Figure 4-2: Annual Time Series of Mean Underpricing of IPOs by Method 1917-86
Mean underpricing is defined as the equally-weighted mean of first-day returns. There were no placings in 1917-19, 1922-23,1930-31,1939,and 1976, and no public 
offers between 1940 and 1945. The mean is shown for the war years 1940-44.
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Figure 4-3: Econometric Evidence on First-day Returns 1920-39 and 1947-86
First-day returns (%) are the coefficients of the year dummy variables included in regression (8) in Table 4-7. The mean is the simple average of the dummy 
coefficients for 1920-39 and 1955-86 respectively.
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CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF REPUTABLE UNDERWRITERS
An issuing house, broker or investment bank which underwrites an IPO is 
certifying the quality of the listing firm to outside investors. Since Big Bang in 
October 1986 the distinction between issuing houses and brokers has 
disappeared and their functions have been merged into the modern investment 
bank. Underwriting is the contractual obligation entered into by an issuing 
house or stock broker to buy at an agreed price, usually the offer price less an 
underwriting commission, any shares not subscribed by investors in the IPO. 
An IPO which is not underwritten is executed on a “best efforts” basis and as 
such the issuing firm has no guarantee of a minimum level of IPO proceeds. 
IPOs sponsored but not underwritten by an issuing house avoid any 
commitment of financial capital, in which event,however prominently placed the 
name of an issuing house is on a prospectus, this should be of little comfort to 
any serious investor. I regard an IPO by way of placing as “underwritten” where 
the issuing house or broker agrees to buy any shares not placed.171 Under the 
fixed offer price regime in Britain underwriters have typically been at risk for 
around 10 days between the date of price fixing and the start of trading.172
In this chapter I make further use of my data set to address three 
questions regarding the role played by issuing houses in the IPO market. 
Firstly, were the criticisms of the Macmillan Committee in 1931 regarding the 
lack of merchant bank participation in IPO underwriting in the 1920s justified 
and, if so, at what point did participation begin to improve? Secondly, did the 
entry into the process of reputable issuing houses such as the merchant banks 
have a beneficial effect on underpricing? Alternatively, to the extent that no 
beneficial effect is observable in underpricing, could the issuing houses be 
accused of exercising monopsonistic power over issuing firms? Finally, what 
light does the new evidence presented in this chapter throw on the claim that 
the stock market failed British industry?
The research findings presented in this chapter point to merchant banks 
committing themselves to the underwriting of ordinary share IPOs starting in 
1945, when the Issuing Houses Association (IHA) was founded. By the time of
171 Of course an underwriter is usually at risk for a much longer period of time in the case of a 
public offer than in the case of a placing.
72 This was still true in the mid-eighties, The Times 18 September 1984, p.22 “New issue 
pricing is more of an art than a science” by R. Broadley, Chairman of IHA.
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the Radcliffe Report (1959), the IHA, with the reputable merchant banks at its 
core, had steadily increased their influence over IPOs and continued to do so 
up to the 1980s. However, there is little sign that this change worked in the 
interests of issuing firms by lowering underpricing. Instead, it appears that the 
IHA could have operated as a cartel in self-regulating underwriting activity in its 
own interests. At the minimum, the issuing houses can be accused of being 
content to tolerate a higher level of underpricing than would have prevailed in a 
more competitive underwriting market. Their reluctance to implement the 
tender offer more widely and thereby to exploit fully the benefits of lower 
underpricing for their corporate clients is an indictment of their lack of 
dynamism.
In the case of British Motor Corporation (BMC), the claim is that insufficient 
monitoring by institutional investors contributed to its poor industrial and 
financial performance in the 1960s.173 Bowden (2002) drew attention to a 
similar failing by institutional shareholders in Rolls Royce between 1968 and 
1971. Both cases can be at least partially excused. At BMC the controlling 
shareholding of the Nuffield Trust made it difficult if not impossible for 
institutional shareholders to exercise “voice.” At Rolls Royce the problems were 
already being addressed by the clearing and investment bankers, if somewhat 
rather late in the day. By comparison, the missed opportunity of the tender offer 
method described in this chapter provides a clear instance of post 1945 capital 
market failure.
The layout of this chapter is as follows. I discuss in detail the historical 
background to the development of underwriting and the rise in influence of both 
the merchant banks and the IHA on the IPO market through the last century 
(5.1). I then analyse their impact on underpricing (5.2). Finally, in returning to 
the question of whether the stock market failed industry, I recount the history of 
the tender offer and the extent of its use (5.3). Section 5.4 summarises.
5.1 The entry of reputable capital into IPO underwriting
The IPO underwriting market in the 1920s was extremely fragmented 
and disorganised by the standards of the post 1945 period. As discussed in
173 Bowden, Foreman-Peck and Richardson (2001), p.68-72.
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chapter 2, section 2.3, underwriting was carried on by company directors 
themselves, industrial and mining companies, syndicates of private investors as 
well as broking firms and issuing houses. Many of the former entities were not 
underwriting on an arm’s length basis and were undercapitalised. As a 
consequence, underwriters frequently escaped their underwriting obligations by 
making use of an undercapitalised subsidiary which then filed for bankruptcy.174 
In 1931, the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry argued that:
“It would in our opinion be an important reform that relations between 
finance and industry should be so developed that issuing institutions of first- 
class strength and repute should vouch for the intrinsic soundness of the issues 
made.... “17S
As the Committee pointed out, such certification was forthcoming in the case of 
foreign issues but not in the case of domestic industrial issues. Furthermore, 
stockbrokers were no substitute for a first-class issuing house and the “Big Five” 
clearing banks were simply confusing investors by agreeing to act as receiving 
banker for share subscriptions. The Report left its reader in no doubt that 
responsibility for the disastrous performance of the 1928 crop of IPOs over the 
following 2 to 3 years was largely attributable to the absence of first-class 
issuing houses from the underwriting process.176 By the time of the Radcliffe 
Report (1959), the merchant banks had involved themselves fully in sponsoring 
and underwriting domestic issues to the apparent satisfaction of the 
Committee.177 Even small firms seemed to be in receipt of a better service.178
In order to establish exactly when this commitment was forthcoming, I first 
need to define a “first-class” or reputable merchant bank. As Cassis (1994) has 
pointed out, the definition of a merchant bank before 1914 is difficult to pin 
down. The definition offered is that of a financial institution whose main activity 
comprised the acceptance of bills of exchange and an involvement in large 
international financial operations.179 Hence, merchant banks were also called 
“accepting houses.” Chapman (1984) traces the emergence of Barings and
174 Finnie (1934), p.137-42.
175 Macmillan Report, para.388.
176 ibid., para.387.
177 Bolton Report, para.226.
178 ibid., para.229.
179 Cassis (1994), p.29.
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Rothschilds as the pre-eminent accepting houses through the middle of the 19th 
century.180 These two leading houses were joined by another nineteen firms to 
form the Accepting Houses Committee (AHC) on 5 August 1914.181 The 
primary purpose of the Committee was to address the liquidity crisis precipitated 
by the non-payment of debts by Germany and its allies.182 These houses made 
up the “magic circle” of the City banking community.183 Membership of the AHC 
continued to confer prestige on a bank up until its dissolution in the late 1980s.
Table 5-1 lists those merchant banks which Cassis (1994) considered the 
most important in 1914 judged by size and by business focus184 (col.(1)), the 
members of the Accepting Houses Committee in 1914 (col.(2))185, and the 
members of the same Committee just after WW2 once membership had 
stabilised (col.{3)). Membership of the Accepting Houses Committee was by 
invitation only and dependent upon the willingness of the Bank of England to 
accept any members’ discounted bills of exchange at the finest discount 
rates.186 As far as it is possible to tell, given the lack of coverage by the 
Bankers Almanac and the fact that the Committee met irregularly, this 
membership did not change substantially through the interwar years. Whilst 
there is some overlap between the Cassis list and the AHC membership in 
1914, in total there are thirty-two merchant banks listed in columns (1) and (2). 
This extended list furnishes me with a definition of the most reputable merchant 
banks in the interwar years.
In the fifties, first S. Japhet and then S.G. Warburg gained entry to the 
AHC, increasing membership to seventeen at which level it stabilised. The 
members of the AHC from 1945 until the merger of the Committee with the IHA 
in 1988 to form the British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association 
are summarised in Table 5-2, along with the year of establishment and the 
period of membership. According to Clay and Wheble (1976), qualifications for 
membership in the post 1945 period included a first-class reputation, a 
meaningful acceptance business and the ability to discount bills of exchange at 
only the finest rates as well as a determination to undertake the other functions
180 Chapman (1984), ch.2.
181 ibid., p.55 Table 3.4.
182 ibid., p.30.
183 ibid., p.30. Saemy Japhet referred to the AHC as the “inner circle” of London’s merchant 
banking community, Dennett (1979), p.78.
184 Cassis (1994), p.10.
185 ibid., p.30-31.
186 Orbell and Turton (2001), p.562.
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of an accepting house, and the intention to run the bank prudently in the 
interests of depositors and shareholders.187 Other functions of accepting 
houses by the 1970s included new issues as well as medium-term finance, 
mergers and acquisitions, foreign exchange and commodity dealing, and 
leasing.188 Membership of the AHC continued to be synonymous with pre­
eminence in merchant banking and the issuing of securities was now 
recognised as a growing and important business of any serious merchant bank. 
I shall take AHC membership as my definition of a reputable merchant bank 
after 1945.
The change in underwriting market share of reputable merchant banks in 
my data set over the period 1917-1986 is graphed in Figure 5.1.189 Figure 5-1 
confirms the conclusions reached by the Macmillan Committee. The merchant 
banks were indeed noticeable by their absence in the 1920s and this situation 
did not improve in the following decade. Only from the 1960s did the accepting 
houses take a significant share of IPO underwriting.190 Over the interwar period 
as a whole only 5 IPOs, or less than 1% of my interwar sample, were 
underwritten by an AHC member.191 This statistic is consistent with the general 
picture which emerges from the business histories of Schroders by Roberts 
(1992), of Kleinwort Benson by Wake (1997) and of Morgan Grenfell by Burk 
(1989). Neither of the latter banks became prominent in the IPO market until 
the steel privatisations of the 1950s. Whilst extremely active in underwriting 
foreign bond issues in the 1920s and willing to begin underwriting debenture 
issues made by more mature domestic industrial firms, Schroders never turned 
its attention to the industrial share IPO market. Their issuing and underwriting 
revenues declined by almost four-fifths in the 1930s compared to the 1920s 
consequent upon the drastic decline in foreign bond business.192 This situation 
was not remedied until the merger with Helbert Wagg in 1965.
187 Clay and Wheble (1976), p.24.
188 ibid., p.v-vii.
189 Although the IHA continued in existence for a further year after Big Bang, in keeping with the 
analysis in previous chapters I have opted for 1986 as the end date for my analysis of 
underwriting market shares and of the influence of reputable underwriting on underpricing.
190 The 65% share in the period 1980-86 may well overstate the importance of the leading 
merchant banks given that the IPOs in this sample are all Official List IPOs and the banks’ 
share of USM IPOs is probably much lower.
191 Helbert Wagg did underwrite 8 interwar IPOs and was growing rapidly in stature but was not 
an accepting house.
192 Roberts (1992), p.268-69.
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The criticisms of the Macmillan Committee are therefore borne out by my 
data. When did matters start to improve? The impetus for change came from 
outside the inner circle. Helbert Wagg, a stock broker turned issuing house 
began underwriting industrial IPOs with considerable enthusiasm in the interwar 
years.193 This firm was influential in pushing for the establishment of a body to 
represent to government, the Bank of England and the LSE among others the 
interests of those houses specifically handling new issue business rather than 
acceptance business. Such a body was the Issuing Houses Association (IHA), 
established in November 1945.
The IHA shared the same offices and secretarial staff as the AHC and had 
at its core the leading merchant banks. It was intended as a consultation body 
and did not generally seek to regulate the affairs of its members. The only 
departure from this principle was the insistence in June 1969 that henceforth 
every member had to give a written undertaking to comply with the new City 
Code on Takeovers and to accept the jurisdiction of the Takeover Panel. By 
this time, the IHA concerned itself with merger and acquisition advice as well as 
the issuing business of its constituent members. The IHA did vet applications 
for membership, requiring a statement of the applicant’s financial position, its 
board of directors and underwriting record.194 Applications were frequently 
deferred when applicants were felt to be undercapitalised and inexperienced.195 
Such an approach provided a marked contrast with two decades earlier. There 
is also evidence that the Executive Committee of the IHA, which consisted of 
between 8 and 10 members dominated by the established accepting houses, 
informally censured members from time to time. In 1951, Whitehead Industrial 
Trust was reprimanded over the way it advertised IPOs and in 1968 Morgan 
Grenfell was criticised over its reaction to a Takeover Panel ruling.196 Hence, 
the IHA did to some extent seek to regulate entry and conduct in order to 
preserve the reputation of its members.
The IHA was certainly influential in terms of market share. A full list of the 
members of the IHA from its inception is drawn up in Table 5-3. The 
considerable merger activity among members is apparent from the highlighted 
entries in the Table. Hill Samuel, for example, was established in 1965 and was
193 ibid., p.360-414.
194 Issuing House Association Rules, 20 June 1969, MS29336, Guildhall Library.
195 Executive Committee Minutes, IHA Archive, Guildhall Library, MS29328
196 ibid., Files 2 and 6.
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the product of mergers between Philip Hill & Partners, Higginson, Erlangers and 
M.Samuel over the previous 14 years. The IHA enjoyed a majority share in IPO 
underwriting from the start (Figure 5-2). The rest of the market was shared 
among stock brokers, issuing houses which were not members of the IHA, and 
those IPOs handled on a best efforts basis. Stockbrokers were by far the most 
important underwriters outside of the IHA accounting for about 20-30% of the 
market.197 I have estimated retrospectively the IHA’s share of underwriting 
assuming the Association had been constituted in the 1930s and that the IHA 
membership of 1947 applied to 1930. The year 1947 was chosen given that 
most of the new membership joined in the first 2 years of the IHA’s existence. 
Its market share comes out at only 30%, considerably below that of post 1945. 
Clearly, both the degree of organisation and influence of the issuing houses 
upon the underwriting of ordinary share IPOs was substantial after 1945.
The membership of the IHA numbered around 50 and membership 
turnover was modest averaging around one or two firms each year (Figure 5-3). 
The most active period of new entry occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when 
there was considerable merger activity among issuing houses. Only in the late 
1970s did two major US banks, namely Credit Suisse First Boston and 
Manufacturers Hanover, join the IHA. Other foreign financial institutions to gain 
entry were Scandinavian Bank (1978), Enskilda Securities (1983) and Svenska 
Handelsbanken (1986) and Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation 
(1981) via the acquisition of Grindlays Brandts. None of these foreign issuing 
houses subsequently claimed a material share of IPO underwriting in London. 
Similarly whilst three of the main UK clearing banks attained membership in the 
1970s, National Westminster in 1971, Barclays in 1972 and Lloyds in 1979, 
none made aggressive inroads into IPO underwriting. The fourth, Midland 
Bank, acquired an established player, Samuel Montagu in the early 1970s. 
Equally significantly, none of the US investment banks who were the dominant 
players in their domestic IPO market chose to join.198
Was there a subset of the IHA which were particularly influential in terms of 
market share? Table 5-4 tracks the market shares of the largest underwriters in
197 These IPOs are underwritten by stockbrokers acting alone without an issuing house. Those 
underwritten by an issuing house almost always had a stockbroker associated with the IPO as 
well to advise on “market conditions” and to arrange sub-underwriting with institutional 
investors.
198 First Boston, the US investment banking arm of the CSFB group, ranked 14th in securities 
underwriting in the 1960s, Hayes ((1971), Exhibit III, p.143.
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the period 1930-86 decade by decade. Apart from Whitehead Industrial Trust in 
the late 1940s, no issuing house had a share of ordinary share IPO underwriting 
greater than 10%. Furthermore, there is no stable coalition of underwriters 
dominating the market across the period. The C5 concentration measure varies 
between 19.7% and 37.7% over the life of the IHA. Although the make-up of 
the top 5 issuing houses is unchanged between 1945 and 1959, it does change 
from decade to decade thereafter. It does not appear therefore that there was a 
stable coalition within the IHA exercising market power.
In summary, reputable capital entered the ordinary share IPO market from 
1945. Membership of the AHC and IHA between 1945 and 1986 provides me 
with both a narrow and a broad definition of issuing house reputation, 
respectively, with which to model the impact of reputation on underpricing. It is 
possible, given its large market share, stable membership and lack of 
aggressive new entrants, that the IHA tended toward the oligopolistic. Although 
the minutes of the AHC and IHA do not reveal any discussion of underwriting 
fees or underpricing199, underwriting fees remained unchanged at 2% for the 
period of the IHA’s existence. Almost certainly competition in underwriting was 
subdued until the approach of Big Bang in the mid-eighties. I will return to this 
theme after examining the impact on IPO underpricing of the entry of reputable 
capital into underwriting.
5.2 Impact on underpricing
The empirical literature on the impact of underwriting on IPO underpricing 
is largely US-centric. In the modern period, US investment banks publicised 
their IPO underwriting activities by taking out a “tombstone” advertisement in 
the financial press. A “tombstone” advertises an IPO after its successful launch 
and lists up its underwriters in order of importance as judged by the number of 
shares underwritten. Such a custom was not established in Britain until very 
recently and does not therefore allow me a measure of underwriting reputation 
over the period of study. The discussion in the previous section does provide 
me with two binary variables, membership of AHC (AHCDV) and membership of 
IHA (IHADV), which take the value 1 for membership and 0 otherwise. I would
199 Manuscripts Section, Guildhall Library.
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expect the coefficient signs in both cases to be negative if reputation minimises 
underpricing. I make use of a third ordinal variable RANK which takes the value 
1 if the underwriter is an AHC member, 2 if an IHA but not AHC member, 3 if a 
broker or non-member of IHA, and 4 for non-underwritten IPOs. I would expect 
the coefficient sign to be positive in this case.
The OLS regression results from including these two variables in turn on 
the right hand side of the underpricing model outlined in the previous chapter 
are summarised in Table 5-5 (regressions (i) (ii) and (iii)). A correlation matrix 
of the dependent and independent variables is set out in Table 5-6. The 
regressions reported here and for the rest of this chapter cover the period from 
1949, just after the 1948 Companies Act, up to 1986. The coefficients on 
AHCDV, IHADV and RANK are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
The IHADV and RANK coefficients are the correct sign but are barely 
economically significant, the maximum benefit to underpricing being a modest 
1% and 1.5% respectively. Merchant bank or issuing house reputation 
apparently did little to minimise underpricing in this period.
An alternative proxy for underwriter reputation is the age of the 
underwriter. The year in which an issuing house was established is disclosed in 
either the Bankers Almanac or the Stock Exchange Year Book. Where 
unavailable, I default to the date of registration of the issuing house. In each 
decade from the 1940s onwards, I place all active members of the IHA into 
quartiles according to the year of establishment. The issuing houses in the first 
quartile are the oldest and most reputable whereas those in the bottom quartile 
are the youngest and least reputable. To these four categories I then add a fifth 
consisting of issuing houses that are not members of the IHA, these being the 
least reputable (rank 5). I proceed to allocate a rank from 1 to 5 to each 
underwritten IPO based on the rank of the issuing house beginning at the end of 
1945 when the IHA was established. I call this ordinal variable IHAGE.
I previously included brokers in my definition of RANK as belonging in the 
next to bottom category. This judgement of broker reputation is somewhat 
harsh. Although regarded by the Macmillan Committee as inferior to issuing 
houses, broking firms such as Cazenoves and Rowe & Pitman established first- 
class reputations in the post-war period and were invariably employed by such 
houses as Barings to assist in the arrangement of underwriting and in the
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di3tribution of IPOs.200 Consequently I exclude them in defining IHAGE 
because I currently have no means of assessing their reputation. I also exclude 
IPOs not underwritten at all.
Despite IHAGE having more variability than AHCDV, IHADV or RANK, it 
does not perform any better in explaining underpricing in the linear model of 
underpricing (Table 5-5, regression (iv)). The coefficient on IHAGE is the 
correct sign but not statistically and barely economically significant. Reputation 
no matter how defined still seems not to explain any variability in underpricing.
However, there may be an endogeneity problem causing the estimated 
coefficients to be biased. As well as issuing firms choosing prestigious 
underwriters, reputable issuing houses may wish to associate with certain types 
of IPO. In accordance with the certification hypothesis, such houses may be 
more likely to underwrite riskier firms, or those IPOs where only existing shares 
are sold, in other words, the type of IPO where the issuer is in particular need of 
certification to minimise potential underpricing.
Following the approach of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), I use a two stage 
least squares estimation method to attempt to handle this endogeneity problem 
instrumenting for IHAGE with the natural logarithm of the post-IPO net assets of 
the issuing firm attributable to its voting shareholders expressed in 2004 prices 
and the total dividends to be paid by the issuing firm in the financial year of its 
IPO as disclosed in the prospectus expressed in 2004 prices 201 However, 
IHAGE is once again the wrong sign and is not statistically significant 
(regression (v)). Furthermore, a Hausman (1978) specification test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimation such as regression (iv) is 
consistent202
200 Kynaston (1991), ch.5, 6 and 7 documents Cazenove’s rise to prominence as a new issue 
broker. Their success is attributed to their being at the centre of information flows between the 
large financial institutions, p.232.
201 In cases where no forecast for the current year is disclosed, the historic figure is taken. 
Habib and Ljungqvist used historic earnings.
202 This test is the version of the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and Mackinon (1989). 
The null hypothesis is that the OLS estimation of underpricing with IHAGE as an explanatory 
variable (regression (v)) produces consistent estimates. This test firstly runs a regression of 
IHAGE on all exogenous variables plus the two instruments, saves the residuals and then runs 
a second regression of underpricing against the exogenous variables including IHAGE and the 
saved first-stage residuals. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis if the coefficient of the 
first-stage residuals is statistically significant. EVIEW S 5  User’s Guide (2004), p-578-79.
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There is no support for the hypothesis that reputable underwriters 
minimised underpricing in this period given the adequacy of the proxy for 
underwriter reputation used above.
5.3 Tender Offers -  a missed opportunity
The first IPO of ordinary shares by tender occurred in 1961. Although 
tender offers had the potential to lower underpricing for issuing firms, only 1 in 8 
IPOs between 1961 and 1986 adopted this method. The analysis of this section 
concludes that the tender method was underexploited by issuing houses on 
behalf of their corporate clients and this provides empirical evidence of what 
appears to be an instance of capital market failure.
The mechanics of a tender offer are similar to an offer for sale with the 
important difference that in the case of a tender offer, investors are invited to 
apply for shares at or above a minimum price set by the issuing firm and its 
adviser. A potential weakness of tenders is that investors collude to submit low 
bids and buy the offered shares on the cheap. The minimum tender price acts 
as a reservation price to prevent investors colluding in order to buy shares 
cheaply. In an underwritten tender offer, if applications are received for fewer 
shares than the number offered, the offer price is fixed at the minimum tender 
price and the issuing house will take up those shares not applied for at this 
minimum price less a commission.
The vast majority of tender offers in Britain between 1961 and 1986 were 
simultaneous uniform price auctions.203 In other words, each investor submitted 
a one-shot, sealed bid for a single block of shares at a specified price. Hence, 
in the stylised example in Figure 5-4, Investor A tenders for an amount of a 
shares at a price of P1f Investor B for an amount of b shares at a price of P*, 
and Investor Cfor c shares at a price of P*.204 This stylised example describes 
a demand curve for IPO shares which is classically downward sloping to the 
right. Once all bids are submitted, the issuing firm and its adviser allocate 
shares at a single “strike price.”
203 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), p.214-224, describes four different types of share 
tenders, Klemperer (2004), p.30-31, discusses share auctions, as do Brealey and Nyborg
, Howe and Newbould (1967), p.214, Figure 10.1.
(1997).
Merrett
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The strike price in its purest sense is that price which just clears the 
demand and supply of shares. In practice, issuing firms and their advisers are 
also preoccupied with ensuring a reasonable spread of ownership and liquidity 
in the shares. The Joseph Bradbury & Sons prospectus, dated 9 December 
1963, illustrates the point. It stated that:
“In deciding the sale price and the basis of allocation due consideration 
will be given to the desirability of distributing shares over a reasonable number 
of applicants in relation to the number of shares offered, the size of the 
company, the obtaining of a quotation and the establishment of a market
Whilst the primary objective of any issuing firm was to maximise proceeds, as 
this quotation makes clear it is also necessary to fulfil the LSE’s requirement 
regarding marketability of the shares. Hence, “scaling down” occurs where the 
tender offer was oversubscribed at or above the minimum tender price. In such 
a case, successful applicants receive only a pro rata allocation rather than 
being allotted shares in full. This lowers the strike price below the level 
necessary to clear the market.
An example is provided by one of the earliest tender offers. In November 
1963, Renwick Wilton & Dobson offered 405,000 existing shares out of a total of 
1.735 million shares outstanding at a minimum tender price of 13s. through S.G. 
Warburg. The offer was fifteen times oversubscribed, there being applications 
for 6,230,900 shares at prices between 13s. and 30s. As can be seen from 
Table 5-7 (i), the market-clearing strike price would have been 17s. 9d., at 
which price shares would have been allocated to a relatively small number of 
investors - between 220 and 230 investors. Due to the heavy oversubscription, 
all applications had to be scaled down and the basis of allotment is set out in 
Table 5-7 (ii). After scaling down had taken place, the strike price was set at 
15s. 9d. and 1194 investors were allocated shares. The tender was successful 
in achieving an offer price 2s. 9d. above the minimum price of 13s.. However, 
the company gave up an extra 2s. per share, equivalent to 12.6% of IPO 
proceeds, in order to distribute shares to approximately five times as many 
shareholders.
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The Renwick Wilton & Dobson demand curve is graphed in Figure 5-5.205 
Approximately 90% of the applications were made at prices 10% either side of 
the strike price. Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) obtained data on the 
quantities and prices of all applications in the case of 12 tenders in 1963. The 
resulting demand curves were very similar to that of Renwick Wilton & Dobson, 
namely, downward sloping. This is evidence that it was feasible for issuing 
firms and their advisers to practise discriminatory pricing in which event shares 
would be allocated to successful applicants at various strike prices descending 
the demand curve. Hence, in the stylised example investors A and B receive 
shares at P1 and Investor C shares at the lower price of P2 (Figure 5-4). This 
method allows the issuer to maximise gross IPO proceeds by capturing the 
additional proceeds described by the area Pi YZP2.
However, there were only 2 IPOs which adopted discriminatory pricing, 
Hurst and Sandler and Hurst Park Syndicate, both launched in the early 
1960s.206 Given LSE concerns about the ability of some retail investors to 
assess the valuation of an IPO, tenders were restricted to the uniform price 
type. There was concern that investors might submit excessively high bids in 
their efforts to secure share allocations and would be forced to overpay for any 
shares allocated to them. Similarly, although in theory “multiple bid” tenders 
allowing each investor to submit multiple applications at different prices were 
preferable to the one-shot bid approach because they would reveal more 
information about the nature of the demand curve for the IPO, such tenders 
were not experimented with. Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) 
recommended a modified single bid, multiple price version of the tender but this 
was never adopted.207 Uniform price auctions dominated.
The first tender offer was undertaken in June 1961 for Parway Land and 
Investments, a small property company with a market capitalisation at the strike 
price of £700,000 which was less than half the mean firm size. All 250,000 
shares were sold by insiders who presumably had a particular incentive to 
maximise gross proceeds from the IPO. In early 1960, the LSE had previously 
rejected a request for a relaxation of the restriction of the tender method to only
205 The curve is truncated below 15.75s., the strike price, because details regarding the 2754  
applications for 4.17 million shares below this price down to 13s. were not provided.
Even in these 2 examples, price discrimination was limited with only 2 or 3 strike prices at 
various points on the demand curve being chosen.
207 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), ch.11
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water company issues, this restriction having existed since the early twentieth 
century. The approval of the tender method in the case of the Parway IPO was 
for two reasons. Firstly, there had been a recent spate of heavily-underpriced 
IPOs characterised by “stagging” and, secondly, the valuation of Parway’s 
property portfolio was less than straightforward given that much of it was still 
under development.208 Kleinwort Benson was the issuing house credited with 
this particular innovation.209 The minimum tender price was set at 16s. and the 
strike price was set at 17s. 6d. the issue having been three and a half times 
oversubscribed. Whilst bids for shares were received all the way up to 40s., 
17s. 6d. represented the highest price at which a desirable dispersion of 
ownership could be achieved.210 The shares closed at 20s. on the first day of 
trading, representing an underpricing of 14.3%. This was somewhat better than 
the average underpricing of 23.5% on the 17 public offers since the beginning of 
that year.
Despite a second IPO of ordinary shares by tender occurring in the same 
month211, this innovation was slow to catch on. Only one further ordinary share 
tender offer occurred during the next 26 months and this was strictly speaking a 
re-admission to the market of Rolls Razor following a reverse takeover in May 
1962.212 Thereafter, there were a further 66 ordinary share IPOs by tender, 
almost half of which occurred in 1968 alone when one in two offers were by 
tender (Table 5-8). After the heavy issuance in 1968, there were then only four 
further IPOs by tender in the following year and only one at the very end of the 
1970s despite there being 285 IPOs, 223 of which were fixed price offers. 
There were a further 36 tenders up until “Big Bang” in 1986. The resurgence of 
interest occurred in 1983 when 16 tenders were launched on the market 
following renewed dissatisfaction with underpricing of fixed price offers 
exemplified b^ the shares of Superdrug rising by 54% on its first day of 
trading.213 Unfortunately, the London market’s interest in tenders had a
208 The Times, 10 June 1961, p.15: “First Equity Issue by Tender”.
209 Wake (1997), p.391.
210 The Times, 19 June 1961, p. 16: “Kleinwort Tender Issue Success”.
211 Country and New Town Properties. This was a “penny” share IPO, the strike was set below 
2s. at 1s.10 1/2d. I have excluded this issue from my analysis to preserve comparability with 
the rest of the sample. There were no other “penny” share IPOs by tender.
212 Rolls Razor is excluded from the foregoing because it was a readmission. This firm was first 
listed in 1927 and is included in my data set for that year.
213 Investors Chronicle, 21 October 1983, p14.
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tendency to wax and wane214 and the number of tenders fell away again in 
1984. The very last IPO by tender offer was The Virgin Group in November 
1986.
Between 1961 and 1969 tender offers only represented 13% of all IPOs 
(Table 5-8). Given that placings in the 1960s may not have been close 
substitutes for public offers in this period, it is perhaps preferable to regard fixed 
price offers as the only alternative to tender offers. In this case tenders 
accounted for 18% of all public offers between 1961 and 1969, still only one in 
five IPOs. In the seventies, tenders virtually disappeared. Whilst the market 
became very inactive after 1973, there is no obvious reason for this 
disappearance in the early years of the decade. The risk characteristics of 
IPOs in the 1970s judged by firm age, valuation and R&D intensity along with 
the measures of incentive alignment (VENDOR) were not particularly different 
from those of the sixties or the eighties (Table 5-9). In addition, the 
underpricing of offers in 1971 and 1972 averaged over 13% and close to 10% 
respectively and there were still instances of IPOs climbing to large first-day 
premia. Mothercare in 1972 and Rolls Royce Motors in 1973 both recorded 
first-day returns over 50%. Yet, the tender method was ignored. When tenders 
did make a comeback in the 1980s, they still only accounted for 22% of all 
ordinary share IPOs on the Official List215
What sort of firms went public using the tender method? Is it the case 
that this method was rationally chosen by those firms which were more difficult 
for the market to value or had incentives to avoid underpricing? Tenders were 
felt to be necessary where there existed a lack of directly comparable quoted 
companies with which to benchmark an IPO. Such IPOs exhibited firm risk. 
Equally, if riskier firms are likely to suffer from a greater propensity of 
underpricing, I would expect these firms to opt for the tender method, other 
things being equal. I would also expect incentives to play a part in the decision 
over issue method. The more of the issue sold by existing shareholders, the 
more likely they would opt for a tender, whereas, the greater the proportion of 
primary shares in the IPO, the less likely is the occurrence of a tender. I first 
summarise the characteristics of IPOs by tender relative to those undertaken by
214 ibid., 11 November 1983, “Don't write off the stags”.
2151 make the assumption that offers and placings were close substitutes by this time.
145
other issue methods and then analyse how the likelihood of a tender varies with 
these characteristics.
Table 5-9 compares the characteristics of IPOs by tender with IPOs by 
other methods. In the 1960s, the characteristics of IPOs by public offer (row 
(2)) are also included since this is probably the more relevant comparison, as 
discussed above. The conclusions to be drawn are consistent across the two 
periods. Firms choosing tenders were larger than those doing offers and 
placings but age was similar. Valuations of IPOs by tenders, whether judged by 
book value to offer price (BVP) or dividend yield (DY), were more expensive. 
Firms making use of tenders were more likely to be undertaking R&D activity. 
In summary, whilst firm age and firm size suggest firms opting for tenders were 
not riskier, firm valuation and R&D intensity indicate the opposite. Finally, IPOs 
by tender were more likely to be selling existing shares as a percentage of post- 
IPO shares outstanding (VENDOR) than new shares (PRIMARY). In such 
circumstances, issuing firms were more incentivised to moderate underpricing 
and to opt for a tender as predicted.
A probit model offers a more rigorous tool for analysing the marginal 
influence of the various choice variables on the decision to opt for a tender. 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the IPO is a tender and 0 if it is a 
fixed price offer or placing. The statistically significant explanatory variables are 
firm size (MCAP), valuation (BVP), R&D and incentive alignment proxy variable 
(VENDOR) (Table 5-10). The sign of the coefficients of the latter variables were 
generally as predicted. More highly valued firms, R&D-intensive firms and firms 
selling existing shares were more likely to select a tender offer but larger firms 
tended to choose tenders, contrary to expectations. Firm age was not at all 
statistically significant (results not shown). Firm size in this regression may be 
picking up the degree of financial sophistication of the issuing firm rather than 
acting as a risk proxy. Hence, with the exception of firm size, the probit results 
confirm that riskier issuing firms and firms selling vendor shares are more likely 
to choose the tender method in expectation of minimising underpricing.
Did the tender offer deliver lower underpricing? Merrett, Howe and 
Newbould (1967) provided early evidence that tenders delivered lower 
underpricing.216 However, was this sustained after 1963? My results show that
216 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967), p.113, Table 5.7.
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tenders did continue to deliver lower underpricing thereafter (Table 5-11). 
Underpricing of tenders averaged 7.57% and 5.19% as compared to that of 
public offers and placings averaging 14.12% and 12.83% for 1960-69 and 1980- 
86 respectively. I have omitted the 1970s because there was only a single 
tender the results of which were not reported in the financial press. 
Furthermore, controlling for the various IPO characteristics, tenders still 
delivered lower underpricing. Tables 5-12 and 5-13 summarise the results from 
OLS regressions with first-day returns as the dependent variable for the two 
periods 1960-69 and 1980-86. Controlling for firm age, firm valuation defined 
as book value to offer price, incentive alignment (VENDOR) and R&D activity, 
the tender method significantly lowers underpricing by 10.0% across the period 
1961-86 (Table 5-12, regression (1)). A similar margin of lower underpricing in 
favour of tenders is apparent for both sub-periods, 1961-69 and 1980-86 
(regressions (2) and (3)).
Lower underpricing of this magnitude would have increased gross 
proceeds by approximately £1,200 million between 1961 and 1986 in 2004 
prices.217 Privatisations have been excluded from this calculation, in keeping 
with the rest of my analysis, primarily because these IPOs did not, first and 
foremost, aim to maximise proceeds but to encourage the growth of share 
ownership among the general public which therefore required an attractive level 
of underpricing.218
Given that the tender method was successful in lowering underpricing why 
then was it not more widely employed? One possibility is that there was 
resistance to this new innovation by the more established issuing houses. For 
example, the first issuing house to underwrite a tender was Kleinwort Benson, 
a relative new entrant to the issuing business following the merger between 
Kleinwort & Sons, a first-tier accepting house, and Robert Benson Lonsdale, a 
small issuing house. Table 5-13 summarises the extent to which AHC and IHA 
members were underwriting tender offers. Whilst only 25% of the tenders in the 
sixties were underwritten by a member of the Accepting Houses Committee 
(AHC), this proportion had risen to 72% by the 1980s. The broader
membership of the Issuing Houses Association was active in underwriting
217 This estimate is based on applying the 10.0% average to all offers between 1961 and 1969 
and all offers and placings between 1970 and 1986. It includes IPOs on the USM between 1980 
and 1985 only 10 of which were by tender.
2,8 Jenkinson and Mayer (1994).
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tenders with an overall market share of close to 60% in the sixties, rising to 80% 
in the eighties. In each decade, seventeen and twelve AHC members 
respectively separately underwrote tenders. There is therefore no evidence that 
tenders were being promoted by a very small number of houses and being 
resisted by the majority. Most houses experimented with tenders, a few more 
enthusiastically than others.219 Notwithstanding this fact, the tender method 
was underutilised.
What were the disadvantages at least as perceived by the market? 
Alleged disadvantages included IPO pricing being left to uninformed investors, 
such investors bidding at excessively high prices to secure shares and incurring 
losses in post-IPO trading, and the deterrence of stags.220 The view of the 
Chairman of the IHA as late as 1984 was that tenders deterred both retail 
investors and stags.221 These arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, 
informed investors also participated in tenders and, despite the noise created by 
uninformed investors, their participation would help to secure a better price for 
issuing firms. The alternative was a fixed price offer which required the issuing 
house, usually in combination with a broker, setting the offer price. Yet, the 
overwhelming evidence of this chapter is that such an approach did not secure 
the best price for their corporate clients. Secondly, any investors overbidding 
for shares in a tender and incurring losses would quickly revise their price 
expectations and their approach to valuing IPOs. Finally, stags still participated 
in tenders but compared to fixed price offers they would no longer be able to 
profit from excessive initial returns. One further alleged disadvantage of 
tenders was that the extra effort required of investors in assessing firm value 
and then submitting a bid discouraged them from applying at all, leading in turn 
to under subscription. One such instance of undersubscription was VG 
Instruments, a high-technology company, where over half the issue was left with 
the underwriters.222 Yet, there were very few instances of tenders being 
undersubscribed.223 Perhaps the most legitimate criticism levelled at tenders is
219 Morgan Grenfell underwrote 8 and NM Rothschild 6 tender offers out of the 36 in the 1980s.
220 Briston (1970), p.91; and The Times 7 October 1963, p.16, “Offers by Tender May Become 
Standard Practice”.
221 The Times 18 September 1984, p.22 “New issue pricing is more of an art than a science” by 
R. Broadley, Chairman of IHA.
222 Investors Chronicle, 13 January 1984, p.28, “VG gaining its due”.
223 The Britoil privatisation in November 1982 was the most spectacular example. Approximately 
75% of the offer was left with the underwriters. As a privatisation this IPO is not included in my 
sample.
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the lack of transparency in the basis of allotment when offers were 
oversubscribed and a tendency to discriminate against large bids from 
institutions.224 However, it is far from obvious that the allocation basis of fixed 
price offers was any more transparent.
Since the criticisms of tenders lack substance, the strong suspicion is that 
it was inertia on the part of the issuing houses which prevented the switch to 
tenders.225 As discussed in section 5.1, before Big Bang, competition among 
issuing houses was a restrained affair, at least as far as IPOs were concerned. 
The number of new entrants into the IHA was relatively modest and none made 
any great impact in terms of market share. The merchant banking arms of the 
clearing banks made only modest attempts to break into IPO underwriting and 
the leading US investment banks made no attempt to enter the business. 
Consequently, both issuing houses and brokers enjoyed a relatively “quiet life”. 
They neither needed to compete for IPO business on their record of 
underpricing, nor adopt the tender method aggressively.
Issuing houses were not perhaps solely to blame however. It is possible 
that institutional investors whose ownership of the market rose steadily from the 
1960s onwards were equally happy to maintain the status quo. Generally, 
issuing houses arranged for IPOs (and rights issues) to be sub-underwritten by 
the large investment institutions whilst keeping a portion of the underwriting for 
themselves. Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) in respect of the period 1959- 
63 and Marsh (1980) in respect of the period 1962-75 commented on the fixed 
nature of underwriting fees at around 2% of issue proceeds.226 This fee 
schedule still applied in the 1980s.227 The issuing house would typically pay 
1.25% out of the 2% to the sub-underwriters. Since many of these same sub­
underwriters were investment institutions also applying for shares in the IPO, 
they had a dual interest in seeing the shares underpriced. Not only would they 
be allocated shares at a favourable price, they would also earn a relatively risk­
free sub-underwriting profit given that underpriced issues were very unlikely to 
be undersubscribed. Marsh (1979) in a study of the underwriting of 671 UK
224 The Economist, 14 December 1963, p.1203-04, “Experiment Justified”.
225 The Times, 14 August 1967, p.18, “Equity issue by tender -  efficient but seldom used”. This 
article reviewed the Merrett, Howe and Newbould study and concluded issuing houses not only 
“found conventional issues sufficiently rewarding but also tenders require a great deal more 
effort to arrange”.
226 Marsh (1980), p.694.
227 The Times 18 September 1984, p.22 “New issue pricing is more of an art than a science” by 
R. Broadley, Chairman of IHA.
149
equity rights issues between 1962 and 1975 concluded that sub-underwriting 
fees appeared excessive relative to the risks being borne. The underwriting 
institutions were earning excess ex post returns and issuing firms consequently 
overpaying for rights issues. Merrett, Howe and Newbould also found that 
excess underwriting returns were made on a sample of 168 IPOs between 1959 
and 1963.
As Marsh recognised, the possibility remains that these excess returns are 
offset by side payments such as the brokerage commissions which the sub­
underwriting institutions have to pay to the broker in order to get onto the sub­
underwriting list in the first place. Nonetheless, the impression created is one of 
institutional investors also content with the fixed price offer system. The 
growing power of these investors with whom the issuing houses played a 
repeated game in the underwriting market made it difficult to shift the balance of 
power back towards the issuing firms.228
Such a shift did take place in the 1980s. The abolition of foreign exchange 
controls in October 1979 automatically meant that the LSE as the primary 
market for the trading of British securities would now have to compete for a 
share of the investment portfolios of British institutional investors 229 This was 
followed in July 1983 by the LSE agreeing to the abandonment of certain 
restrictive practices, namely, fixed commissions, the prohibition of dual capacity 
and the prohibition of foreign ownership of LSE members. The seeds of this 
momentous decision lay in the referral of the LSE to the Monopolies 
Commission in August 1973 over the restriction on advertising by brokers which 
subsequently led on to an investigation into fixed brokerage commissions. The 
threat of a referral to the Restrictive Practices Court hung like a black cloud over 
the LSE for the following decade.230
The fresh winds of competition ushered in by exchange control abolition 
and then Big Bang created an environment conducive to innovation in the 
underwriting market. Wall Street had deregulated fixed commissions over a 
decade earlier in 1975 and as a consequence new techniques were imported 
from the US the first of which in the case of the IPO market was the “red
228 R. Broadley, Chairman of the IHA, in a second article on the new issue market 
acknowledged this power in putting forward suggestions as to how to attract the retail investor 
to IPOs, The Times 13 February 1985 “Opening the new issue door to a wider share-owning 
public”.
Michie (2001), p.544.
230 ibid., p.482-83 and p.547.
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herring.” This was a preliminary prospectus filed with the relevant listing 
authority containing all necessary disclosures on the issuing firm excepting 
details on the offer price. The investment bank would then use this document to 
market the IPO to investors and on the basis of their feedback adjust the final 
offer price. This technique was first adopted in Britain in the case of the British 
Telecommunications and the British Aerospace privatisations in November 
1984 and February 1985 respectively. Thereafter, red herrings became more 
common.
As it turned out, this particular innovation was only an intermediate step on 
the way to the adoption of another Wall Street technique, book-building, in the 
early 1990s. This method improved upon the tender offer by introducing more 
flexibility into the process of setting the terms of the IPO. Firstly, the investment 
bank would set an indicated offer price range rather than a minimum tender 
price for investors to consider; secondly, investors had the opportunity to revise 
their indicated interest rather than be constrained to submit a single bid as 
under the tender method; and thirdly, the book-building method allowed more 
flexibility in increasing the offer size and in allotting more shares to investors 
with price-sensitive information. In theory at least, this should have led to lower 
underpricing other things being equal. However, in practice IPO underpricing 
was disrupted by the dotcom bubble at the end of the 1990s and the 
subsequent collapse in issue activity in the following 3 years. It is still too early 
to tell whether this new technique has improved the underpricing result as far as 
issuing firms are concerned.
5.4 Summary
Reputable underwriters became more involved in the IPO market from 
1945 onwards. They appear to have had no beneficial impact on underpricing. 
What is equally apparent is that the merchant banks, having had a good idea, 
failed to adopt the tender method as enthusiastically as they might have. This 
looks like an opportunity missed and resulted in issuers between 1961 and 
1986 leaving £1.2 billion on the table in 2004 prices. At its worst, the merchant 
banks may have been guilty of operating a cartel; at the minimum, they opted 
for a quiet life. According to Broadberry and Crafts (2001), cartels operated to 
the detriment of innovation and industrial performance through the 1950s and
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1960s in a large number of manufacturing industries. This chapter has 
uncovered an interesting parallel in the financial sector in the same era. 
Whether the result of a premeditated cartel or not, competition was lacking in 
IPO underwriting to the detriment of financial innovation.
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Table 5-1: The leading London Merchant Banks 1914-47
Cassis (1994), p.10, provides a list of merchant banks (col.(1)) based on his estimation of size 
and their financial orientation. The membership of the Accepting Houses Committee (AHC) in 
1914 (col.(2)) is from Cassis (1994) p.30-31 and in 1947 (col.(3)) from Bankers’ Almanac and 
Yearbook 1947-48.
Merchant Banks 
1914 
col. (1)
AHC 
1914 
col. (2)
AHC 
1947 
col. (3)
# members 22 21 15
Arbuthnot Latham & Co ® ® ®
Baring Bros & Co ® ® ®
Arthur H. Brandt & Co. ®
Wm. Brandt, Sons & Co. ® ®
Robert Benson & Co ® ®
Brown Shipley & Co ® ® ®
Cunliffe Brothers ®
Erlangers & Co ®
Robert Fleming & Co ®
Fruhling & Goschen ® ®
Antony Gibbs ® ® ®
C.J.Hambro & Son (notel) ® ® ®
Horstman & Co. ®
Frederick Huth & Co ® ®
Kleinwort Sons & Co. ® ® ®
Konig Brothers ®
Lazard Brothers & Co. ® ®
H.S. Lefevre & Co ®
Matheson & Co ®
Morgan Grenfell & Co. ® ® ®
Samuel Montagu & Co ® ®
Neuman Luebeck & Co. ®
NM Rothschild & Sons ® ® ®
A. Ruffer & Sons ®
M. Samuel & Co. ® ®
D. Sassoon & Co. ®
J Henry Schroder ® ® ®
Seligman Bros ® ®
Wallace Brothers & Co. ® ®
Stern Brothers ®
S. Japhet (note2) ®
Speyer Brothers ®
Notes: 1. C.J. Hambro merged with British Bank of Northern Commerce to form Hambros Bank 
in 1920
2. S. Japhet joined the Committee in 1921, resigned in 1942 and then rejoined in 1952 
[Dennett (1979), p.78-79, p.82].
Table 5-2: Accepting House Committee Membership after 1945
ACCEPTING HOUSE EST. AHC IHA CORPORATE HISTORY
Arbuthnot Latham 1833 1952-87 1961-79
Baring Brothers 1762 1914-87 1946-87
Wm Brandts 1805 1914-76 1947-81, 1987 1976 acquired by Grindlays Bank
Brown Shipley 1810 1914-87 1946-87
Charterhouse Japhet/Charterhouse Bank 1880 1965-87 1965-87 acquired by RBS 1986, renamed Charterhouse Bank
Erlangers 1859 1945-59 1946-58 1959 merged with Philip Hill Higginson
Robert Fleming 1909 1980-87 1967-87
Anthony Gibbs & Sons 1808 1947-79 1949-83 1980 acquired by HSBC
Guinness Mahon 1836 1946-87 1946-87
Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers 1859 1960-65 1961-64 1965 merged with M. Samuel
Hambros Bank 1839 1914-87 1946-87
Hill Samuel 1831 1965-83 1965-87
S. Japhet 1880 1921-42,
1952-64
1946-64 1954 acquired by Charterhouse; 1964 renamed Charterhouse Japhet
Kleinwort Benson 1830 1961-87 1962-87
Kleinwort, Sons & Co 1830 1914-61 1946-61 1961 merged with Robert Benson Lonsdale
Lazard Brothers 1877 1914-87 1946-87
Samuel Montagu 1853 1914-87 1946-87
Morgan Grenfell 1838 1914-87 1946-87
N. M. Rothschild & Sons 1805 1914-87 1946-87
Rea Bros 1919 1969-87 1951-87
M. Samuel 1831 1914-65 1946-64 1965 merged with Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers
J. Henry Schroder 1804 1914-87 1946-61 1960 merged with Helbert Wagg
Seligman Brothers 1864 1946-57 1946-56 1957 acquired by S.G. Warburg
Singer & Friedlander 1907 1973-87 1946-87
S G Warburg 1934 1958-87 1946-87 1957 acquired Seligman Brothers
Source: Bankers Almanac 1945-87, Stock Exchange Year Books 1945-87, Orbell and Turton (2001)
Table 5-3: Membership of Issuing Houses Association and Accepting Houses Committee
ISSUING HOUSE Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
British Linen Bank 
James Finlay Corp
1746 1978-79 
1750 1980-87
Glyn Mills /Williams & Glyn's
National Commercial & Schraders/ 
National Commercial & Glyn's
1753 1969,
1971-83 
1964 1967-69
1970 merged with Williams & Deacons and National Commercial Bank 
1969 renamed; 1970 merged with Glyn Mills and Williams & Deacons
Baring Brothers 1762 1946-87 1914-87
J. Henry Schroder 
Helbert Wagg 
J. Henry Schroder Wagg 
Leadenhall Securities Corp
1800 1946-61 
1848 1946-61 
1800 1962-87 
1935 1947-69
1914-87
1962 Helbert Wagg and J. Henry Schroder merge
acquired by J. Henry Schrader f lH H IH H H I ilH H H i
N. M. Rothschild & Sons 
Wm Brandts/Grindlay Brandts/ 
ANZ Merchant Bank 
Anthony Gibbs & Sons 
Brown Shipley
1805 1946-87 
1805 1947-81, 
1987
1808 1949-83 
1810 1946-87
1914-87
1914-76
1914-79
1914-87
1976 acquired by Grindlays Bank; acquired by Australia and New
Zealand Bank, parent of ANZ Merchant Bank
1980 acquired by Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.
Kleinwort, Sons & Co 
Robert Benson 
Robert Benson, Lonsdale 
Kleinwort Benson
1830 1946-61 
1852 1946-54 
1852 1955-60 
1830 1962-87
1914-61
1961-87
1955 merger of Robert Benson and Lonsdale Inv. Trust 
1962 merger of Kleinwort and Robert Benson Lonsdale
M. Samuel 
Higginson 
Philip Hill & Partners
€ 3 1831
1907
1932
1946-64
1946-51
1946-58
1945-65 r *
ISSUING HOUSE__________
Philip Hill, Higginson 
Erlangers
Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers 
Hill Samuel
British Shareholders Trust
Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
1907 
1859 
1859 
1831
1921
1952-60
1946-58 1945-59
1961-64 1960-65
1965-87 1965-83
1947-55
Investment Registry 1903 1946-65
Arbuthnot Latham 1833 1961-79 1914, 1952-87
Dawson & Forbes 1833 1967-72
Stern Bros. 1833 1946-63
Barclays Merchant Bank/BZW 1836 1972-87
County Bank 1836 1971-87
Guinness Mahon 1836 1946-87 1946-87
Morgan Grenfell 1838 1946-87 1914-87
Ionian Bank 1839 1965-86
Matheson 1848 1964-84
Edward Bates 1852 1946,
1971-77
Ullmann 1853 1947-63
A. Keyser 1868 1962-63 T> V - r S t i
Keyser Ullmann 1853 1964-81
1951 merger of Philip Hill & Partners and Higginson & Co
: • . . V .  ^
1959 merger of Philip Hill, Higginson and Erlangers
1965 merger of Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers and M.Samuel
1955 acquired by Philip Hill Investment Trust 
1964 acquired by M. Samuel
m m .
owned by Arbuthnot Latham
1962 merger of A.Keyser and Ullman; 1981 acquired by Charterhouse
Samuel Montagu 
Drayton Corporation 
Hart Son & Co
1853
1852
1899
1946-87 1945-87
1955-68
1971-72
1973 acquired by S. Montagu 
1960 acquired by Samuel Montagu
■ :  ' !
Tozer Standard and Chartered/ 1853 1976-87
Std. Chartered Merchant Bank
renamed 1976
ISSUING HOUSE Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
First National Industrial Trust 
Birmingham Industrial Trust
1855
1959
1971-87
1962-69
owned by First National Finance Corp 
1970 acquired by First National Finance Corp
Lloyds Bk Intl/Lloyds Merchant Bk 1862 1979-87 1973 LBI acquired Bank of London and South America (est. 1862)
Seligman Brothers 
S G Warburg
1864
1934 1946-87
1914-57
1958-87 1957 acquired Seligman Brothers
Wardley/HSBC 1865 1984-87 1972 HSBC established Wardley
Gray Dawes
Banque Arab & Internationale 
d'lnvestissement (B.A.I.I.)
1865
1865
1971-79
1985-87 1980 acquired Gray Dawes h h h h ^ h h b;■ . V . . . : . . : ' , .  ^ ,
Svenska International/ 
Svenska Handelsbanken 1871 1986-87
Lazard Brothers 
Edward de Stein
S. Japhet
Charterhouse Investment Trust/ 
Charterhouse Finance Corp 
Charterhouse Japhet/ 
Charterhouse Bank
1877
1925
1946-63
1965-871880
1914-87
1960 acquired by Lazard Brothers
1921-42, 1952- 1954 acquired by Charterhouse Industrial Devpmt; 1964 renamed 
64 Charterhouse Japhet
1954 acquired S. Japhet; 1964 renamed Charterhouse Japhet
1965-87 acquired by Royal Bank of Scotland 1986, renamed Charterhouse Bank
English Assoc. Grp/English Trust 1884 1982-87
Law Debenture Corp._____________ 1889______ 1946-56
English Association of American Bond and Share Holders until name 
change in 1980
ISSUING HOUSE Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
Henry Ansbacher 1894 
Robert Fraser & Partners 1935
1964-87
1956-77 1972 acquired by Henry Ansbacher
Midland Trust 1896 1946-69
Singer & Friedlander 1907 1946-87 1973-87
Robert Fleming 1909 1967-87 1980-87
Hambros Bank 
British Empire Trust
1839
1902
1946-87 1914-87 
1952-69 1970 by Hambros f lH H H H H H !
Lothbury Assets & Land 1912 1960-69
British Trusts Association 1917 1946-77
Leopold Joseph 1919 1965-87
London & Yorkshire Trust 1919 1946-84
Rea Bros 1919 1951-87 1969-87
Standard Industrial Trust 1920 1946-84
United Dominions Trust 1922 1972-83
Old Broad Street Securities 1939/1922 1946-72 est. 1939; 1949 acqiuired by United Dominions Trust (eSt. 1922)
Power Securities Corp 1922 1946-69
Anglo-Scottish Amalgd. Corp 1925 1946-76
Close Brothers 1925 1946-87
Federated Trust & Finance Corp 1925 1946-87
Gresham Trust 1925 1946-87
Industrial Fin. & InvestmentCorp 1925 1946-65 1971 renamed Dawnay Day
Dawnay Day 1928 1946-87 1966 acquired by Industrial Fin. & Inv Corp; 1971 name reverted
ISSUING HOUSE Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
Anglo-Federal Banking Corp 1925 1946-49
Electric & General Industrial Trust 1928 1946-72
Minster Trust 1928 1946-87
Ocean Trust 1928 1946-68
ED Sassoon/Wallace Bros 
Sassoon Bank 1930 1971-77 1972 renamed
Leadenhall Investments & Fin. 1934 1946-58 1958 acquired by Leadenhall Sterling Investments
Seton Trust 1935 1946-81
Brown Harriman 1935 1947-49
English Transcontinental 1935 1950-79
Whitehead Industrial Trust/St 1936 1946-69 1959 renamed
Michael's Securities
British Bank of Commerce 1936 1971-76
Cheviot T rust 1939 1947-50 1950 voluntarily wound up
I.C.F.C.
Scottish Industrial Finance/ICFC
i Q/l £ 1965-85
1965-77
1980 name changed to Finance for Industry 
1964 acquired by I.C.F.C.
Glasgow Industrial Finance 1946 1947-64 1964 renamed Scottish Industrial Finance
Gwent & West of England
Enterprises 1946 1960-81
Tokenhouse Securities Corp 1946? 1946-52
Bentworth Trust 1950 1953-77 owns Bentworth Securities
Neville Ind. Sec.s/GR Dawes 1952 1949-87 1973 reorganised as GR Dawes
Cayzer 1954 1978-87
Burston & Texas Commerce Bk/ 1955 1971-73 both firms part of Burston Group
Burston Hoare
Slater Walker 1964 1971-77
J. F. Nash & Partners 1965 1969-79
CSFB 1968 1977-87
Manufacturers Hanover Corp 1968 1977-87
Noble Grossart 1969 1973-87
ISSUING HOUSE Est. IHA AHC Corporate History
Scandinavian Bank 1969 1978-84
Orion Bank 1970 1978-87
M.J.H. Nightingale/Granville & Co 1971 1981-87
European Banking Co/EBC Amro
Bank 1973 1981-87
Guidehouse 1978 1986-87
Enskilda Securities 1982 1983-87
Consortiums
Year of establishment unknown
Energy Finance & General Trust/ ? 1978-84
Equity Finance Trust/Yorks. Trust
Finance for Trade ? 1967-68
Industrial Securities ? 1958-62
Avenue Finance Co ? 1969
Chapter Investments ? 1954-61
Manchester Exchange Trust ? 1983-87
Midland Industrial Issues ? 1968-81
National Securities Corp ? 1946-48
Ufitec T  rust ? 1969
Equity Capital for Industry ? 1978-84
E.T. Trust ? 1980-85
Manchester & Liverpool Industrial
Securities ? 1946-87
Nthn. Ireland Industrial Devpmt. &
Finance ? 1960-69
Table 5-4: Top 20 Issuing Houses underwriting ordinary share IPO 1930-87
ISSUING HOUSE Est. AHC IHA #IPOs 1930-87 1930-45 1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-87
#IPOs 1959 249 256 350 616 285 203
1. Whitehead Ind. Trust/St Michael's Sec.s 1936 ‘46-69 69 3.5% 5.2% 17.3% 4.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
2. Charterhouse IT/Finance Corp 1925 ‘46-63 43 2.2% 3.2% 5.6% 5.6% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0%
3. Charterhouse Japhet/Charterhouse Bank 1804 ‘65-87 ‘65-87 22 1.1% 4.8% 2.4% 1.6%
4. N. M. Rothschild & Sons 1805 ‘14-87 ‘46-87 38 1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 6.0% 2.8% 6.0%
5. Investment Registry 1903 ‘46-65 38 1.9% 1.2% 3.2% 4.4% | 6.4% 0.0% 0.0%
6. S G Warburg 1934 ‘58-87 ‘46-87 38 1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 1.6% 6.0% 3.6% 3.2%
7. Singer & Friedlander 1907 ‘73-87 ‘46-87 37 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 7.2% 6.0% 0.4%
8. London & Yorkshire Trust 1919 ‘46-84 37 1.9% 1.2% 3.2% 4.8% 4.4% 1.2% 0.0%
9. Hambros Bank 1839 ‘46-87 36 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.4% 6.4% 3.6%
10.Kleinwort & Sons/Kleinwort Benson 1830 ‘14-87 ‘62-87 37 1.8% 0.4% 4.4% 2.4% 7.2%
11.Hill Samuel 1831 ‘65-83 ‘65-87 35 1.8% 2.4% 4.4% 7.2%
12. Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers 1859 ‘61-65 ‘61-64 26 1.3% 4.4% 5.2% 9.6%
13.Standard Industrial Trust 1920 ‘46-84 35 1.8% 3.6% 3.2% 3.2% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
14.Morgan Grenfell 1838 ‘14-87 ‘46-87 32 1.6% 0.4% 1.2% 2.4% 1.2% 2.4% 5.2%
15.Samuel Montagu 1853 ‘14-87 ‘46-87 30 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 3.6% 2.8%
16.Minster Trust 1928 ‘46-87 28 1.4% 0.0% 1.2% 2.8% 6.8% 0.4% 0.0%
17.Gresham Trust 1925 ‘46-87 26 1.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 7.2% 1.6% 0.0%
18.J.Henry Schroder Wagg 1804 ‘14-87 ‘62-87 24 1.2% 3.6% 2.8% 3.2%
19.Helbert Wagg 1800 ‘46-61 16 0.8% 0.8% 2.8% 2.8%
20.Lazard Brothers 1877 ‘14-87 ‘46-87 22 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 4.4% 1.2% 2.0%
C5 measure 14.5% 33.7% 19.7% 37.3% 24.1% 28.9%
Notes: 1. Philip Hill Higginson Erlangers includes the IPOs underwritten by Philip Hill & Partners (10), Philip Hill Higginson (6), and Erlangers (7). 2. J. Henry 
Schroder Wagg includes the IPOs underwritten by J. Henry Schroder (3) but not those of Helbert Wagg (16) before the merger in 1962.
161
Table 5-5: Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing 1949-86
Dependent variable is first-day returns adjusted for market movement between prospectus 
date and initial trading date. Regression model is as described in chapter 4. AGE is firm 
age. BVP is book value to offer price. VENDOR is number of existing shares sold in IPO as 
a proportion of post-IPO shares outstanding. AHCDV and IHADV are dummy variables 
taking value 1, if the underwriting issuing house is a member of Accepting Houses Committee 
and Issuing Houses Association respectively. RANK and IHAGE are defined in the text. The 
latter excludes IPOs not underwritten or underwritten by a broker. In regression (v) the 
natural logarithm of real net asset value (LNNAV) and real dividends paid (DIV) are the 
instruments for IHAGE (see text). Placing and tender method dummy variables are included 
but results not shown. Standard errors are shown in brackets and are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. *, 
**, and *** asterisks indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively. Missing 
variables are AHCDV (1), IHADV (1), IHAGE (1), VENDO R (3), AGE (2), RD (2), DIV (5), and 
NAV(2).
Estimation method
(i)
OLS
(ii)
OLS
(iii)
OLS
(iv)
OLS
(v)
2SLS
LN(1+AGE) -0.016** -0.016*** -0.015** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
LN(BVP) -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
VENDOR -0.056** -0.057** -0.057** -0.072** -0.084**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.040)
RD 0.031* 0.032* 0.032* 0.046** 0.050**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
AHCDV
IHADV
RANK
IHAGE
YEAR EFFECTS
0.008
(0.012)
y
-0.001
(0.011)
y
0.005
(0.006)
y
0.003
(0.005)
y
0.018
(0.017)
y
INDUSTRY EFFECTS y y y y y
N obs. 1440 1440 1440 955 952
Adj R-sqd 13.00% 12.96% 13.00% 16.08% 15.03%
Table 5-6: Correlation Matrix of Variables used in Underwriter Reputation Regressions 1949-86
Adj Return is the first-day return adjusted for market movement between prospectus date and first trading date.
ADJ
RET AGE
LN
(1+AGE) BVP LNBVP VDR RD AHC IHA IHAGE NAV LNNAV MCAP LNMCAP DIV LNDIV
ADJRET 1.000 -0.088 -0.109 -0.053 -0.077 -0.108 0.073 -0.009 -0.026 0.008 0.020 -0.085 0.012 -0.035 -0.005 -0.035
AGE 1.000 0.859 0.181 0.229 0.080 -0.021 0.051 0.010 0.024 0.061 0.213 0.114 0.058 0.139 0.155
LN(1+AGE) 1.000 0.180 0.244 0.110 -0.019 0.035 0.011 0.047 0.045 0.165 0.076 -0.003 0.109 0.200
BVP 1.000 0.862 0.142 -0.075 -0.095 -0.026 0.110 0.217 0.331 -0.022 -0.209 0.049 -0.035
LNBVP 1.000 0.089 -0.071 -0.127 -0.032 0.132 0.145 0.383 -0.068 -0.266 0.016 -0.055
VENDOR 1.000 -0.063 -0.136 -0.066 0.156 0.016 -0.145 -0.085 -0.202 -0.012 -0.017
RD 1.000 0.136 0.068 -0.113 0.048 0.114 0.162 0.168 0.115 0.073
AHC 1.000 0.269 -0.541 0.159 0.376 0.255 0.477 0.248 0.232
IHA 1.000 -0.644 0.049 0.190 0.077 0.219 0.078 0.199
IHAGE 1.000 -0.050 -0.305 -0.169 -0.404 -0.162 -0.221
NAV 1.000 0.474 0.582 0.354 0.661 0.234
LNNAV 1.000 0.560 0.773 0.595 0.460
MCAP 1.000 0.635 0.882 0.354
LNMCAP 1.000 0.614 0.522
DIV 1.000 0.448
LNDIV 1.000
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Table 5-7: Renwick Wilton & Dobson Tender Offer Results 11 Nov. 1963
(i) No. of applications, shares applied for and prices tendered
In total there were 3968 applications for 6230900 shares. 405,000 shares were offered by 
S.G. Warburg on behalf of the company at a minimum price of 13s.. The detail regarding 
applications below 15.75s. was not disclosed.
Tendered 
Price (s.)
No. shares 
applied for
Cumulative No.
no. shares applications
Cumulative no. 
applications
30 200 200 1 1
26 5000 5,200 1 2
22 2400 7,600 7 9
21 1000 8,600 1 10
20 35000 43,600 49 59
19.75 200 43,800 1 60
19.5 400 44,200 1 61
19.25 13500 57,700 8 69
19 25500 83,200 35 104
18.75 20800 104,000 3 107
18.5 32800 136,800 12 119
18.25 25900 162,700 11 130
18 233800 396,500 89 219
17.75 29000 425,500 12 231
17.5 195800 621,300 73 304
17.25 104700 726,000 25 329
17 236900 962,900 150 479
16.75 59200 1,022,100 23 502
16.5 298400 1,320,500 154 656
16.25 158900 1,479,400 90 746
16 463800 1,943,200 368 1114
15.75 119900 2,063,100 100 1214
13-15.75 4,167,800 6,230,900 2754 3968
(ii) Basis of allocation
Tendered 
Price (s.)
Pro rata 
allotment
Maximum 
no. shares
Minimum 
no shares
18 and over 50% 3,000 200
17.75 50% 2,745 200
17 to 17.5 20% 1,000 200
15.75 to 17 200% 200 200
below 15.75 0% 0 0
Source: The Times, 12 November 1963, p. 19.
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Table 5-8: IPO Volume by issue methods
Total offers include fixed price offers as well as tender offers. Total IPOs include placings along 
with fixed price offers and tender offers. There are 67 tenders between 1960 and 1969 excluding 1 
“penny” IPO and 1 re-admission (see text) and 35 between 1980 and 1986 excluding 1 privatisation 
(Britoil). The IPO by tender in 1962 was a re-admission and is excluded. There was a tender offer 
in November 1979 for which I could not find the results of the tender.
Tender
Offers
Fixed Price 
Offers
Total
Offers
% Total
IPOs
%
1961 1 30 31 3% 59 2%
1962 0 37 37 0% 69 0%
1963 14 34 48 29% 63 22%
1964 11 54 65 17% 76 14%
1965 1 28 29 3% 58 2%
1966 1 22 23 4% 31 3%
1967 4 17 21 19% 30 13%
1968 31 37 68 46% 81 38%
1969 4 43 47 9% 56 7%
1961-69 67 302 369 18% 523 13%
1980 1 2 3 33% 5 20%
1981 1 7 8 13% 13 8%
1982 2 6 8 25% 11 18%
1983 16 7 23 70% 25 64%
1984 4 15 19 21% 22 18%
1985 7 28 35 20% 39 18%
1986 5 36 41 12% 56 9%
1980-86 36 90 126 29% 171 21%
Table 5-9: Comparison of characteristics of IPOs by Tender and IPOs by Offer for Sale and Placinqs
Rows (1), (4) and (5) include offers for sale and placings. In the later period characteristics of Offers are not separately broken out (see text). Characteristics 
are equal weighted means of post-IPO market capitalisation at the offer price at 2004 prices (MCAP), firm age (AGE), no. of years historic profits disclosed in 
IPO prospectus (TRACK), book value per share to the offer price (BVP), forecast dividend yield at the offer price (DY), proportion of the total shares 
outstanding sold at the IPO (MKTABILITY), the proportion of the shares offered which are existing shares (VENDOR) and new shares (PRIMARY) and the 
proportion of IPOs which undertake R&D activity (R&D).
MCAP AGE TRACK BVP DY MKTABILITY VENDOR PRIMARY R&D N
£000 yrs yrs X % % % % %
1960-69
(1) All ex. Tdrs 21,577 39.2 8.9 0.85 5.9% 31% 25% 6% 5.3% 549
(2) Offers 31,324 39.0 8.9 0.62 5.5% 33% 25% 8% 4.1% 338
(3) Tenders 33,098 41.8 8.9 0.46 4.3% 35% 31% 4% 9.0% 67
1970-79
(4) All 48,252 42.2 8.1 0.47 5.6% 33% 23% 10% 5.6% 277
1980-86
(5) All ex. Tdrs 95,945 32.8 4.9 0.46 4.0% 33% 18% 15% 20.3% 135
(6) Tenders 176,101 33.7 5.1 0.28 2.5% 31% 18% 13% 31.4% 36
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Table 5-10: Probit regressions for tender offers 1961-86
Dependent variables is a binary variable taking 1 if tender offer and 0 otherwise. MCAP is the 
ordinary share market capitalisation at the offer price at 2004 prices. Age was neither economically 
or statistically significant. Figures in brackets are z-statistics. One, two and three asterisks indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level or better. The LR statistic tests the overall significance of 
the model.
Estimation 
Dep. Variable
(1)
Probit
Tender
(2)
Probit
Tender
(3)
Probit
Tender
(4)
Probit
Tender
(5)
Probit
Tender
Constant -5.138*** -1.594*** -1.295*** -1.407*** -5.581***
(-5.975) (-16.603) (-22.335) (-13.430) (-5.714)
LNMCAP (£m) 0.228*** 0.220***
(4.557) (3.931)
LNBVP -0.346*** -0.276***
(-4.719) (3.608)
RD 0.437*** 0301*
(2.656) (1.733)
VENDOR 0.644* 1.092***
(1.838) (2.805)
LR statistic 20.77*** 22.62*** 6.71*** 3.35* 47.66***
N obs. 970 969 968 967 964
Missing obs. 0 1 2 3 6
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Table 5-11: Comparison of underpricing of IPOs by issue method
First-day returns are unadjusted for market movement; adjusted returns are statistically 
insignificant. Tender offer returns are estimated based on the published strike price. T-statistics 
test the null hypothesis that mean first-day returns are equal to zero. RET>0%  is the proportion 
of IPOs whose first-day return is greater than zero.
EW MEAN MEDIAN T-STAT RET>0 N
D1 RET D1 RET % Obs.
1960-69
(1) All ex. Tenders 14.12% 8.93% 16.79 81% 549
(2) Offers 11.58% 6.82% 11.30 74% 338
(3) Tenders 7.57% 4.17% 3.68 85% 67
1980-89
(4) All ex. Tenders 12.07% 7.50% 7.18 79% 135
(5) Tenders 5.19% 3.64% 4.19 63% 36
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Table 5-12: Regressions of First-day returns for 1961-86.1961-69 and
1980-86
The dependent variable is first-day return adjusted for market movement between 
prospectus publication and initial trading (%). Estimation method is OLS. The t-statistics in 
brackets are calculated using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent method. Year 
and industry dummy variables are included all four regressions below but results are not 
shown. TENDER is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the IPO is by tender offer and 0 
otherwise. Market capitalisation at the offer price gives similar results when substituted for 
age. I include a placing dummy variable and either a 1 or 3 month lagged market return in 
all regressions. Standard errors are shown in brackets and are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. *, 
**, and *** asterisks indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1 % respectively.
Estimation method 
Dep. Var.
Period
(1)
OLS
D1RET
1961-86
(2)
OLS
D1RET
1961-69
(3)
OLS
D1RET
1980-86
LN(1+AGE) -0.013* -0.012 0.016
(0.007) (0.012) (0.017)
LN(BVP) -0.034** -0.048***
(0.010) (0.0130
LN(DY) -0.019
(0.027)
TRK -0.010*
(0.005)
RD 0.059** 0.119***
(0.023) (0.033)
VENDOR -0.072 -0.110** -0.155
(0.045) (0.054) (0.098)
TENDER -0.100*** -0.106*** -0.100**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.042)
YEAR EFFECTS Y y Y
INDUSTRY EFFECTS Y y y
Adj. R-sqd 12.93% 17.46% 18.88%
N obs 964 523 159
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Table 5-13: Underwriting of Tender Offers
AHC is the abbreviation for Accepting Houses Committee and IHA for the Issuing Houses 
Association.
1960-69
#IPOs
1960-69
%
1980-86
#IPOs
1980-86
%
Tenders 67 100% 36 100%
Underwritten by:
Issuing House: 44 66% 31 86%
AHC/IHA member 17 25% 26 72%
IHA member only 22 33% 3 8%
IHA non-member 5 8% 2 6%
Broker 23 34% 5 14%
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Figure 5-1: IPO Underwriting Share of Reputable Merchant Banks 1917-86
“Underwriting Share” is the percentage of all IPOs in my data set underwritten by AHC members 
after 1945 and those banks listed in Table 5-1 columns (1) and (2) before that date. Placings 
are included and are deemed underwritten to the extent that the issuing house has agreed to 
purchase shares at the placing price in the event of their not being placed with investors.
Figure 5-2: IPO Underwriting Market Shares 1930-86
“IHA” denotes issuing houses which were members of the IHA and “Non-IHA” those which were 
not. “Other” covers companies, syndicates and individual company promoters engaged in 
underwriting.
■  IHA □  Non-IHA □  Broker □  Other ® N ot underwritten
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Figure 5-3: IHA Membership 1946-86
No. entrants starts in 1948 (see text).
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Figure 5-4: Stylised Demand curve for shares under a Tender Offer
This stylised example is taken from Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967). See text.
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Figure 5-5: Demand curve for shares in Renwick Wilton November 1963
The demand schedule is derived from Table 1 (i).
*  18
250,000 500,000 750,000 1,000,000 1,250,000 1,500,000 1,750,000 2,000,000 2,250,000
no. shares
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CHAPTER 6: IPOs DURING TECHNOLOGY BUBBLES
In this final chapter, I examine how the IPO market performed during the 
technology-related share price bubbles of the late 1920s and the late 1990s. 
In each period, there was a sudden surge in investor awareness of the potential 
of new technologies, electricity, chemicals and automobiles in the twenties, and 
the internet and information and communications technologies (ICT) in the 
nineties.
The literature on the economics of financial markets with respect to both 
periods has focussed almost entirely on the US stock market. There is some 
disagreement, particularly regarding 1929, about whether technology firms 
contributed to the share price bubble or whether they were undervalued by the 
market. DeLong and Shleiffer (1991), White (1990) and Rappoport and White 
(1994) attributed the 1929 Wall Street crash to the irrational exuberance of 
investors. Ofek and Richardson (2001) explained the US “dotcom” mania of the 
late nineties in terms of the increased participation of overoptimistic, uninformed 
investors in internet stocks and the constraints on short selling. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) have documented how the surge in US IPO underpricing in 1999- 
2000 was associated with technology and internet firms. The claim that the 
stock market of 1928-29 was nothing but a bubble has been challenged by 
McGratten and Prescott (2004) and by Nicholas (2005). Both argue that far 
from being overvaluing, the new technologies were undervalued by the market. 
Nicholas claims that technology firms defined by patent counts and patent 
citations outperformed the rest of the market both during the bull market and 
through the post-1929 crash in terms of share price returns and of survival 
rates.
Whilst IPO activity did not approach the levels of Wall Street, on both 
occasions London experienced the same frenzied run-up and subsequent 
collapse in share prices. The surge in underpricing in 1999-2000 bears a strong 
similarity to the US. No comparison of the two technology bubbles in either 
period has been made to date. The British experience offers a relevant case 
study of how markets behave during technology bubbles.
I compare IPO underpricing and IPO survival during 1928-29 and 1999- 
2000 and their respective run-up periods. Given the improvements in 
regulation, disclosure and underwriting in the intervening seven decades
174
discussed in chapters 2 and 5, I would expect these reforms to moderate the 
extent of underpricing in hot technology markets and improve post-IPO survival 
prospects other things being equal. Better regulation and disclosure should 
moderate the increased uncertainty brought on by any technology shock, whilst 
the switch to book-building of IPOs should extract from exuberant investors a 
price closer to fair value than in previous hot markets which laboured under the 
fixed offer price regime. These same reforms should minimise the instances of 
questionable, if not fraudulent, ventures being sold to an unwary public. 
Reputable underwriters are motivated to safeguard their reputations and to 
avoid being associated with an IPO delisted within only a few years of its debut 
as a quoted company. “Fringe” banks underwrite to make a fast buck.
I recognise the dangers of making sweeping comparisons between two 
time periods characterised by differences in economic and institutional 
environments. Yet, the main findings of this chapter are interesting. 
Underpricing of technology IPOs in 1999-2000 rose to levels well beyond those 
scaled in 1928-29. On the other hand, survival of technology IPOs launched in 
1999-2000 was much better. Improvements in the IPO market probably 
contributed to this survival performance but could not deliver a better 
underpricing outcome. Several hypotheses concerning new manifestations of 
familiar agency problems from the US IPO empirical literature have applicability 
to the UK and may help to explain this further surprising underpricing result.
The next three sections discuss the background to the 1920s and the 
1990s, the data and the associated descriptive statistics. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 
analyse underpricing and survival, respectively, in the two periods. Section 6.6 
discusses the implications of my findings.
6.1 Background to the 1920s and 1990s
The 1920s was a decade of rapid technological progress built on the 
science of the Second Industrial Revolution developed over the previous 40 to 
50 years.231 Large US firms with newly-established research laboratories were 
the driving force behind this progress pulling British industry along in their
231 Mokyr (2002), p.105-116.
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wake.232 Along with the internal combustion engine, electricity and chemicals 
were the most important technologies of the early twentieth century.233 
Innovation in these areas spawned a dramatic and observable increase in 
patent activity.234 Radio was the most tangible embodiment of this new world, 
rapidly developing as a mass consumer product235 and propelling RCA’s share 
price to levels of valuation on Wall Street in 1928 and early 1929 previously 
unseen.
Although somewhat slow to follow the US lead in electricity, chemicals 
and automobiles, some authors have argued that nonetheless these “new” 
industries were decisively important to the British interwar economy and were 
responsible for the strong relative economic performance of the 1930s.236 This 
claim has been contested by Aldcroft (1967) and Buxton (1975) largely on the 
definitional grounds as to what constitutes a new industry. One authoritative 
source estimated the direct contribution of these industries to the growth in 
British manufacturing output at almost 30% between 1924 and 1937 and at over 
40% in the post-war period.237 Reflecting this industrial shift, British corporate 
as opposed to individual patent applications rose from 15% of the total pre-1913 
to reach 58% in 1938.238 Radio, gramophone, cellulose acetate and 
automobile-related IPOs featured prominently in the list of LSE IPOs of the late 
twenties. Decca Gramophone and Ford Motor went public in the last quarter of 
1928, their share prices rising 43% and 86% respectively on the first day of 
trading. Foreman-Peck (1985) has claimed that most new businesses 
established in the interwar years were more “chaff” than the “seed-corn” of 
industrial growth. His analysis drew on census data taken from both private and 
public firms as well as large and small. IPOs of the late 1920s can similarly be 
categorised into seed-corn and chaff.
The sentiment enveloping share prices in London was almost as frenetic 
as Wall Street. The increased incidence of share-pushing culminated in the
232 Mowery and Rosenberg (1989); Edgerton and Horrocks (1994).
233 Mowery and Rosenberg (2000), p.8.
234 Moser and Nicholas (2004) and Nicholas (2005), Figure 3.
235 Stromberg (2004).
236 Richardson (1961,1962).
237 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982), p.257, Table 9.2 This estimate ignores any 
spillover effects on the growth in output of other parts of the economy.
2 8 Hannah (1983), p114 and footnote 40 which refers to the original study of patenting in Britain 
by Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman (1958).
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Hatry scandal of September 1929.239 This does not show up, however, in the 
available British stock market indices (Figure 6-1). Since the FT30 was not 
established until 1935. I have made use of the Bankers Magazine Variable 
Securities Index. It is likely that preference as well as ordinary shares are 
included in this index and that, as a result, it most probably understates both the 
rise and fall in prices in the late twenties.
The post-1929 economic decline in the UK was modest in comparison 
with the US. British GDP at constant prices declined only 5.8% between 1929 
and 1931. This was far less than the 18.4% decline during the 1920-21 
recession.240 The annual total of company liquidations, both voluntary and 
compulsory, increased only 8% between 1929 and 1931 and barely increased 
as a proportion of all companies both public and private 241 In as far as 90% of 
the liquidations were voluntary and some of these were the result of owners 
wishing to retire or to merge with another firm, these figures represent an upper 
bound estimate of company deaths due to poor performance 242
The 1990s shared some similarities with the 1920s. The internet 
seemed to represent as profound a technological breakthrough as did electricity 
in its day.243 Its scientific foundations were built on the advances made in 
information and communications technology over the preceding forty years 
starting with the development of the transistor. Whilst evidence on the 
productivity growth dividend of these technological advances is still emerging244, 
as in the 1920s, this innovative activity had a dramatic impact on share prices of 
internet firms pushing both US and UK indices to new highs in 2000 before then 
experiencing a dramatic collapse (Figure 6-2). On both sides of the Atlantic, 
internet IPOs were to the 1999-2000 market what radio and gramophone IPOs 
were to the 1928-29 market. Mean IPO underpricing in the UK and US reached 
almost 90% and over 70% respectively in 1999 (Table 6-1). Internet IPOs 
contributed significantly to the rise in underpricing over the decade in both
239 Michie (2001), p.262.
240 Mitchell (1988), National Accounts Table 5A, p.836: Compromise Estimate of GDP at Factor 
Cost in constant price for the UK excluding Southern Ireland.
241 Hudson (1989), Figures 1 and 2, p.104-105.
242 ibid., p.111.
243 A search for articles on the “internet revolution” in The Financial Times in 1999 and 2000  
generated 175 separate articles.
44 See Crafts (2002), p.94-98, for a concise review of the evidence in comparison with the US.
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cases.245 In February 2000, for example, Oxygen Holdings saw its share price 
rise 2775% on its first day of trading on the LSE.
According to Table 6-1, there were almost four times as many IPOs 
during 1991-2002 in the US compared to Britain, even when penny shares are 
excluded. Given the larger scale of the US IPO market and the leading role 
taken by US firms in the commercial exploitation of the internet, the recent 
empirical finance literature has concentrated exclusively on this market. 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), a change in IPO risk composition can 
only partially explain the surge in US underpricing. New hypotheses are 
required to account for the hot market, among them the changing objectives of 
issuing firms happy to leave money on the table for investment banks in order to 
“buy” research coverage of their shares by the bank’s highly-ranked analysts 
(the “analyst lust” hypothesis). The emergence of “spinning” whereby an 
issuing firm’s CEO allowed their own IPO to be excessively underpriced in 
return for shares of subsequently underpriced IPOs brought by their investment 
bankers is a further example, cited by the authors, of a shift of IPO objectives. 
A second main hypothesis, the realignment of incentives, put forward by 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) attributes the issuing firm’s toleration of higher 
underpricing to the managers owning a smaller percentage of the firm and 
selling fewer shares in the offering in 1999-2000 than previously. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) have disputed this argument on the grounds that managers may 
have owned a lower percentage of the pre-IPO firm but the dollar value of those 
shareholdings at the offer price was significantly higher in 1999-2000 than 
previously and the desire to maximise dollar wealth should have been incentive 
enough to minimise underpricing. A third explanation implied by the analysis of 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) is that internet IPOs were swept up by the 
irrational exuberance enveloping internet shares consequent upon the greater 
participation of relatively unsophisticated retail investors in these counters 
coupled with the constraints on short selling these stocks. The first part of this 
explanation has certain parallels with the hypothesis advanced by White (1990) 
for the 1929 Wall Street bubble.
245 Ljungqvist (2003), Table 6, in regression (11) the coefficient on the internet dummy for the 
whole period is highly significantly positive. Loughran and Ritter (2004), Table VI, p.28, in 
regressions (3) and (4) technology IPOs display a rise in underpricing in 1999-2000 but not 
internet IPOs. The latter definitions appear to be mutually exclusive (Appendix D, p.35). 
Ljungqvist offers no definition of “internet-related” IPOs. Note that testing for a hot market in 
internet IPOs is not at all the focus of the paper.
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None of these hypotheses has been tested on UK IPOs. Given certain 
similarities with the US capital markets, analyst lust, realignment of incentives 
and irrational exuberance have equal applicability to Britain. Spinning appears 
not to be relevant to IPOs on the LSE.246
I have discussed the regulatory regime surrounding the IPO market in 
the interwar years in chapter 2. In 1925-29, there were no minimum listing 
criteria for IPOs on the Supplementary List. Companies did have to apply to the 
LSE for permission to have their shares dealt in on the floor of the LSE. I have 
yet to find any evidence of pre-vetting procedures or of the rejection of 
applications in the LSE minutes. At the end of the last century, listing 
requirements of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) superficially appeared 
as lax as those of the twenties (Table 6-2). However, this would be to ignore 
the importance of the role of the “nominated adviser” and a commitment by any 
listing firm to the ongoing obligations of a quoted company, including that of 
adequate disclosure. Together with the stronger accounting standards and 
investor protections documented in chapter 2, these represented important 
reforms to the listing process compared to the 1920s.
6.2 Data
I have assembled data samples comprising 347 IPOs between 1925 and 
1929 and 813 IPOs between 1995 and 2000. The choice of period covers both 
the “hot” IPO years, 1928-29 and 1999-2000, and the “run-up” years, 1925-27 
and 1995-98 respectively. The nineties run-up includes an extra year in order 
to take in the establishment of AIM from June 1995. It is my intention to extend 
both data sets to encompass the whole decade in each case in my post­
doctoral research.
The 1925-29 data set consists of all ordinary share IPOs whose 
prospectuses are included in The Times Book of Prospectuses excluding 
investment trusts and firms already listed on another stock market. 217 IPOs 
where disclosure allowed the calculation of first-day returns were included in the
246 Following the SEC ’s lead, the Financial Services Authority did launch an investigation, albeit 
an informal one, into the occurrence of spinning in October 2002 following a review earlier in the 
same year of certain internet IPOs from 1999-2000 which failed to uncover any wrongdoing, 
Financial Times, 24 Oct 2002 “FSA launches probe into share spinning”. No firms were 
subsequently prosecuted as a result of this investigation.
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underpricing data analysed in chapter 4. A further 77 are penny share IPOs 
and the remaining 53 IPOs gave no disclosure of the issue or placing price and 
include introductions (Table 3-1, chapter 3). The data on the 813 IPOs during 
1995-2000 were sourced from the LSE website, KPMG New Issues and SDC 
Platinum. Transfers from Ofex or Rule 4.2 were excluded as were firms already 
listed on an overseas stock exchange. Share price data for the twenties came 
from the Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL), whilst that for the nineties 
came mainly from Datastream supplemented by SEDOL.
Data on characteristics of IPOs in the twenties, namely, firm age (AGE), 
length of historical profits disclosed in the prospectus (TRACK), the post-IPO 
net asset value attributable to shareholders (NAV), and whether or not the IPO 
was underwritten (UW) or the accounts audited (AUDIT), were extracted from 
the prospectus. Firm size (MCAP) was based on the total number of shares 
outstanding post-IPO as disclosed in the prospectus and in the Stock Exchange 
Year Book and the first-day share price. Technology IPOs were defined based 
on prospectus disclosure either as those firms engaging in research and 
development activities (RD), or possessing or having applied for patents (PAT1) 
in their own name, or having been granted access to patented innovations 
following the purchase of rights to manufacture or sell (PAT2). UW, AUDIT, 
RD, PAT 1 and PAT2 are dummy variables.
Characteristics of IPOs in the nineties, MCAP, NAV and R&D 
expenditure, were sourced from Datastream,247 The R&D expenditure data 
enables the calculation of a dummy variable (RD). All IPOs in this later period 
had audited accounts, virtually all were underwritten248 and all Official List IPOs 
disclosed the required minimum number of years of historic profits. There is no 
variability in these characteristics with which to explain either underpricing or 
survival. I do make use of a dummy variable indicating the less stringent listing 
criteria on AIM compared to the Official List. The only missing characteristic 
compared to the earlier IPO sample is firm age. MCAP and NAV are sufficient 
to proxy for firm risk through firm size.
As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.8, SEDOL industry classifications 
are crude in the interwar years and do not allow a definition of technology by
247 This is in the hope of accessing existing data sets for this period at some stage in my 
postdoctoral research work.
According to Ljungqvist (2001), only 13 of 735 IPOs in these 6 years were not underwritten., 
Table 1, p.38
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industry. Based on prospectus disclosure as to the main business activity, the 
95 broadly defined patent firms (PAT2) fell into the radio and gramophone (21), 
automobile-related (11), and rayon (8) industries. By the nineties, I am able to 
make use of the Financial Times Actuaries industry classifications to identify 
technology industries. The earlier SEDOL classifications do make possible the 
identification of mining and tea, coffee and rubber plantations as well as oil 
exploration and production firms. These industries together represent the 
natural resource sector (NATRES) and were viewed as relatively high risk 
investments which nonetheless attracted a loyal investor following in London.
Initial returns are first-day returns, the exception being initial returns of 
penny IPOs between 1925 and 1929 which in order to minimise share price 
data collection are partial first-month returns. There is no statistically significant 
difference between first-day and partial first-month returns as discussed in 
chapter 4, section 4.4 (iv).
Following Fama and French (2004), I identify those IPOs delisted for 
cause, i.e. those delisted because of winding up or liquidation. In respect of the 
twenties, the Register of Defunct and Other Companies compiles a list of those 
firms which disappear from the Stock Exchange Year Books. There are two 
problems with this data source. Firstly, these defunct companies were not 
restricted to those listed on a British stock market. By 1939 the Stock 
Exchange Year Book contained entries on 19,000 securities issued by 9,400 
companies. Of these only 10,297 were traded on the London Stock Exchange, 
another 2,103 were listed on the Provincial Stock Exchanges and the remaining 
6,600 securities were quoted overseas or were too small to be quoted at all.249 
Secondly, not all companies disappear for reasons of bankruptcy and the 
reason for disappearance, other than a change of name, is not made clear. I 
therefore checked the 347 IPOs for delisting within 5 years of IPO based upon a 
search of the Stock Exchange Year Books and the Stock Exchange Daily 
Official Lists (SEDOL). The entry in the Year Book documents when a firm has 
been wound up or liquidated, been acquired or is still trading as a going 
concern. SEDOL confirms whether the shares are still quoted.
A word is necessary on the definition of delisting for cause in 1925-29. 
There is an important distinction between a voluntary and a compulsory winding
249 The Stock Exchange Year Book, 1939; Michie (2001), p.283
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up. In the former case, a firm may be liquidated, even though it is a going 
concern, because the owners wish to retire or because of acquisition by another 
firm.250 The Year Books make it clear when a firm has been liquidated due to 
acquisition and whether any consideration has been paid. Instances where a 
voluntary wind up is recorded without mention of an acquisition or asset sale 
are assumed to be delistings for cause. In the 1925-29 sample there were also 
14 instances of IPOs still being included in the Year Books despite their share 
price disappearing from SEDOL following a decline in price to one penny or 
less. I have treated these cases as delistings for cause. There are 8 IPOs 
where the share price suddenly disappears at a non-penny value and the firm is 
still trading according to the Year Books. I have excluded these IPOs from the 
survival analysis. The tracking of IPO survival is more straightforward in 1995- 
2000 through a combination of the LSE’s Regulatory News Service and 
Datastream.
As already mentioned, these primary sources also indicate when a firm 
delists due to merger or acquisition. There were 21 IPOs which were acquired 
in the 5 years following IPO, accounting for only 6.1% of the 1925-29 data set. 
In the 1995-2000 period, however, 165 IPOs were acquired within the first 5 
years of their life as a public company, equivalent to 20.1% of all IPOs. 
Following Fama and French (2004), it is difficult to determine prima facie 
whether or not such firms delisted due to acquisition would have survived since 
in some cases they will have been acquired because of poor industrial and 
financial performance. I have therefore calculated survival rates both including 
and excluding acquisitions to estimate a lower and upper bound.
6.3 Descriptive Statistics
The characteristics of this data set are described in Table 6-3. Panels A 
and B summarise the 1925-29 IPOs and Panel C and D the 1995-2000 IPOs. 
The 53 penny share issues accounting for over a quarter of all IPOs in 1928 
and 1929 is evidence of the speculative activity which infiltrated the market in 
the late twenties (Panel A). The high penny share issuance in 1925 reflects the 
boom in rubber plantation IPOs. Natural resource IPOs principally plantation
250 Hudson (1989), p.111
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and mining IPOs dominated the market in 1925 and 1926 but fell away 
thereafter. The hot market of 1928 and 1929 was a domestic industrial affair 
and was not attributable in any way to speculation in natural resource stocks. 
Although very few of the IPOs were firms undertaking R&D activity (RD), there 
was a marked increase in the proportion of IPOs with patents, particularly in 
1928 when two-fifths of all IPOs had access to intellectual property on the broad 
patent definition (PAT2, Panel A). Firms with patented products and processes 
were not yet engaging in the formal R&D activity increasingly characteristic of 
the largest firms. There are no trend changes in MCAP, NAV, or TRACK in 
terms of means or medians, IPOs do become younger on average in 1928 and 
1929, and are more likely to be underwritten (UW) but less likely to have 
audited financials (AUDIT) (Panel B). This pattern agrees with that already 
observed in the data described in chapter 3. The correlation matrix in Table 6- 
4, Panel A, indicates that patent IPOs were also quite likely to be penny shares.
The characteristics of the 1995-2000 IPOs point up both similarities with 
and contrasts to the earlier sample. All IPOs in that earlier sample were 
admitted to the Supplementary List, effectively the interwar junior market. In the 
second half of the nineties 60% were listed on the junior market, AIM (Panel 
C).251 The main listing criteria of AIM, less onerous than those of the Official 
List, are summarised in Table 6-2. Penny share and natural resource IPOs252 
were of relatively minor importance in contrast to the 1920s (Panel C). 
Technology IPOs are defined by R&D expenditure disclosure (RD), by 
membership of the information and communications technology industry (ICT), 
or as pure internet firms (DOTCOM). The detail is discussed in Appendix 6.1. 
On the first two definitions technology firms formed an important and increasing 
share of the IPO market in the late nineties accounting for over 30% of all IPOs 
in the peak volume year of 2000 (RD and ICT, Panel C). Internet IPOs were 
heavily clustered in 1999-2000. The definition of a Dotcom company employed 
is such that there is relatively little correlation between DOTCOM and ICT. In 
common with patent firms (PAT2) in the twenties, very few of the Dotcom firms 
were undertaking research and development in contrast to ICT firms, as 
indicated by the correlation coefficients (Table 6-4, Panel B). As regards firm
251 There was just one IPO on the USM in January 1995 before it was replaced by AIM as the 
iunior market.
52 These include metal mining and oil exploration and development and oil services companies.
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risk, firm size (MCAP) increased in 1996 and 1997 before levelling out. AIM 
IPOs tended to be smaller, both in terms of MCAP and NAV. IPOs became 
younger on average (AGE) (Table 6-3, Panel D). Since I lack data on firm age, 
I cannot check whether firm age is positively associated with technology.
In summary, there was a surge in young firms and technology firms 
accessing the IPO market in both 1928-29 and 1999-2000 compared to the run­
up periods. Technology was represented by patents in 1928-29 and by the 
internet and ICT in 1999-2000. In the next section, I compare the impact which 
the shift to technology had upon IPO underpricing in these two periods.
6.4 Underpricing
Chapter 4 analysed the annual time series of underpricing between 1917 
and 1986. In this section, I compare underpricing of British IPOs in the late 
twenties and the late nineties and make use of the same linear model to explain 
underpricing subject to the availability of right hand side variables.
The annual time series of first-day returns for 1925-29 and 1995-2000 
are set out in Table 6-5 and 6.6 respectively. My returns data for the latter 
period is consistent with the pattern described by Ljungqvist’s data (Table 6-1). 
These two returns series, along with that for the US in the 1990s, are graphed 
in Figure 6-3. Whilst IPO returns averaged 28.5% in 1928, those of 1999 ran up 
to almost 100%. Part of this surge in underpricing is attributable to penny share 
IPOs which were particularly susceptible to investor over-exuberance and price 
manipulation. Although the exclusion of penny shares lowers the mean 
underpricing in both 1928 and in 1999-2000, 1928-29 still qualifies as a hot IPO 
market but remains dwarfed by the scale to which underpricing soared at the 
end of the century. Breaking down the 1995-2000 returns by market clearly 
shows that AIM IPOs were more heavily underpriced than those on the Official 
List. The increase in underpricing in 1999-2000 on the Official List is relatively 
modest by comparison to AIM. This is consistent with IPOs on AIM being 
riskier, exemplified by their both being smaller and having shorter track records. 
AIM was also generally the recipient of greater retail investor participation.253
253 Wall Street Journal Europe, S. Ascarelli, 7 Feb 2000, “Small Bourse Makes a Big Mark” 
Retail investors owned 34% of AIM shares compared to only 19% held by financial institutions 
in 1999.
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How hot was the market in technology IPOs? In 1928-29 there was a 
marked increase in the underpricing of technology IPOs, as defined by either of 
the patent dummy variables (Table 6-5, PAT1, and PAT2). This did not diffuse 
into other parts of the IPO market (NONPAT2). The hot market was exclusively 
in patent IPOs. There are too few R&D-intensive IPOs for these results to be at 
all meaningful and they are not shown. ICT IPOs in 1995-2000 were on 
average more underpriced than other IPOs (NONTECH) and did exhibit a 
modest surge in underpricing relative to the rest of the market excluding penny 
IPOs (Table 6-6). DOTCOM IPOs on the other hand did see a sharp rise in 
mean underpricing to 300% in 1999 and 155% in the following year. Even 
when excluding penny shares, these IPOs were still on average underpriced by 
141% in 1999.
Summarising the analysis of the annual time series of mean underpricing 
in these two periods, the IPO market was much hotter in 1999-2000 than in 
1928-29 particularly when penny share IPOs are removed from the picture. The
1928-29 hot market was exclusively in patent IPOs. In contrast, whilst the 
1999-2000 hot IPO market was principally concentrated in internet firms, ICT 
firms also participated.
These findings are in general supported by the results of multiple 
regression analysis (Table 6-7). In general, the OLS regressions suffer from 
clustering of observations, especially in 1925-1929. As a result the coefficient 
estimates lack precision. Regressions (1) and (2) indicate that the hot market 
begins in the second quarter of 1928 and runs out during the third quarter of 
1929, even controlling for penny share IPOs. This timing concurs broadly with 
that of Wall Street in the late twenties.254 If anything, IPO underpricing appears 
to peak ahead of the market indices in September/October. Accordingly, the 
hot market dummy variable (HOT) takes the value 1 for all IPOs from April 1928 
to the end of June 1929. Firm size (MCAP), the penny share IPO dummy 
(PENNY), marketability or the proportion of firms sold at IPO (MKTABILITY), 
and the underwriting dummy (UW) are of the correct sign and economically 
significant but only UW and MKTABILITY are statistically significant (regression 
(3)).255 Including these same control variables in regressions (4) and (5), a
254 White (1990).
255 I have omitted BVP because there are 120 missing net asset values out of a total of 294  
observations.
185
surge in patent IPO underpricing in 1928-29 seen in the simple annual time 
series is corroborated in the case of IPOs under the broad patent definition 
(PAT2). The sign of the coefficient on the interaction between PAT2 and HOT 
is positive (105.79%) and statistically significant at the 1% level, whilst that on 
PAT 1 and HOT is much smaller (18.70%) and not significant.
Turning to the late nineties, underpricing starts to rise in early 1999 
(regression (1), Table 6-8) and remains strong through 2000. I define the hot 
market dummy (HOT) to cover IPOs in 1999 and 2000. Once again MCAP, 
PENNY and MKTABILITY are employed as control variables along with firm 
valuation, or net asset value to market capitalisation (BVP). From regressions 
(2), (3) and (4) I conclude that there was a hot market in dotcom stocks, largely 
in 1999 and possibly 2000, excluding penny shares.256 R&D and ICT IPOs 
were significantly more underpriced around 20% throughout the whole 6 years 
at a 1% level of significance, but not particularly underpriced during 1999-2000.
Summarising the results of this section, returns in 1999-2000 surged to 
levels far beyond anything seen in the late twenties or indeed afterwards. The 
hot market in 1928-29 was exclusively in patent IPOs; in 1999-2000, it was 
concentrated in Dotcom IPOs, although ICT IPOs also saw increased 
underpricing given their internet-relatedness. Technology as defined here was 
hot in both periods but it was a lot hotter in 1999-2000 despite the 
improvements in disclosure and underwriting. On average the dotcom IPOs of 
1999 (140.94%) were underpriced at 3.5x the patent IPOs of 1929 (38.87%). 
My results say nothing about why this happened in the UK and the relative 
importance of irrational versus rational explanations. As discussed in section 
6.2, some of the explanations put forward for US IPO underpricing are most 
likely equally applicable to the UK case.
6.5 IPO Survival
Irrational exuberance can lead not only to a surge in underpricing but 
also to IPOs being successfully launched that in the cold light of day should
256 The evidence on a hot market in ICT and Dotcom IPOs together is inconclusive. The 
coefficient on the interaction term for this group with HOT is positive but not statistically 
significant.
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never have been financed at all. A combination of irrational exuberance and lax 
regulation can be unfortunate for IPO investors. Was the heightened investor 
interest in patent IPOs and internet IPOs simply a fad which allowed poor 
quality firms to be foisted on unwary investors, or was there a fundamental 
basis supporting the demand for these IPOs considering the riches which the 
new technologies seemed to promise? To the extent that IPOs launched during 
hot periods were fads exploited by unscrupulous entrepreneurs out to dupe 
investors, then these IPOs would not be expected to survive very long. 
Alternatively, if these IPOs possess good business plans with positive NPV 
projects, then they should survive their first few years as a public firm, 
irrespective of underpricing. Intense product market competition may, of 
course, mean many IPOs do not make the returns that they initially projected to 
the detriment of share price performance but few would go out of business 
entirely in such a short space of time.
A further reason for comparing IPO survival arises from the Nicholas 
(2005) claim that seasoned firms in the US of the 1920s demonstrated better 
long-term survival records the more valuable was their stock of patents. The 
intriguing question is whether a similar claim can be made regarding IPOs in the 
same period.
There are two measures of the post-IPO performance of firms. The first is 
a calculation of the total returns to an IPO including dividends and capitalisation 
changes after the first day of trading over a 3 to 5 year period. The latter 
method is heavily data-intensive. Performance must be compared not simply to 
the overall market return but to the return of a peer group of seasoned quoted 
firms with similar size and book value to price characteristics. The only study of 
long-run IPO performance was published anonymously in the December 1931 
issue of the Economic Journal and examined the long-run performance of the 
1928 new issue cohort. The 1928 new issues comprised those of debenture 
and preference shares as well as ordinary shares and investment trust issues. 
The author concluded that the value of this 1928 portfolio of 277 new issues of 
ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures alike depreciated by 41% to 
May 1931, excluding Ford Motor which appreciated by 175%. Harris (1933) re­
examined the performance of the same portfolio and estimated its depreciation 
at 47% over the period to April 1933. He went on to show that the “new 
ventures”, i.e. the youngest firms and the firms with no audited historic profit
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record, were the worst performers their share prices declining by 90% on 
average. Neither study looked at total return or compared IPO performance to 
a matched sample of seasoned firms. I estimate that underperformance for the 
1928 IPO cohort was approximately 10% over the period to April 1933 adjusting 
for the market return.257
A second measure of post-IPO performance is IPO survival rates which I 
define as the proportion of IPOs which are not delisted for cause by their fifth 
anniversary as a quoted company. Although not as comprehensive a measure 
of long-run performance as total return, it does capture the downside risk of 
IPOs. Investors in IPOs may be prepared to accept share price declines post- 
IPO but not a substantial portion of their IPO portfolio being delisted and wound 
up. This level of downside risk is more characteristic of unquoted, early stage 
venture capital investment, not quoted security investment258
Andrews (1937) analysed the failure rates of newly-registered companies, 
both quoted and unquoted, between 1919 and 1932 in Britain. The failure rate, 
or what he called “the risk factorJ’, is the percentage of firms registering in year t 
failing within x years of registration, where t ranged between 1919 and 1932 
and x varied up to 10 years. The survival rate is therefore equivalent to one 
minus the failure rate. His stratified sampling of the Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence produced 481 observations. He then defined the failure of a firm in 
terms of a winding up or being struck off the Companies Register. Mergers and 
acquisitions were excluded. Andrews’ main findings in respect of 5-year 
survival rates are summarized in Table 6-9. This 5-year rate clearly declines at 
the end of the decade. 83.6% of IPOs between 1919 and 1927 survive, 
whereas only 62.7% of the 1928-29 cohorts survive.
The 5-year survival estimates for the 1928 and 1929 cohorts include the 
depression years of the early thirties fully whilst the 1919 to 1927 cohorts do 
not. Andrews’ data allows the recalculation of survival rates through to the end 
of 1934, a point at which the economy is past its 1932 trough. 1928-29 IPO 
survival was considerably worse than that of the run-up period even when the
1929-31 economic downturn is taken into account. Andrews’ analysis also
257 These returns are price only. The market index is the Bankers Magazine Variable Dividend 
Series. Relative performance is most likely underestimated given the poorer dividend record of 
many of the 1928 ordinary share IPOs compared to firms in the index.
258 Gompers and Lerner (1999), p.6. Only 25-30%  of venture capital portfolios typically prosper 
to become quoted firms; the rest either fail, are acquired or become the “living dead”.
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provided a flavour of firm survival by industry, although the basis of 
classification is not disclosed. He estimated that in the case of two of the 
leading technology industries, “electric and wireless” and “motors”, only 40% 
and 53%, respectively, of firms survived; in contrast, approximately 70% of 
metal mining firms (excluding tin), 78% of rubber plantation firms, 80% of oil 
firms and 82% of tin mining firms survived.259 Technology firms were less likely 
to survive in this period than firms in the other acknowledged high risk sector, 
natural resources.
No subsequent study of survival rates has been carried out on British 
IPOs since the Andrews’ study, although Levis (1990) did undertake a study of 
long-run performance of IPOs in the 1980s. In the US, Fama and French 
(2004) conducted a study of 10-year survival rates of IPOs and seasoned firms 
between 1973 and 2001. Their main finding relevant to my study is the sharp 
decline in survival rates from 60% for the 1973 IPO cohort to an average of 38% 
for the 1980 to 1991 IPO cohorts. Seasoned firms saw a much less 
pronounced decline in survival rates from a similar 60% to 50%. The authors 
attribute this fall in IPO survival to a decline in the cost of equity capital which 
allowed “weaker” firms to go public.
In the remainder of this chapter, I do three things. I improve upon the early 
studies of Andrews (1937) by focussing exclusively upon IPOs, thereby 
specifically highlighting the role of the stock market in new firm formation, and of 
Harris (1933) by analysing survival of the 1929 IPO cohort and the cohorts prior 
to 1928. I then supplement the survival rate analysis by estimating IPO survival 
times and by employing a hazard regression model to assess whether firm 
characteristics observed at the time of listing help to explain observed survival 
times. This approach allows me to analyse the survival of firms possessing 
technology assets at IPO relative to other types of firm controlling for such 
covariates as firm age or size. Finally, I compare the 1925-29 IPO cohorts with 
the 1995-2000 cohorts to ascertain whether survival has improved.
259 Andrews (1937), Table VII, p.508.
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(i) Survival rates
5-year survival rates for my IPO samples are summarised in Table 6-10. 
Panels A and B tabulate survival rates for 1925-29 and 1995-2000 respectively. 
Panels C and D break out the results for 1995-2000 into IPOs on the Official 
List and those on AIM. Out of the 347 IPOs between 1925 and 1929, 120 
(34.6%) were delisted for cause and 21 (6.1%) were merged or acquired within 
the following 5 years. In contrast, only 93 (11.5%), of the 813 IPOs between , 
1995 and 2000 were delisted for cause, whereas 165 (20.1%) were 
subsequently acquired. Reflecting the uncertainty as to whether those firms 
acquired would have survived, I calculate a lower and upper bound estimate of 
the 5 year survival rates. The former includes acquired IPOs in the 
denominator and the latter excludes them. Estimated survival is bounded 
between 62.3% and 64.6% for 1925-29 and between 85.6% and 88.5% for 
1995-2000. A greater proportion of IPOs survived following the nineties’ bubble 
than that of the twenties.
A closer examination of the survival rates in Panel A by cohort and taking 
the mid-point of the upper and lower bounds indicates an approximately 39% 
better survival rate of those IPOs launched in the run-up, 1925-27, compared to 
those in the hot market of 1928-29. There is a much less marked deterioration 
in survival rates of 1999-2000 IPOs compared to those of the run up, 1995-98 
(Panel B). The 1928-29 cohorts could be affected by the economic downturn of 
the early 1930s. The results of recalculating the survival rates to the end of 
1934 are included in the final two columns of Panel A. All survival rates fall, as I 
would expect, but the gap between the rate for the run-up and for the hot years 
narrows by only 1 to 2%. In short, fewer than one in two of the 1928-29 IPOs 
survive 5 years, whereas approximately 80% of the 1999-2000 IPOs did so.
IPOs in the twenties should perhaps be compared exclusively with IPOs 
on AIM, given the less strict listing criteria of this market relative to the Official 
List. IPO survival was approximately 10% worse for IPOs on AIM (Panel D) 
compared to the Official List (Panel C). Taking the approximate mid-point of the 
upper and lower bounds, survival rates for AIM IPOs deteriorated in 1999 and 
2000 to a level 15% and 5% respectively below the run-up years 1996 to 1998. 
Nevertheless, the survival of AIM IPOs in 1999-2000 was still substantially 
better than that of the 1928-29 IPOs.
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What was the survival experience of technology IPOs? Did those firms 
coming to market holding patents or undertaking R&D activity improve their 
chances of surviving other things being equal? Survival rates for technology 
IPOs in the second half of the twenties deteriorated substantially (Table 6-11, 
Panel A). On the broad patent definition (PAT2), only 35.7% of the 1928-29 
IPOs survived, much worse than the 58.5% survival rate of non-patent IPOs. In 
comparison to the twenties, the survival rates for technology IPOs in 1995-2000 
on all 3 definitions were better in both the run-up and in the hot years (Panel B). 
In addition, the decline in survival rates was modest, only 7% to 11% for ICT 
and R&D IPOs respectively. The same comparison for DOTCOM IPOs is of 
less use given the small number of DOTCOM IPOs in 1995-98.
In summary, a comparison of simple survival rates both for the overall 
market and for technology IPOs indicates a vastly better performance in 1999- 
2000 than in 1928-29 subject to the qualification that I may not have been able 
to account adequately for the more severe macro-economic conditions post- 
1929 compared to post-2000.
(ii) Survival analysis
An alternative analytical approach is duration or survival analysis. 
Rather than employing a simple dichotomous survival variable, I make use of 
the survival time of an IPO, defined as the length of time a firm survives post- 
IPO and a hazard regression model of survival times against firm characteristics 
at the time of IPO. This approach has the advantage of introducing a time 
dimension to the analysis of IPO survival. Survival or duration analysis has 
been widely employed in medicine and engineering. Kiefer (1988) has 
surveyed these models in the context of the duration of unemployment and 
Shumway (2001) has applied them to the study of corporate bankruptcy. Closer 
to my own research theme, Nicholas (2005) has used hazard regressions to 
analyse the survival of large quoted US firms post-1929 and Woo, Jeffrey and 
Lange (1995) analysed the survival of Australian IPOs debuting on the market 
between 1983 and 1988.
I calculate the survival time for each IPO defined as the shorter of the 
time to exit, equivalent to the number of months between the end of the first 
month of trading and the month of winding up or delisting for cause, and the
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time to censoring, 60 months in this case. I can now make use of survival times 
to plot Kaplan-Meier estimates of the cumulative survivor function.260 This 
function is a step function which describes the probability of an IPO surviving up 
to time t, where t in this case extends from 0 up to 60 months and steps down at 
each monthly interval when an IPO exits (Figures 6.4 and 6.5). A comparison 
of the estimated survivor functions for the two samples confirms that the 
probability of an IPO surviving is better for the period 1995-2000 than for 1925- 
29 over any period up to the time of censoring.
The rate of decline of the IPO survivor function measures the risk of an 
IPO exiting or delisting for cause at time t, conditional upon the firm surviving up 
to that time. This instantaneous exit rate is called the hazard function or rate. 
There is an inverse relationship between the two functions. A common model 
of hazard rates is the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model which assumes 
an exponential distribution and is of the form:
h(t/x) = h(t)exp(X1p 1+....+ X n f i n )
where h(t/x) is the hazard of IPO exit and X, are the explanatory variables and 
where i=1,...,n. Explanatory variables include firm size, firm age, and track 
record as well as dummy variables for underwriting, audited accounts, penny 
shares and technology activity, all observed at the time of IPO, or t=0.
The critical assumption made by the model is that of the proportionality of 
hazards for IPO sub-groups over time, or in other words, that the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the hazard of IPO exit is the same across each sub­
group at each time t. Given the tendency of the 1925-29 IPO sample to fall into 
two clusters, I need to test whether the same empirical model would apply to 
IPOs launched in the run-up and in the hot years. A proportional hazards test 
rejects this assumption in the case of 1925-29 but not in the case of 1995- 
2000.261 I therefore estimate the Cox model separately for the run-up period 
January 1925 to March 1928 and for the hot market April 1928 to September 
1929 (Tables 6.12 and 6.13), whilst estimating a single model for the whole of 
1995-2000 (Table 6-14).
260 Stata 7 Reference Q-St, p.389-390.
261 Stata 7 Reference Q-St, p.296-299. The test for proportional hazards is a test of whether 
the Schoenfeld residuals which is a diagnostic measure specific to the Cox model is 
independent of time. If they are not then the proportional hazards assumption does not apply.
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A coefficient with a value less than one implies a decrease in the hazard 
of IPO exit per unit change in the explanatory variable adjusting for the effects 
of all other explanatory variables in the model; any coefficient greater than one 
implies an increase in the hazard of exit. For example, in the run-up period, 
1925-1928 Q1, the hazard of exit decreases 60% for every £1 million increase 
in market capitalisation at IPO and 38% for each extra year of audited historic 
profits disclosed at the IPO evaluated at mean values (regression (1)). None of 
the regressions for this run-up period have much explanatory power.
During the 1928-29 hot market, the statistical significance of the 
regressions improves (Table 6-13). Audited financials disclosed in the 
prospectus (TRACK, AUDIT) lower the hazard of exit (regressions (10) and
(12)) but underwriting an IPO increases its hazard (regression (11)). Penny 
share IPOs had over twice the hazard of exit of non-penny IPOs confirming their 
highly speculative nature (regression (13)). Patent IPOs raised the hazard of 
exit by between 35% (regression (16)) and 90% (regression (15)) compared to 
IPOs without patents. These results were consistent whether market 
capitalisation or firm age was included as the control variable for firm risk. 
Finally, patent IPOs launched in 1929 as well as those in the last three quarters 
of 1928 had a higher hazard of exit than non-patent IPOs (regressions (21) and 
(23)). Harris’s analysis applied as much to 1929 as to 1928 IPOs.
What was the experience of the late nineties? I do not have data on 
patent ownership for this period and therefore make use of the R&D 
expenditure dummy (RD), given the mandatory disclosure of this item in 
company accounts where material, as well as the two technology industry 
dummy variables, ICT and DOTCOM. The only consistently statistically and 
economically significant coefficient in the regressions is that of the AIM dummy 
(Table 6-14). AIM IPOs suffered a hazard of exit between 46% and 56% 
greater than that of Official List IPOs controlling for firm size and firm age. The 
coefficients on RD suggest a lower hazard of exit for technology IPOs but this is 
not borne out in the cases of ICT and DOTCOM definitions of technology. None 
of these coefficients is statistically significant. There is no evidence to support 
technology, as defined here, either improving or hindering the survival 
prospects of an IPO in the late nineties.
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In general, the results of the Cox hazard regressions are consistent with 
the survival rate analysis. Investors in technology IPOs in 1999-2000 
experienced less downside risk than those of seventy years earlier.
6.6 Summary and Discussion
In both 1928-29 and 1999-2000 there were hot markets, in patent IPOs 
and internet IPOs, respectively. However, in their respective peak years the 
underpricing of the latter averaged 3.5x that of the former, excluding penny 
shares. Investors may have been prone to greater irrational exuberance at the 
end of the century than in the late twenties but it is far from clear whether this 
was the case. The presence of sophisticated institutional investors did mean 
greater investor heterogeneity at the end of the century than in the twenties. 
Recent empirical research points to both the emergence of a more complex 
objective function of issuing firms and the pivotal role played by today’s 
investment banks in the IPO process as contributing to the huge underpricing of 
1999-2000. Whatever the relative importance attached to these various 
explanations, collectively they appear to have more than outweighed the 
reforms and improvements in the IPO market discussed in chapter 2.
My results confirm the poor survival record of the 1928 IPO cohort 
commented on by contemporary observers. The 1929 cohort was just as bad. 
The poor performance was concentrated in patent IPOs. This evidence runs 
contrary to the findings of Nicholas (2005) in the same period for large 
seasoned US firms with intangible asset backing undertaking research and 
development. Few of the IPOs analysed here were doing research and 
development either because they had not yet organised that activity or simply 
chose not to disclose it in the prospectus. Company promoters, underwriters 
and entrepreneurs were most likely exploiting investor interest in patents in 
order to get IPOs away, however ill-conceived their business plans. This is 
consistent with the claim made by White (1990) that the increased participation 
of uninformed investors during the late twenties on Wall Street created a 
window of opportunity for issuing firms to exploit. The same events were set in 
train in London and repeated a pattern familiar to investors of the nineteenth 
century.
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Many of the 1928-29 IPOs were probably Foreman-Peck (1985)’s chaff 
rather than seed-corn. It is possible that some IPOs were well-conceived but 
simply failed due to intense product market competition. For example, seven 
new entrants into the rayon business had their IPOs between 1925 and 1929.262 
The dominant player in this new industry was Courtaulds which controlled the 
key patents on the viscose process by virtue of having acquired the British and 
American rights before 1913.263 Consequently, the patents held by the new 
entrants may therefore have been of little commercial value. Further 
examination of the nature and importance of the patents held by the 1925-29 
IPOs based on an analysis of raw patent counts and patent citations can help to 
winnow the IPO seed-corn from the chaff.
As argued in chapter 2, the fallout from the 1928-29 IPO boom prodded 
the LSE into more careful scrutiny of applications to list after 1929 and a 
tightening of listing requirements after 1945. I have tracked the improvement in 
5-year survival rates of the ordinary share IPO sample, described in chapter 3, 
through the thirties and up to 1948 (Figure 6-6). Given how strict listing 
requirements remained up to the establishment of the USM in 1980, I would 
fully expect that survival rates remained at these lofty levels with the possible 
exception of the 1970s. Unfortunately, this better IPO survival record was 
bought at the cost of denying younger firms early access to the stock market 
(Figure 3-6, chapter 3).
Consequent upon the establishment of the USM in 1980 and then of AIM 
in 1995, the supply curve of equity funding to British IPOs by investors shifted 
outwards in a similar way to that described by Fama and French (2004) in the 
case of the US after NASDAQ had started up. Seemingly, a balance had been 
struck between protecting the IPO investor from unacceptable downside risk, on 
the one hand, and providing young entrepreneurial firms adequate opportunity 
to access the equity market, on the other. However, the question still remained 
as to whether the relaxation of listing requirements would invite a plunge in IPO 
survival the next time there was a hot technology market. The results 
presented here suggest that this was not the case in 1999-2000. Dotcom and 
ICT IPOs of the late nineties had a much better survival record than patent
262 This excludes the Canadian Celanese IPO in April 1926 which was a subsidiary of American 
Viscose Corporation, itself part of the Courtaulds group.
263 Coleman (1977), p.90 and p.94-94
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stpcks of the late twenties subject to my inadequate control for the differing 
post-crash macro-economic backgrounds. Having been much worse than non­
technology IPOs in 1928-29, the hazard of exit of technology IPOs was no 
worse in 1999-2000. This would suggest that there was a material 
improvement in survival. Although reputable underwriters could neither avoid a 
surge in underpricing nor being partially enveloped by investor exuberance, 
they perhaps took their responsibilities more seriously when bringing a firm to 
the stock market than their counterparts in the twenties. This factor along with 
higher standards of accounting disclosure, notwithstanding the short track 
records, and tougher investor protection are likely contributors to this result.
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Table 6-1: UK and US First-Dav Returns 1995-2000
In addition to the 712 IPOs below I have data on a further 107 introductions for which first-day 
returns cannot be calculated. Loughran and Ritter’s data excludes “penny” IPOs defined as 
those with an offer price below $5.
UK IPOs UK IPOs US IPOs
LJUNGQVIST CHAMBERS LOUGHRAN &
RITTER
D1RET N D1RET N D1RET N
1991 12.9% 12 12.0% 274
1992 6.9% 25 10.2% 385
1993 13.4% 78 12.8% 484
1994 7.2% 120 9.8% 387
1995 16.1% 65 13.93% 68 21.5% 434
1996 13.5% 163 12.69% 159 16.7% 623
1997 12.2% 128 12.59% 129 14.0% 437
1998 18.6% 72 18.80% 65 22.2% 268
1999 88.7% 75 98.27% 69 71.7% 457
2000 64.8% 227 60.57% 222 56.1% 346
2001 15.2% 80 13.5% 80
2002 14.2% 63 8.9% 67
Total 1108 712 4242
Sources: Ljungqvist (2003), Table 1; Loughran and Ritter (2004), Table 1
Table 6-2: Minimum Listing Criteria 1995-2000
Minimum criteria Official List AIM Supplementary List 
1925-29
Market capitalisation Yes no no
Marketability 25% no no
Trading record 3yrs no no
Pre-vetting of prospectus Yes no* no
* No pre-vetting but role of the nominated adviser to the firm is critical in ensuring 
adequate disclosure.
Table 6-3: Descriptive Statistics of IPOs 1925-29
Panel A
PENNY PENNY NATRES NATRES RD RD PAT1 PAT1 PAT2 PAT2
N Obs. N O bs. %total NO bs. %total NO bs. %total N Obs. %total N O bs. %total
1925 71 20 28% 52 73% 1 1% 5 7% 5 7%
1926 31 3 10% 18 58% 1 3% 2 6% 4 13%
1927 50 1 2% 15 30% 0 0% 2 4% 2 4%
1928 122 33 27% 7 5% 8 7% 41 34% 57 47%
1929 73 20 27% 4 5% 5 7% 21 29% 27 37%
N Obs. 347 77 22% 96 28% 15 4% 71 20% 95 27%
Panel B
MCAP MCAP AGE AGE NAV NAV TRACK TRACK UW AUDITED
ACCOUNTS
N Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median %total %total
£000 £000 Yrs yrs £ £ yrs yrs
1925 71 494 185 13.7 6.0 264 188 0.6 0.0 61% 59%
1926 31 424 257 14.4 0.0 325 198 1.2 0.0 60% 55%
1927 50 438 221 17.8 3.0 520 371 1.1 0.0 60% 46%
1928 122 560 216 9.3 0.0 481 205 1.1 0.0 74% 42%
1929 73 413 193 8.3 0.0 293 161 1.2 0.0 70% 44%
N Obs. 347 347 347 316 316 187 187 347 347 340 347
missing 0 0 31 31 160 160 0 0 7 0
Panel C
ICT and DOTCOM IPOs are defined in Appendix 6.1
AIM AIM PENNY PENNY NATRES NATRES RD RD ICT ICT DOTCOM DOTCOM
N Obs. N O bs. %total N Obs. %total N Obs. %total NO bs. %total N O bs. %total N O bs. %total
1995 84 33 38% 1 1% 6 7% 12 14% 13 15% 1 1%
1996 182 110 59% 14 8% 3 2% 19 10% 43 24% 4 2%
1997 146 79 54% 11 8% 11 8% 13 9% 25 17% 1 1%
1998 82 38 46% 1 1% 5 6% 14 17% 18 22% 1 1%
1999 76 52 69% 5 7% 3 4% 15 20% 24 32% 16 21%
2000 243 176 72% 20 8% 10 4% 85 35% 75 31% 39 16%
N Obs. 813 485 60% 52 6% 38 5% 158 19% 198 24% 62 8%
Panel D
The firm age (AGE) and proportion of underwriting (UW) statistics are taken from Ljungqvist (2001), Table 1.
MCAP MCAP MCAP MCAP MCAP MCAP AGE AGE NAV NAV UW
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ALL ALL OL OL AIM AIM ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
N O bs. £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 yrs Yrs £000 £000 %total
1995 84 68,653 21,153 99,676 44,325 18,240 5,488 24.6 8.0 26,214 9,165 99%
1996 182 155,414 29,822 188,318 49,816 132,350 16,480 21.7 9.0 43,660 4,698 98%
1997 146 361,284 20,651 771,752 61,343 13,166 8,288 27.1 11.0 104,398 4,578 97%
1998 82 253,059 41,852 448,032 126,373 27,301 13,855 19.0 8.0 83,622 7,976 99%
1999 76 241,287 25,712 705,043 203,919 27,245 11,888 11.1 5.0 97,764 8,070 99%
2000 243 226,200 36,747 710,726 213,325 41,750 23,323 5.6 3.0 41,883 7,276 98%
N O bs. 813 813 813 330 330 484 484 730 730 809 809 730
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 12 12 -
TABLE 6-4: Correlation Matrix of IPO Characteristics
Panel A: 1925-29
The 318 observations exclude the 21 acquisitions and 8 IPOs whose survival could not be tracked. 7 IPOs do not disclose 
underwriting arrangements and 26 do not disclose age.
N=318 MCAP AGE TRACK AUDIT UW RD PAT1 PAT2 PENNY
MCAP 1
AGE 0.0078 1
TRACK 0.1106 0.526 1
AUDIT 0.0941 0.3745 0.4666 1
UW -0.0097 -0.0273 0.043 0.1848 1
RD 0.0184 -0.0037 -0.0358 -0.0203 0.0296 1
PAT1 -0.0036 -0.0964 -0.0917 -0.1347 0.1267 0.3376 1
PAT2 -0.0224 -0.1611 -0.148 -0.2258 0.1428 0.2766 0.8301 1
PENNY -0.134 -0.1559 -0.1297 -0.1664 0.086 -0.0075 0.2329 0.3157 1
Panel B: 1995-2000
N=589 MCAP NAV RD ICT DOTCOM AIM PENNY
MCAP
NAV
RD
ICT
DOTCOM
AIM
PENNY
1
0.1416 1
0.0444 0.0228 1
0.0009 0.0136 0.3432 1
-0.0112 0.0328 -0.0421 0.1157 1
-0.1903 -0.2028 -0.1941 -0.0679 0.1312 1
-0.0444 -0.053 -0.1226 -0.0982 0.0679 0.1624 1
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Table 6-5: Mean Initial Returns 1925-29
Initial returns are first-day returns with the exception of Penny shares which are partial first- 
month returns.
ALL ALL ALL ex 
PENNY
PENNY PAT1 PAT2 PAT1 ex 
PENNY
PAT2 ex 
PENNY
NON-PAT2 
ex PENNY
NObs D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET
1925 59 5.07% 7.37% 0.59% -9.29% -9.29% -9.29% -9.29% 8.76%
1926 23 3.20% 7.17% -23.26% 9.76% 9.76% 9.76% 9.76% 6.88%
1927 39 6.25% 6.53% -4.17% -12.41% -12.41% -12.41% -12.41% 7.04%
1928 108 28.50% 9.03% 72.77% 29.62% 30.43% 23.50% 18.02% 2.34%
1929 65 10.92% 16.57% -1.80% 20.86% 21.59% 35.48% 38.87% 4.26%
Total 294 294 217 77 66 86 43 54 163
Table 6-6: Mean Initial Returns 1991-2000
No R&D IPOs, 6 Information and Communications Technology 
Industry (ICT) IPOs and 8 Dotcom IPOs were penny shares.
Panel A
ALL
Obs
ALL
D1RET
ALL x 
PENNY  
D1RET
PENNY
D1RET
OFFICIAL
LIST
D1RET
AIM
D1RET
1995 66 13.93% 13.89% 16.67% 10.63% 23.45%
1996 159 12.69% 10.82% 32.08% 13.36% 12.14%
1997 129 12.59% 11.74% 21.67% 10.15% 14.84%
1998 65 18.80% 18.50% 37.50% 16.47% 21.35%
1999 67 98.27% 59.95% 573.44% 18.95% 137.04%
2000 225 60.36% 40.76% 261.27% 20.58% 75.83%
Total 711 710 659 52 302 409
Panel B
NONTECH are those IPOs not in the ICT or internet sectors.
RD ICT RD x ICT x DOTCOM DOTCOM NONTECH NONTECH
PENNY PENNY x PENNY x PENNY
D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET D1RET
1995 23.70% 28.57% 23.70% 28.57% 11.62% 11.53%
1996 17.60% 15.11% 17.60% 15.11% 7.14% 7.14% 11.93% 9.29%
1997 16.17% 14.31% 16.17% 12.87% 15.20% 15.20% 12.12% 11.41%
1998 21.40% 30.50% 21.40% 30.50% 180.00% 180.00% 14.65% 14.17%
1999 48.26% 60.66% 48.26% 62.63% 300.42% 140.94% 44.44% 45.02%
2000 41.81% 53.99% 41.98% 51.28% 155.46% 41.48% 33.22% 31.64%
Total 146 186 146 180 56 48 496 457
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Table 6-7: OLS Regressions of IPO Returns 1925-29
Dependent variable is first-day returns with exception of penny share returns 
which are partial first-month (see text). *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%  and 1% levels 
of significance respectively. The standard errors in brackets are calculated using 
White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent method. Time dummy variables are 
included.
i l l SSL J31 i l l ia
MCAP (£M) -0.0200 -0.0050 -0.0217 -0.0216* -0.0170
(0.0221) (0.0193) (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0151)
PENNY 0.2170* 0.1806 0.1727 0.1717
(0.1268) (0.1171) (0.1203) (0.1333)
UW -0.2053** -0.2049** -0.2092**
(0.1046) (0.1060) (0.1055)
MKTABILITY -0.4736*** -0.4675*** -0.2954**
(0.1524) (0.1566) (0.1509)
PAT1 -0.12434
(0.1367)
PAT 1 *HOT 0.187
(0.1814)
PAT2
PAT2*HOT
PAT2* MKTY
Y25 0.0613** -0.0202
(0.0289) (0.0558)
Y26 0.0425 0.0063
(0.0689) (0.0777)
Y27 0.0733 0.0596
(0.0450) (0.0460)
Y281 0.0829 0.0306
(0.0593) (0.0698)
Y282 0.3527* 0.3295*
(0.2056) (0.1910)
Y283 0.4006** 0.3504**
(0.1889) (0.1693)
Y284 0.2595** 0.1468
(0.1226) (0.1102)
Y291 0.1152 0.0518
(0.0964) (0.1064)
Y292 0.1617 0.0802
(0.1528) (0.1504)
Y293 -0.0998 -0.2146
(0.1794) (0.2313)
Adj R-sqd 0.70% 2.44%
NO bs 294 294
0.1302
(0.4808)
1.0579*** 
(0.2797) 
-1.6903*** 
(0.6333)
8.78%
289
7.99%
289
12.78%
289
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Table 6-8: OLS Regressions of IPO Returns 1995-2000
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%  and 1% levels of significance respectively. The 
standard errors in brackets are calculated using White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent method. Time dummy variables are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MCAP (£M) -0.0909*** -0.0748*** -0.0706** -0.0566**
(0.0321) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0259)
PENNY 1.4432** 1.2803** 1.2904** 1.1690**
(0.6913) (0.6541) (0.6561) (0.5933)
BVP 0.1145*** 0.1157*** 0.1107***
(0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0363)
MKTABILITY -0.0027**
(0.0013)
-0.0028**
(0.0013)
RD 0.2117***
(0.0572)
RD*HOT -0.3543
(0.2152)
ICT 0.2015***
(0.0590)
ICT*HOT -0.3587
(0.2430)
DOTCOM 0.3712
(0.2756)
DOTCOM *Y99 1.9291*
(1.1597)
DOTCOM*YOO 0.6732
(0.7863)
1995 0.1243***
(0.0311)
1996 0.0080
(0.0646)
1997 0.01772
(0.0652)
1998Q1 0.33362
(0.2785)
1998Q2 0.1386***
(0.0244)
1998Q3 0.0840***
(0.0257)
1998Q4 0.3291
(0.2306)
1999Q1 0.5188
(0.3288)
1999Q2 0.1059
(0.2264)
1999Q3 1.2042*** 
(0.4068)
2000 0.4924***
(0.1240)
Adj R-sqd 8.05% 13.12% 13.18% 18.20%
NO bs 712 708 708 710
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Table 6-9: Andrews’ Data on 5-Year Survival Rates 1919-29
Cohort is defined by the year of registration. The sample includes both IPOs and unquoted newly 
established private companies. Survival rate is the number of firms not wound up or struck off the
Companies Register at t + 5 years as a proportion of firms registered at t, where t=1919....... 1929.
Analogously survival rate to Dec-1934 is the proportion of firms surviving as of the end of 1934.
Cohort 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
5yr survival rate 81.0 86.3 77.8 86.4 100.0 81.5 74.4 80.0 85.0 63.5 61.4
(%)
Survival rate to na na na na 86.4 74.1 59.0 76.7 75.0 60.8 61.4
Dec-1934 (%) 
N Obs. 63 73 18 22 22 27 39 30 40 74 44
Source: Andrews (1937), p.507
Table 6-10: Survival Rates of IPOs 1925-29 and 1995-2000
The denominator of the upper and lower bound survival rates are all IPOs in the cohort at the 
time of origin and all IPOs less those acquired (M&A) within the defined period respectively.
Panel A: 1925-29
Cohort IPOs 
N Obs
Delisted 
for cause 
in 5yrs 
NO bs
M&A 
in 5yrs
NO bs
5-yr
Survival
Rate
Upper
5-yr
Survival
Rate
Lower
Survival 
rate to 
Dec-34 
Upper
Survival 
rate to 
Dec-34 
Lower
1925 71 7 7 90.1% 89.1% 84.5% 82.5%
1926 30 3 3 90.0% 88.9% 80.0% 76.9%
1927 49 11 3 77.6% 76.1% 73.5% 71.1%
1928 117 64 7 45.3% 41.8% 39.3% 35.5%
1929 72 35 1 51.4% 50.7% 48.6% 47.1%
1925-27 150 21 13 86.0% 84.7% 80.0% 77.6%
1928-29 189 99 8 47.6% 45.3% 42.9% 40.0%
total
missing
339
8
120 21 64.6% 62.3% 59.3% 56.1%
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Panel B: 5-vr Survival rates of all IPOs 1995-2000
Cohort IPOs
N O bs
Delisted 
for cause 
N O bs
M&A
N O bs
Survival
Rate
Upper
Survival
Rate
Lower
1995 84 9 24 89.3% 85.0%
1996 182 21 45 88.5% 84.7%
1997 146 17 27 88.4% 85.7%
1998 82 8 20 90.2% 87.1%
1999 76 15 13 80.3% 76.2%
2000 243 41 36 83.1% 80.2%
total 813 111 165 86.3% 82.9%
missing 0
Panel C: 5-vr Survival rates of Official List IPOs 1995-2000
Cohort IPOs
NO bs
Delisted 
for cause 
N O bs
M&A
N O bs
Survival
Rate
Upper
Survival
Rate
Lower
1995 52 0 18 100.0% 100.0%
1996 75 1 21 98.7% 98.1%
1997 67 5 14 92.5% 90.6%
1998 44 3 16 93.2% 89.3%
1999 24 1 3 95.8% 95.2%
2000 67 9 15 86.6% 82.7%
total 329 19 87 94.2% 92.1%
missing 0
Panel D: 5-vr Survival rates of AIM IPOs 1995-2000
IPOs
N O bs
Delisted 
for cause 
N O bs
M&A 
N Obs
Survival
Rate
Upper
Survival
rate
Lower
1995 32 8 6 75.0% 69.2%
1996 107 13 24 87.9% 84.3%
1997 79 11 13 86.1% 83.3%
1998 38 4 4 89.5% 88.2%
1999 52 14 10 73.1% 66.7%
2000 176 32 21 81.8% 79.4%
total 484 82 78 83.1% 79.8%
missing 0
Table 6-11: 5-Year Survival Rates of Technology IPOs 1925-29 and 1995-2000
Panel A: 1925-29
See text for definitions of technology, PAT1 and PAT2. Survival rate is the proportion of IPOs 
delisted for cause to all technology IPOs. Given the small number of acquisitions of PAT1 and 
PAT2 IPOs, I have not calculated the upper bound survival rate adjusting for these observations. 
NONPAT2 are those IPOs that did not own or have access to patents. This survival rate is the 
mid-point of he upper and lower bound estimates.
PAT1
IPOs
PAT1 
Delisted 
for cause
PAT1
M&A
PAT1
Survival
rate
PAT2
IPOs
PAT2 
Delisted 
for cause
PAT2
M&A
PAT2
Survival
Rate
NONPAT2
Survival
Rate
NObs NObs NObs %IPOs NObs NObs NObs %IPOs %IPOs
1925-27 9 3 0 66.7% 11 3 0 72.7% 86.5%
1928 41 26 2 36.6% 57 36 3 36.8% 55.5%
1929 21 12 0 42.9% 27 18 0 33.3% 62.6%
1928-29 62 38 2 38.7% 84 54 3 35.7% 58.5%
Total 71 41 2 42.3% 95 57 3 40.0% 74.0%
missing 0 1 7
Table 6-11: 5-Year Survival Rates of Technology IPOs 1925-29 and 1995-2000 (cont.)
Panel B: 1995-2000
R&D indicates those IPOs undertaking research and development expenditure at time of IPO. ICT denotes those IPOs in a technology industry and DOTCOM those 
IPOs that are pure internet firms (see Appendix 6.1). Survival rates are the mid-point of the upper and lower bound estimates. Given the small number of DOTCOM  
IPOs in 1995-98 I have only shown the aggregated figures.
R&D R&D R&D R&D ICT ICT ICT ICT DOTCOM DOTCOM DOTCOM DOTCOM
IPOs Delisted M&A Survival IPOs Delisted M&A Survival IPOs Delisted M&A Survival
for cause rate for cause rate for cause rate
N O bs N Obs N O bs %IPOs N O bs N O bs N O bs %IPOs N Obs N Obs N O bs %IPOs
1995 12 0 3 100.0% 13 2 3 82.3% 1 0 0
1996 19 1 5 93.8% 43 4 10 89.3% 4 0 0 -
1997 13 0 0 100.0% 26 3 3 87.7% 1 1 0 -
1998 14 1 2 92.3% 18 2 4 87.3% 1 0 1 -
1999 15 1 4 92.1% 24 4 6 80.6% 16 2 7 82.6%
2000 84 12 14 84.3% 74 13 10 81.1% 39 7 6 80.4%
1995-98 58 2 10 96.2% 100 11 20 87.6% 7 1 1 84.5%
1999-2000 99 13 18 85.4% 98 17 16 81.0% 55 9 13 81.1%
Total 157 15 28 89.4% 198 21 36 84.3% 62 10 14 81.5%
Table 6-12: Hazard Ratios of IPOs 1925-28Q1
The results below are from estimating a Cox Proportional model. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1 % levels of significance respectively. Lin and Wei 
(1989) robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MCAP (£Mil) 0.400 0.288 0.274 0.386 0.253 0.255 0.188
(0.351) (0.280) (0.256) (0.338) (0.238) (0.233) (0.217)
Age (no. yrs) 0.980
(0.014)
0.983
(0.014)
Track 0.620*
UW
(0.171)
1.664
Audit
(0.768)
0.946
Penny
Pat1
(0.381)
2.041
(0.954)
2.193 2.901*
Pat2
(1.355)
1.815
(1.121)
(1.848)
1.803
(1.132)
No IPOs 150 146 150 150 150 150 150 128 128
No failures 25 23 25 25 25 25 25 20 20
Log-likelihood -118.160 -110.77 -121.16 -120.11 -120.51 -120.77 -119.95 -93.45 -94.17
Table 6-13: Hazard Ratios of IPOs 1928Q2-29
The results below are from estimating a Cox Proportional model. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. Lin and Wei (1989) robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets.
Period
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
1928
(21)
1929
(22)
1928
(23)
1929
MCAP 0.274*** 0.238*** 0.256*** 0.378*** 0.256*** 0.277*** 0.382*** 0.483* 0.107**
(£Mil) (0.102) (0.097) (0.099) (0.142) (0.102) (0.109) (0.138) (0.200) (0.023)
Age 0.961 0.965*“ 0.991 0.968** 0.957*
(no. yrs) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.129) (0.024)
Track 0.762*** 0.764*” 0.808“
(0.060) (0.062) (0.085)
UW 1.584* 1.542 1.701”
(0.424) (0.416) (0.471)
Audit 0.630**
(0.139)
Penny 2.304*** 1.865*** 2.356*“
(0.517) (0.420) (0.513)
Pat1 1.501** 1.355
(0.316) (0.287)
Pat2 1.901*“ 1.654“ 1.357 1.39 1.700** 2.103" 1.421 1.813*
(0.398) (0.354) (0.291) (0.300) (0.455) (0.720) (0.381) (0.646)
No IPOs 168 165 168 168 168 168 164 164 164 164 97 95 71 69
No exits 95 095 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 60 60 35 34
Log-
likelihood -433.4 -437.6 -439.7 -435.3 -437.2 -440.2 -435.6 -433.7 -422.6 -420.8 -244.5 -242.0 -128.4 -126.3
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Table 6-14: Hazard Ratios of IPOs 1995-2000
The results below are from estimating a Cox Proportional model. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%  
and 1 % levels of significance respectively. Lin and Wei (1989) robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. NAV's were unavailable for 16 IPOs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MCAP (£M) 0.9994* 0.9994* 0.9994*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
NAV (£M) 0.9971* 0.9969** 0.9969**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
AIM 1.4572* 1.4813* 1.5175* 1.5625** 1.5071* 1.5588**
(0.3118) (0.3135) (0.3293) (0.3322) (0.3331) (0.3383)
RD 0.6795 0.6699
(0.1891) (0.1862)
ICT 1.0651 1.1122
(0.2278) (0.2401)
DOTCOM 1.0623 0.9874
(0.3640) (0.3587)
No IPOs 589 573 589 573 589 573
No exits 111 107 92 90 111 107
Log Likelihood -691.35 -664.10 -692.35 -665.09 -692.37 -665.21
Figure 6-1: British and US Stock Market Indices Dec 1921 -  Sep 1939 (Dec 1921=100)
BMI is the Variable Securities Values Index of the Bankers Magazine from inception in Dec 1921 to Dec 1934. This is spliced with the FT30 Index from 1-Jan- 
1935.
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Figure 6-2 British and US Stock Market Indices Dec1989 -  Dec 2004 (Dec1989=100)
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Figure 6-3: Comparison of First-day Returns of UK IPOs 1920-31 and 1991-2002 and US IPOs 1991-2002
The returns for 1920-31 is Chambers data; those for 1991-2002 are from Ljungqvist (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), reproduced in Table 6.1. T=1920 and 
1991 respectively.
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Figure 6-4: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function of IPOs 1925-29
The y axis is the probability of surviving up to time t; the x axis is survival or analysis time 
expressed in months.
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Figure 6-5: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function of IPOs 1995-2000
The y axis is the probability of surviving up to time t; the x axis is survival or analysis time 
expressed in months.
Kaplan-M eier survival estim ate
—I
N  -
40 6020
analysis time
214
Figure 6-6: 5-Year IPO Survival Rates 1919-48
The 8 IPOs during WW2 are excluded.
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Appendix 6-1: Technology IPOs 1995-2000
Among the Financial Times Actuaries industry classifications used by the LSE 
to categorise IPOs between 1995-2000, those listed in the table below make up 
the Information and Communications Technology sector (ICT) and following 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) exclude pharmaceuticals (370 and 480) and 
medical equipment and supplies (446). The FTA internet industry only captures 
23 IPOs. I therefore default to an alternative definition of internet IPOs 
(DOTCOM) made up of those IPOs classified by the LSE on their website as 
internet or e-commerce companies supplemented by those with a “.com” or “E-“ 
extension to their names and classified by the LSE in other industries but whose 
locus of business appeared to be internet-related based on a company news 
search. The definition of a Dotcom company employed here is a relatively pure 
one and excludes those ICT companies, part of whose hardware or software 
business catered to the demand for internet-related products and services. 
Consequently, there is relatively little overlap between DOTCOM and ICT.
Industry Code No. IPOs
Electronic Equipment 253 19
Information Technology 487 0
Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 673 19
Wireless Telecommunications Services 678 4
Computer Hardware 932 10
Semiconductors 936 6
Telecommunications Equipment 938 8
Computer Services 972 33
Internet 974 23
Software 977 76
Sub-total 198
Pharmaceuticals 370, 480 31
Medical equipment and supplies 446 11
Sub-total 42
Total 238
216
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The major contributions of this thesis are the assembly of a new data set 
of IPOs on the LSE spanning the period 1915-79 and the analysis of IPO 
underpricing up to the point at which modern IPO studies take over. The main 
two questions addressed regarding underpricing are: what was IPO 
underpricing experience before 1959?; and did the improvements in IPO 
regulation, financial disclosure, investor protection and underwriting in the last 
half century deliver the lower level of average underpricing that I would have 
expected? I also isolated the two most notable episodes of investor 
exuberance over technology, namely, the 1920s and 1990s, in order to examine 
whether there was any improvement in IPO underpricing and IPO survival given 
the institutional reforms in the intervening period.
The surprising finding is that underpricing was lower from 1915 through to 
the early 1950s than it became afterwards, controlling for shifting risk 
composition, issue method and IPO characteristics such as marketability and 
whether or not the IPO was underwritten. Extending the definition of 
underpricing beyond the first day of trading does not affect this result. Neither 
does adjusting the initial return for market movement between price-setting and 
initial trading, although I am only able to make this adjustment starting in 1935.
What did this mean for issuing firms? Excluding tender offers, which were 
more tightly priced, and the privatisations of the 1980s, which were not 
concerned solely with the maximisation of issue proceeds, the 2436 ordinary 
share IPOs up to 1986 left £2.5 billion at 2004 prices, or approximately 10% of 
their real gross proceeds, on the table. Three-quarters of this sum fell into the 
period after the mid-1950s. Based on the most recent empirical study of the 
period since 1991 the underpricing problem has become worse, both in 
percentage terms and in money terms. 1108 IPOs raised £14 billion, or 27% 
less than what they might have done in the absence of underpricing.264
Of course, underpricing may have occurred elsewhere in the IPO market 
before the mid-1950s. Preference share IPOs, which were as common as 
ordinary share IPOs in the interwar years, may have experienced more 
underpricing. Yet, the evidence presented on dual share IPOs is that
264 Ljungqvist (2003), p.38, Table 1. I estimated money left on the table by multiplying mean 
underpricing and real gross proceeds for each year.
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preference shares were not underpriced at all. This result could simply be a 
peculiar feature of this type of IPO and the discovery of the underpricing of 
preference share only IPOs forms part of my future research. Placings are 
another possibility. The 83 placings in the interwar data set were certainly 
underpriced much more - by approximately 30%. Although there were another 
471 placings, for which I could not estimate the degree of underpricing, the 
likelihood is that there was considerable underpricing occurring in placings. 
However, this issue method, as employed at that time, was never intended as a 
means of securing the best price for an issuing firm. As such, this finding with 
respect to placings does not alter the fact that there was only very modest 
underpricing of the 674 IPOs which did pursue the much more transparent 
public offer method between 1917 and 1954 by comparison with the modem 
period.
What might account for this puzzling finding? The low level of explanatory 
power of the linear model proposed in chapter 4 leaves the field quite open. 
However, there are four particularly plausible hypotheses which have emerged 
from this thesis. The first is the investment bank monopsony hypothesis 
considered in chapter 5. According to this hypothesis, the issuing houses 
dominated IPO underwriting once they had organised themselves into the 
Issuing Houses Association (IHA) in 1945 and, rather than lending their good 
names for the direct benefit of issuing firms, effectively operated as a cartel 
happy to underprice IPOs as an effort minimisation strategy. The IHA may have 
been a cartel. Although it had a large membership with no dominant group, 
there was only a trickle of new entrants into the IHA throughout the period to fill 
vacancies that arose as firms merged and none of these entrants sought to 
compete aggressively for market share. In the period 1945-79, there was, at 
the very minimum, a definite lack of competition in the IPO underwriting market. 
The collective failure of the issuing houses to implement the tender offer 
method more aggressively than they did is compelling evidence of this lack of 
competition. Only when the threat of entry from the leading US investment 
banks familiar with bookbuilding techniques emerged in the mid-1980s did 
innovation finally take place. I estimate that the failure to adopt the tender 
method fully after it first appeared in 1961 cost issuing firms approximately £1.2 
billion in forgone proceeds up to 1986 in 2004 prices. Notwithstanding this
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finding, econometric evidence of issuing house reputation either lowering or 
exacerbating underpricing of public offers was inconclusive.
A second possible explanation is the provincial competition hypothesis. 
The claim is that a combination of competition for IPO business from the 
Provincial Stock Exchanges and of greater levels of trust existing between 
issuing firms, issuing houses and brokers, and investors all local to these 
exchanges contributed to lower underpricing in the first half of the last century. 
In the second half, these exchanges were increasingly falling into line with LSE 
regulatory practice, first regionalising in 1965 and finally merging with London in 
1973. The preliminary indications from a simple test of this hypothesis provide 
little or no empirical support. I included in the linear underpricing model, tested 
in chapter 4, dummy variables for those 326 IPOs in the data set listing on both 
a Provincial Stock Exchange and the LSE. Whilst significantly lower pricing was 
apparent in the smaller markets of Sheffield and Nottingham, the opposite result 
was found in Birmingham, whilst Manchester and Liverpool showed no 
tendency to underprice either more or less than London.
A further possibility is the ownership and control hypothesis of Brennan 
and Franks (1997). They claimed that underpricing was a deliberate strategy by 
non-selling managers of issuing firms to spread ownership at the time of IPO as 
widely as possible thereby retaining control of the firm whilst obtaining the 
benefits of a listing. Whilst this strategy was unnecessary prior to 1948 since 
the threat of takeover was minimal, it held increasing appeal after the 
Companies Act of that year improved financial disclosure for corporate 
bidders.265 It is possible that as the threat of hostile takeovers became real 
through the following decade thanks to corporate raiders such as Charles Clore, 
managers and their advisers came to appreciate rather more than previously 
the advantages of a diversified shareholder register at which point underpricing 
started to rise.
One final explanation for the lack of underpricing concerns the winner’s 
curse. In the first half of the last century, investors were relatively 
homogeneous and consequently Rock’s winner’s curse was not as pronounced 
as in later years. Institutional investors did not raise their ownership of UK 
equities above that of private individuals until 1975. With institutional
265 Hannah (1974); (1983), p.149.
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investment still in its developmental stage during the interwar period and private 
investors accounting for around 80% of LSE trading volume, the information 
gaps between investors had not yet become very wide. Consequently, the 
winner’s curse may have been less of a problem than it became in the second 
half of the 20th century as equity investment by financial institutions gathered 
momentum.
Each of these hypotheses provides me with an agenda for post-doctoral 
research. The provincial competition hypothesis can be explored by analysing 
the behaviour of IPO underpricing on one of the major Provincial exchanges, 
Birmingham, Liverpool or Manchester, through the interwar years up until the 
effective merger with the LSE. The testing of the ownership and control 
hypothesis requires details of the allocation scheme employed by issuers and 
their advisers in the case of oversubscribed IPOs as well as detailed share 
ownership both pre- and post-IPO. Whilst the latter information is available 
through Companies House, the former may be more problematic. I expect 
some information to be available through a combination of financial press 
comment, issuing house archives and individual company applications filed with 
the LSE and now held at the Guildhall Library. Finally, examination of the 
winner’s curse requires data on the size of applications for IPO shares and 
again the basis of allocation employed by the issuing house. The assumption is 
that the larger the application, the more sophisticated is the investor, something 
which may also require closer examination for the interwar period.
The other underpricing question to which I gave consideration was how 
well the IPO market performed judged by underpricing during the two major 
technology bubbles of the last century. Underpricing of the 1999-2000 internet 
and ICT IPOs was substantially more than that of the 1928-29 patent IPOs. 
This is probably attributable to a combination of greater investor heterogeneity 
and the greater complexity of agency conflicts between issuing firms and their 
investment banking advisers post-Big Bang compared to the interwar period. 
Whilst the London market did not engage in the spinning of IPOs witnessed in 
the US in the late 1990s, it is possible that the investment banks saw the 
exuberance of retail investors for dotcom IPOs as an opportunity to underprice 
and generate initial returns for their favoured institutional clients in exchange for 
other streams of securities business. Issuing firms were happy enough to go 
along with the heavier underpricing in exchange for the research coverage of a
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leading investment bank. These considerations did not exist two generations 
earlier.
How well did the stock market serve issuing firms approaching public 
investors for the first time? The attraction of underpricing as one means of 
addressing this question lies in the stability of the underlying fixed offer price 
regime over the period of this study. In contrast, as Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and 
Wilhelm (2003) have argued, the advent of the bookbuilding method since the 
early 1990s in non-US markets, including the UK, alongside the traditional fixed 
price method has provided issuing firms with a menu of issuing possibilities and 
an underpricing/direct cost trade off which was not previously available to 
issuing firms. Although direct costs fell between the 1920s and the Merrett, 
Howe and Newbould study of the 1960s, underpricing did not. Furthermore, in 
the hottest markets, underpricing in 1999-2000 surged well above the levels 
witnessed in 1928-29.
These findings together with the missed opportunity of the tender offer and 
the lack of access to public equity markets for young entrepreneurial firms, 
effectively blocked by LSE regulation until 1980, support the case for capital 
market failure after 1945. In contrast, interwar underpricing provides an 
instance of the stock market not doing too badly by industry in the first half of 
the 20th century. The robustness of this claim would be strengthened by 
establishing the level of pre-1915 IPO underpricing, a further avenue down 
which my postdoctoral research can proceed. It appears that Lavington (1921), 
Henderson (1951), Grant (1967) and Thomas had been correct to focus on the 
direct costs of new issues and to exclude any consideration of underpricing. 
Criticism by the Macmillan Committee of small firm finance was in one sense 
wide of the mark since there was no apparent size effect operating in IPO 
underpricing in the interwar years.
Yet, such sanguine conclusions must be tempered by the evidence on IPO 
survival in the post-1929 period presented in the last chapter. My findings 
support those of Harris (1933) and Andrews (1937) and extend them by drawing 
a comparison with IPO survival post-2000. Subject to not being able to control 
adequately for the post-1929 economic downturn, survival of 1928-29 IPOs was 
poor compared to those of 1999-2000. Only 46% of the 1928-29 IPOs reached 
their fifth birthday as a quoted firm compared to 80% for 1999-2000 IPOs (Table 
6-10, Panels A and B). The stock market of the 1920s clearly failed to provide
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investors with suitable candidates for investment, and, in addition, failed issuing 
firms in the longer-term by tainting the reputation of the LSE and heightening 
investor risk aversion. The Macmillan Committee’s criticism regarding an 
absence of reputable underwriters was fully justified.
The margin of the rise in IPO survival rates therefore suggests a material 
improvement in the performance of the IPO market on this measure and 
provides a preliminary indication that improved access for younger firms since 
1980 has been provided without exposing investors to unacceptable downside 
risk. Whilst more reputable underwriting, improved disclosure and regulation, 
and better investor protection did not appear to benefit underpricing, it does 
appear to have benefited IPO survival. The robustness of this result can be 
tested by the estimation of long-run total return performance of IPOs relative to 
a peer group. Whilst the preliminary analysis of Harris (1933) would suggest 
otherwise, it at least remains a possibility that on a total return basis the 1928- 
29 IPO cohort fared better than the 1999-2000 IPO cohort because the 
survivors performed particularly well.
I shall make one last observation on the capital market failure debate 
concerning the financing of innovative firms and the Kennedy (1987, 2000) 
claims that such firms faced particular problems posed by unduly large 
information gaps. I have only touched upon this question in this thesis. Apart 
from definitional considerations, the main difficulty is presented by the fact that 
only 7% of my IPO sample was engaged in any R&D activity at the time of IPO 
as disclosed in the prospectus. I have attempted to contribute to this debate by 
examining those episodes when investors have become especially interested in 
technology investments, the late 1920s and 1990s are two such episodes, and 
establishing how underpricing and survival of such firms relative to non­
technology firms has changed. We are again faced with the curate’s egg. 
Underpricing of dotcom IPOs in 1999-2000 exceeded the levels experienced by 
patent IPOs in 1928-29, but survival of the former was better than the latter. 
Furthermore, hazard regressions showed technology assets did not increase 
the risk of exit post-2000, whereas patents did do so post-1929.
An important question touched upon in this thesis is whether better 
regulation, disclosure and investor protection benefit the development of stock 
markets. LLSV (1997, 1998) argue that laws matter for financial development. 
Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) counter-claim that laws did not matter in the
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British case since companies were active issuers of publicly traded securities in 
the first half of the last century despite weak regulation, disclosure and 
protection. This result is based upon a relatively small sample of firms. In this 
study, I have asked whether laws mattered for the IPO market. I tested whether 
regulation, disclosure and investor protection narrowed information gaps and 
lowered underpricing by comparing underpricing in a “strong” state of the world 
(post-1948) with that in “weak” one (the interwar years). This test ultimately 
lacks precision, not least because there are likely to be other influences on 
underpricing of which I have not taken account. Therefore, whilst the behaviour 
of underpricing is a puzzle, this puzzle may not represent a further refutation of 
LLSV. In future research, I need to consider applying the event study 
methodology to underpricing and survival, taking the 1948 Companies Act as 
the event.
In conclusion, was the LSE doing a better job for firms seeking a listing at 
the end of the century than in the interwar years? Purely on the underpricing 
measure the answer appears to be no, despite the improvements in regulation, 
disclosure and investor protection in the second half of the century. Reputable 
underwriting did not appear to help issuing firms and issuing houses appeared 
comfortable with the fixed offer price regime. In contrast, the IPO survival story 
provides us with the possibility of ending on a more optimistic note. Ultimately, 
however, an attempt at a complete answer to this question needs to incorporate 
a consideration of long-run IPO performance and the IPO cycle. These are 
large questions which lie beyond the boundaries of this thesis.
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